Noah N. v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 11 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | SJC-13200 |
| Citation | 489 Mass. 498,184 N.E.3d 784 |
| Parties | NOAH N., a juvenile v. COMMONWEALTH. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Caroline I. Alpert, for the juvenile.
Brooke Hartley, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Sarah Spofford, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.
The issue before the court is under what circumstances, if any, a judge presiding over a juvenile delinquency proceeding may grant a continuance sought by the Commonwealth for the express purpose of delaying resolution of the case past the juvenile's eighteenth birthday. The age of a juvenile on the date of his or her case's disposition is significant: under G. L. c. 119, § 58 ( § 58 ), a delinquent juvenile who is then seventeen or younger may be committed to the custody of the Department of Youth Services (DYS) only until he or she turns eighteen, but a juvenile whose case is disposed of after his or her eighteenth birthday can be committed until he or she turns nineteen. In the instant case, where the motion judge granted such a continuance, it was potentially the difference between twenty days and twelve months in DYS custody.
We conclude that § 58 and Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a) (1), 378 Mass. 861 (1979), tightly constrain the allowance of continuances for the sole purpose of extending the time of commitment. We further conclude that such continuances are authorized only if there is clear and convincing evidence that continued commitment is necessary for the rehabilitation of the juvenile, and express findings are made to that effect after an evidentiary hearing. Absent such findings, allowance of such a continuance is an abuse of discretion. As we have no such findings in the instant case, and the juvenile has now turned eighteen, we reverse the judge's order.1
Background. The facts in this case are undisputed. On March 22, 2021, the juvenile was arraigned in the Juvenile Court on the charge of assault and battery on a family or household member, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a ). The complainant alleged that the juvenile, who was seventeen at the time, had punched and bit her.
On August 4, 2021, the juvenile filed a tender of plea or admission and waiver of rights form and a written request for a hearing. In an August 11 filing, the Commonwealth requested a continuance of the change of plea hearing for the express purpose of delaying the case's disposition until after the juvenile's eighteenth birthday, which was in September. After a hearing and over the juvenile's objection, the Juvenile Court judge granted the continuance on August 13 without providing her reasons for doing so.2
Accordingly, the juvenile's eighteenth birthday passed without his plea being tendered. He petitioned for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and the single justice reserved and reported the petition to the full court.
Discussion. In general, we review the decision to grant a continuance for abuse of discretion. See Vazquez Diaz v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 336, 344, 167 N.E.3d 822 (2021). In deciding whether a continuance was properly allowed here to extend the time of commitment for a juvenile beyond his eighteenth birthday, we must, however, consider both the statutory requirements of G. L. c. 119, § 58, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a) (1). Further informing our analysis, in interpreting the juvenile justice statutes and rules of procedure, we have also long recognized that rehabilitation, not punishment, is the overriding purpose of the juvenile justice system. Commonwealth v. Ulani U., 487 Mass. 203, 207, 166 N.E.3d 430 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 576, 998 N.E.2d 1003 (2013) (). See generally R.L. Ireland, Juvenile Law § 1.3 (2d ed. 2006). Children brought before the court are to "be treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance." G. L. c. 119, § 53. Finally, where the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system are served, we have been particularly receptive to the exercise of judicial discretion. See, e.g., Humberto H., supra at 575-576, 998 N.E.2d 1003 (); Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 467, 961 N.E.2d 581 (2012) (). With these guiding principles in mind, we turn to the relevant specific statutory language and the rule of criminal procedure governing continuances.
1. G. L. c. 119, § 58. Section 58 states, in pertinent part:
"If a child is adjudicated a delinquent child on a complaint, the court ... may commit him [or her] to the custody of the department of youth services, but the ... commitment period shall not be for a period longer than until such child attains the age of eighteen, or nineteen in the case of a child whose case is disposed of after he [or she] has attained his [or her] eighteenth birthday or age [twenty] in the case of a child whose case is disposed of after he [or she] has attained his [or her] nineteenth birthday."
In the juvenile's view, because he sought to tender a plea when he was seventeen, he should benefit from the statute's limit that any commitment to DYS end by age eighteen. Thus, he contends, the grant of a continuance sought for the purpose of committing him until age nineteen was contrary to law.
By its express terms, the statute reflects the Legislature's intention that commitment of a juvenile to the custody of DYS will end when the juvenile attains the age of eighteen. The exception is when the delinquency proceeding is not disposed of until after the juvenile's eighteenth birthday. In these circumstances, apparently recognizing the requirements of an orderly judicial process and the possibility of the need for continuing commitment and rehabilitation, the Legislature allowed commitment, and thus rehabilitation, to continue until the juvenile's nineteenth birthday.3 This provision for the extension of the time of commitment was both mindful and respectful of the judicial process and the statute's rehabilitative purposes.
The Legislature did not, however, expressly address continuances in § 58. This is understandable, as continuances are an ordinary aspect of an orderly judicial process. If a case is continued for reasons related to the judicial process and unrelated to extending the time of commitment, then the statutory requirements for extending such time of commitment are clearly met. Allowing continuances for the sole purpose of extending the commitment period are, however, different. Such continuances, if they do not otherwise serve the purposes of the judicial process, intrude on the Legislature's authority to set limits on the time of commitment. Allowing continuances for this reason alone raises the question whether the statutory language regarding disposal of cases is being manipulated to extend the time of commitment beyond what the Legislature intended. Cf. Ulla U. v. Commonwealth, 485 Mass. 219, 224-225, 149 N.E.3d 713 (2020) (). Further complicating matters is the difficulty of discerning what the Legislature intended regarding continuances when a juvenile's case would ordinarily be disposed of shortly before his or her eighteenth birthday, but the juvenile's rehabilitation could not be accomplished without further need of services requiring an extended commitment.
Before resolving this issue, we address the additional requirements of Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a), which governs continuances.
2. Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a). The rules of criminal procedure permit continuances "only when based upon cause and only when necessary to insure that the interests of justice are served."4 Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a) (1). In most cases, "cause" refers to reasons related to the orderly processing of cases. See, e.g., Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a) (2), 378 Mass. 861 (1979) (...
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