Connors v. City of Boston

• Decision Date: 08 July 1999
• Citation: 430 Mass. 31,714 NE 2d 335
• Parties: DENNIS CONNORS & others v. CITY OF BOSTON & others.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

430 Mass. 31

714 NE 2d 335

DENNIS CONNORS & others¹ v. CITY OF BOSTON & others.²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

April 8, 1999.

July 8, 1999.

Present: WILKINS, C.J., ABRAMS, LYNCH, GREANEY, FRIED, MARSHALL, & IRELAND, JJ.

Vincent P. McCarthy, of Connecticut (William P. Monahan with him) for the plaintiffs.

David A. Mills (Robert L. Quinan, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, with him) for the city of Boston & another. Jennifer L. Levi (Mary L. Bonauto with her) for Diane Pullen & others.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Thomas L. Reilly, Attorney General, & Robert L. Quinan, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General.

David Rome, Katherine Shea, Ann Clarke, & Jeffrey Jacobsen, for Massachusetts Federation of Teachers & others.

MARSHALL, J.

We decide in this case whether an executive order signed by the mayor of the city of Boston extending group health insurance benefits to the domestic partners of city employees is inconsistent with certain provisions of State law and for that reason violates the Home Rule Amendment, art. 89, § 6, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, and G. L. c. 43B, § 13.³ We conclude that it is, and that an interlocutory order to that effect entered by a judge in the Superior Court is correct.

I

On August 4, 1998, Mayor Thomas M. Menino signed an executive order extending group health insurance benefits to registered domestic partners⁴ of city employees and their dependents. The executive order went into effect on November 1, 1998. On November 10, 1998, the plaintiffs, Boston residents, commenced this action pursuant to G. L. c. 40, § 53, challenging the validity of the executive order. They alleged, in broad terms, and without reference to any particular statute or constitutional provision, that the executive order is inconsistent with the authority granted to the city by the Legislature to provide health insurance to city employees.⁵ The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the executive order, on which a hearing was held on December 2, 1998. The Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD), Kay Schmidt, a city employee, and Diane Pullen, Schmidt's registered domestic partner, filed a motion to intervene as defendants. On December 11, 1998, the judge allowed GLAD, Schmidt, and Pullen to intervene,⁶ but limited GLAD's participation to the representation of Schmidt and Pullen's interests.⁷

On December 11, 1998, the judge ruled that the executive order is inconsistent with provisions of G. L. c. 32B, §§ 2 (b) and 15 (b),⁸ and granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. Concluding that "the issue raised in this case presents a current and important question of law not previously decided by a Massachusetts appellate court," the judge, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64, 365 Mass. 831 (1974), reported the following question to the Appeals Court:

"Whether the Executive Order signed by Mayor Thomas M. Menino on August 4, 1998, extending health benefits coverage to domestic partners of Boston city employees, and their dependents, is inconsistent with G. L. c. 32B, §§ 2(b) and 15(b), and, therefore, in violation of § 6 of the Home Amendment Rule and G. L. c. 43B, § 13."⁹

The judge stayed his order granting the preliminary injunction until his report was docketed in the Appeals Court. A single justice of the Appeals Court continued the stay pending appeal because "the question reported ... presents a meritorious issue on appeal" and "the equities weigh heavily in favor of a stay pending appeal." We granted the defendants' application for direct appellate review.

II

We consider whether the judge was correct to conclude that the executive order is inconsistent with certain provisions of G. L. c. 32B. Article 89, § 6, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, the Home Rule Amendment, provides:

"Any city or town may, by the adoption, amendment, or repeal of local ordinances or by-laws, exercise any power or function which the general court has power to confer upon it, which is not inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted by the general court in conformity with powers reserved to the general court by section eight, and which is not denied, either expressly or by clear implication, to the city or town by its charter. This section shall apply to every city and town, whether or not it has adopted a charter pursuant to section three."

The Home Rule Procedures Act, G. L. c. 43B, § 13, contains virtually identical language. Thus, under the home rule provisions, the city may undertake any action that is not "inconsistent" with State laws or the Constitution.¹⁰ Massachusetts has the "strongest type of home rule," Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 143 n.4 (1973), citing 1965 Senate Doc. No. 950 at 65-66, and municipal action is presumed to be valid. Take Five Vending, Ltd. v. Provincetown, 415 Mass. 741, 744 (1993). Cf. Wendell v. Attorney Gen., 394 Mass. 518, 524 (1985). The analysis whether local action is inconsistent with a State statute is analogous to the analysis whether Federal law preempts State action, Bloom v. Worcester, supra at 151; the touchstone of the analysis is whether the State Legislature intended to preempt the city's authority to act. Id. at 155.

