Connecticut Ass'n of Boards of Educ., Inc. v. Shedd

• Decision Date: 22 October 1985
• Citation: 499 A.2d 797,197 Conn. 554
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 28 Ed. Law Rep. 499 The CONNECTICUT ASSOCIATION OF BOARDS OF EDUCATION, INC., et al. v. Mark R. SHEDD, Commissioner of Education, et al.

Page 797

499 A.2d 797

197 Conn. 554, 28 Ed. Law Rep. 499

The CONNECTICUT ASSOCIATION OF BOARDS OF EDUCATION, INC., et al. v. Mark R. SHEDD, Commissioner of Education, et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 9, 1985.

Decided Oct. 22, 1985.

William J. Dolan, Hartford, with whom, on brief, were Ronald Cordilico and Constance Augsburger, Hartford, for appellee (defendant Connecticut Educ. Assn).

Joel M. Ellis, Glastonbury, with whom, on brief, was William S. Zeman, West Hartford, for appellees (defendant Connecticut State Council of AFSA Locals et al.).

George C. Hastings, Timothy S. Hollister and Patricia A. Ayars, Hartford, filed a brief as amici curiae.

Ralph G. Elliot, Hartford, for appellants (named plaintiff et al.). ^*

Thomas P. Clifford III, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on brief, were Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., and Robert W. Garvey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees (named defendant et al.).

Before HEALEY, SHEA, DANNEHY, SANTANIELLO and CALLAHAN, JJ.

SANTANIELLO, Associate Justice.

These consolidated appeals are from a judgment that upheld the constitutionality of Public Acts 1979, No. 79-405, "An Act Concerning Last Best Offer Binding Arbitration For Teacher Contract Disputes," (the act). The original plaintiffs in this action were the town of West Hartford and its duly elected council members; the West Hartford board of education and its duly elected members; Leslie M. Gravlin and Kimberly Cheney, residents, electors and taxpayers of the town of West Hartford; John McGavack, Jr., a resident, elector and taxpayer of the town of Madison; and also the superintendent of schools of the town of Madison, the Manchester board of education and its duly elected members, the Trumbull board of education and its duly elected members, and the Connecticut Association of Boards of Education, Inc. (CABE). Subsequently, the town of Weston and the town of Montville intervened as parties plaintiff. The defendant commissioner of education, Mark R. Shedd, filed a motion to dismiss the action as to all the plaintiffs, alleging that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter because the plaintiffs had failed to allege facts establishing that they had standing to seek an adjudication of the issues raised. The court, Flanagan, J., denied the motion to dismiss as to all parties except for Leslie M. Gavlin, Kimberly Cheney and John McGavack, Jr., with respect to whom the motion to dismiss was granted.

Public Acts 1979, No. 79-405 amended General Statutes § 10-153f, the subject matter of which is the mediation and arbitration of disagreements arising during the course of collective bargaining between local or regional boards of education and school administrators and teachers. The act established within the state department of education a fifteen person arbitration panel composed of members appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the General Assembly. The act authorizes members of the arbitration panel, in groups of three, to hear all issues on which the parties to arbitration disagree, and to render a written decision on each issue, accepting the last best offer of one party or the other, as those last best offers have been submitted by the parties to the arbitrators. The act further provides that the decision of the arbitrators is final and binding upon the parties and is not subject to rejection by the legislative body of the local or regional school district or by referendum.

The original plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment to determine whether the act violated article first, §§ 2 and 8, article second, article third, § 1, or article tenth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution, as well as § 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. They further sought relief by way of declaratory judgment to determine: (1) the impact of the Home Rule Act, chapter 99 of the General Statutes, on the act; (2) the effective date of the act in light of General Statutes § 2-32a; (3) the meaning of the phrase "legislative body of the local or regional school district"; and (4) whether the decision of the arbitrators would be subject to amendment or acceptance with conditions set by the legislative body of the school district.

The defendants filed appropriate answers and claimed by way of special defenses that: (1) the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this action; (2) the complaint failed to set forth a justiciable controversy; (3) the plaintiffs should be left to seek redress by some other form of procedure; and (4) the plaintiffs failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.