Recently, in Boston Gas Co. v. Somerville, 420 Mass. 702, 704 (1995), we summarized the appropriate analysis for resolving this question: We look "to see whether there was either an express legislative intent to forbid local activity on the same subject or whether the local regulation would somehow frustrate the purpose of the statute so as to warrant an inference that the Legislature intended to preempt the subject. Bloom v. Worcester, [supra at] 155-156. Moreover, in some circumstances we can infer that the Legislature intended to preempt the field because legislation on the subject is so comprehensive that any local enactment would frustrate the statute's purpose. Wendell v. Attorney Gen., [supra at 527-528]." Boston Gas Co. v. Somerville, supra. We have also indicated that the invalidation of a local regulation requires a "sharp conflict" between it and the State legislation, which "appears when either the legislative intent to preclude local action is clear, or, absent plain expression of such intent, the purpose of the statute cannot be achieved in the face of the local by-law." School Comm. of Boston v. Boston, 383 Mass. 693, 701 (1981), quoting Grace v. Brookline, 379 Mass. 43, 54 (1979).

The crux of this dispute is accordingly the Legislature's intent in enacting the provisions of G. L. c. 32B. The plaintiffs argue that § 15 (b), the substance of which was first enacted in 1967, was intended to preclude a city from providing group health insurance benefits to persons other than those specifically designated by definition in § 2 (b): city employees and their dependents, defined as spouses, children under nineteen years of age, and children over nineteen years who are unable to provide for themselves. The defendants and amici respond that the Legislature did not intend to address domestic partners at all within the ambit of G. L. c. 32B, and that a governmental unit is free to appropriate and expend public funds to pay for group health insurance premiums for them. They do not suggest that § 2 (b)'s provision for "spouses" includes domestic partners,¹¹ or that domestic partners are otherwise "dependents." Rather, they argue, the statute simply does not pertain at all to the extension of group health insurance benefits to domestic partners.¹²

A

We look first to see whether there was an "express legislative intent to forbid local activity on the same subject." Boston Gas Co. v. Newton, 425 Mass. 697, 699 (1997), citing Boston Gas Co. v. Somerville, supra at 703. Our examination of G. L. c. 32B, as well as the relevant legislative history, leads us to conclude that the Legislature clearly evinced its intent that G. L. c. 32B provide the exclusive manner in which the city may appropriate and expend funds for group health insurance for its employees (those individuals "in the service" of the city, G. L. c. 32B, § 2 [d]), and all persons whose claim to group benefits (paid for by the city) arises because of their relationship with a city employee, i.e., "dependents."¹³ The Legislature has defined precisely those who may be included in the category of "dependents." Cities and other governmental units are not free to expand the category.

General Laws c. 32B is "a comprehensive statute empowering municipalities to provide group insurance (medical and certain other coverages) to their employees and their employees' dependents." Watertown Firefighters, Local 1347 v. Watertown, 376 Mass. 706, 710 (1978). See Kusy v. Millbury, 417 Mass. 765, 768 (1994), citing Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local No. 59 v. Chatham, 404 Mass. 365, 367 (1989). General Laws c. 32B is a "local option" statute: it does not take effect until a governmental unit accepts it. See Kusy v. Millbury, supra at 768 n.4. Once accepted, however, it provides the exclusive mechanisms by which and to whom the city may provide group health insurance. See G. L. c. 32B, § 15 (b); Watertown Firefighters, Local 1347 v. Watertown, supra at 712. Section 15 (b) provides explicitly that the city may not "appropriate or expend public funds" for the payment of group health insurance premiums for its active or retired employees, or their dependents, "unless such insurance is procured pursuant to the provisions of this chapter."¹⁴

The defendants argue that the limitation imposed by § 15 (b) applies only to those defined in the statute — employees and their spouses, children under nineteen years and certain children over nineteen years — leaving the city free to expend public funds to pay for group health insurance for other persons not mentioned in the statute. They view the requirements of G. L. c. 32B as a "floor,"...