Although these consolidated appeals raise the issue of the constitutionality of Public Acts 1979, No. 79-405, we find that the plaintiffs do not have standing to maintain this action. ¹ If no standing exists, this court lacks jurisdiction to decide the appeal on its merits. The individual plaintiffs Galvin, Cheney and McGavack, Jr., have not appealed from the order of the trial court dismissing them as plaintiffs in this action. It is, therefore, unnecessary to discuss their claims of standing. The remaining plaintiffs can be classified into two distinct groups, namely, (1) the towns and the West Hartford town council, and (2) the boards of education (including CABE). We shall discuss each group's status separately.

I

We first consider whether the towns of West Hartford, Weston, Montville and the West Hartford town council have standing to maintain this action. The town of West Hartford and the West Hartford town council were original plaintiffs, whereas the towns of Weston and Montville were later allowed to intervene as parties plaintiff. The towns allege that they are municipal corporations of the state of Connecticut, having as their organic law a charter in accordance with the provisions of the Home Rule Act and article tenth of the Connecticut constitution. They claim that the act deprives the residents, electors and taxpayers of the town of their right to be governed by persons chosen by and responsible to them. They further assert that the act interferes with their constitutionally protected home rule rights and deprives the municipalities, their residents, electors and taxpayers of the right to establish and maintain their local fiscal authority. They allege that the act gives the arbitrators the power and authority to make fiscal decisions which have a profound effect on the local budgetary process in violation of the home rule provisions of the Connecticut constitution. The plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment ruling the act unconstitutional. It is a basic principle of our law, however, that the plaintiffs must have standing in order for a court to have jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment. Berlin v. Santaguida, 181 Conn. 421, 423, 435 A.2d 980 (1980); McGee v. Dunnigan, 138 Conn. 263, 267-68, 83 A.2d 491 (1951).

"The 'fundamental aspect of standing ... [is that] it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before [the] court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.' Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 [1968]." Hartford Kosher Caterers, Inc. v. Gazda, 165 Conn. 478, 485, 338 A.2d 497 (1973). "When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue and not whether the controversy is otherwise justiciable, or whether, on the merits, the plaintiff has a legally protected interest that the defendant's action has invaded." Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 492, 400 A.2d 726 (1978).

With regard to the plaintiff municipalities, "[i]t has been recognized as a general rule that '[t]owns ... are creatures of the state, and though they may question the interpretation, they cannot challenge the legality, of legislation enacted by their creator. New Haven v. New Haven Water Co., 132 Conn. 496, 513, 45 A.2d 831 [1946]; Sanger v. Bridgeport, 124 Conn. 183, 188, 198 A. 746 [1938].' Waterford v. Connecticut State Board of Education, 148 Conn. 238, 245, 169 A.2d 891 [1961]; Windsor v. Windsor Police Department Employees' Assn., Inc., 154 Conn. 530, 539, 227 A.2d 65 [1967]. An exception to this rule has been carved out to allow a municipality, adversely affected by a statute, which is properly in court on a nonconstitutional question to challenge the constitutionality of that statute. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Norwalk, 179 Conn. 111, 425 A.2d 576 [1979]; Hillier v. East Hartford, 167 Conn. 100, 355 A.2d 1 [1974]; Tough v. Ives, 162 Conn. 274, 294 A.2d 67 [1972]; Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 285 A.2d 318 [1971]." Berlin v. Santaguida, supra, 181 Conn. 424, 435 A.2d 980. ²

Thus, in order to ascertain whether the plaintiff municipalities have standing to assert their constitutional claims under the exception mentioned above, we must first determine whether the municipalities are "properly in court on a nonconstitutional question." Exceptions to general rules are not created to permit circumvention of these rules, but rather to allow for special circumstances. The plaintiffs brought suit primarily to have Public Acts 1979, No. 79-405 declared unconstitutional. Had they limited their claims to this issue, there is little question that they would have no standing. Berlin v. Santaguida, supra. In addition to raising constitutional claims, however, the plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief on certain nonconstitutional issues.

The nonconstitutional questions raised by the plaintiffs were as follows: (1) whether the Home Rule Act, or local charters adopted pursuant to it, may be inconsistent with, supersede or prevail over the act, or at least that portion of the act providing that the decision of the arbitrator is final and binding and not subject to rejection by the local governing body or referendum; (2) what was the effective date of the act, in light...