School Committee of Boston v. City of Boston

• Citation: 383 Mass. 693,421 N.E.2d 1187
• Parties: SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF BOSTON et al. 1 v. CITY OF BOSTON et al. 2
• Decision Date: 04 June 1981
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 1187

421 N.E.2d 1187

383 Mass. 693

SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF BOSTON et al. ¹ v. CITY OF BOSTON et al. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 4, 1981.

Decided June 4, 1981.

Stephen H. Oleskey, Boston (Richard A. Johnston & Harold Carroll, Corp. Counsel, Boston, with him), for defendants.

Marshall Simonds, Boston (Henry C. Dinger, Boston, with him), for plaintiffs.

Thomas A. Mela, Boston, for Massachusetts Advocacy Center, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and BRAUCHER, WILKINS, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

LIACOS, Justice.

This case involves a dispute over the funding of programs for special education in the city of Boston. At issue is whether the city's obligation under G.L. c. 71B, § 5, to provide funding for special education is limited by the Boston public school financing scheme set forth in St.1936, c. 224, as amended. The case was argued before the full court on February 4, 1981, and on February 12, 1981, we ordered entry of the following partial summary judgment: "The City of Boston and its financial officers are not required, under G.L. c. 71B, § 5, to provide funding for special needs programs in addition to the funds appropriated under St.1936, c. 224, as amended. The obligation to provide and allocate funding for special needs programs is subject to the limitations on school funding for the City of Boston contained in St.1936, c. 224, as amended." This opinion is in explanation of that order.

1. Proceedings. On October 10, 1980, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking relief pursuant to G.L. c. 71, § 34; G.L. c. 71B, § 5; and G.L. c. 231A. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants (city) had failed to appropriate for fiscal year 1981 the amounts necessary for the support of Boston's special education programs and sought an order requiring the city to appropriate $46,145,272 in supplemental funds, plus an additional 25% of this amount. G.L. c. 71, § 34. The plaintiffs also asked the court to declare that the city of Boston is required under the provisions of G.L. c. 71B inserted by St.1972, c. 766, to provide funding for special needs programs; that this obligation supersedes the St.1936, c. 224, limitation on school committee appropriations in the city of Boston; that the mayor is required to submit requests for supplemental special education funds to the city council and may not veto such appropriations approved by the council; and that the council is required to make such appropriations.

The city filed an answer and a counterclaim in which it asked the court to enjoin the school committee from spending in excess of its St.1936, c. 224, appropriation. ³ On November 7, 1980, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on their prayers for declaratory relief. The city then moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims and for partial summary judgment on its counterclaim.

On December 3, 1980, a Superior Court judge granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, declaring that the city was required under G.L. c. 71B, § 5, to provide funding for special needs programs in addition to the funds appropriated by the school committee under St.1936, c. 224, but did not specify the amount to be provided. The trial judge reported the case to the Appeals Court pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 64, 365 Mass. 831 (1974), and we allowed the city's assented to application for direct appellate review.

2. Facts. The parties submitted the case to the trial judge on a stipulation of facts, which we summarize. On April 29, 1980, the Boston school committee appropriated $195,220,920 as its St.1936, c. 224, appropriation for fiscal 1981. ⁴ On or about July 18, 1980, the school committee submitted its preliminary budget for fiscal year 1981 to the city. This preliminary budget totaled $227,697,844. ⁵ On August 29, 1980, the school committee voted to request supplemental appropriations of $40,700,000, ⁶ for a total general school purposes budget of $231,170,722. ⁷ Of the requested supplemental appropriations, $7,100,000 was earmarked for special needs programs.

Contrary to his practice in previous years, ⁸ the mayor refused to submit the requests for supplemental appropriations to the city council. On September 30, 1980, the school committee by a 3-1-1 vote decided to allocate all of its $195,220,920 charter appropriation to general education. The committee determined that an extra $46,145,272 was needed for special education and instructed the superintendent to demand that the mayor submit a supplemental appropriation in this amount to the city council. The superintendent sent the mayor a letter that day, demanding that the mayor submit a supplemental appropriation of $46,145,272 to the city council and asserting that the school committee was entitled to the appropriation under the provisions of St.1972, c. 766 (commonly known as "c. 766"). The mayor did not respond in writing to this letter, and on October 10, 1980, the plaintiffs filed the instant action.

3. Jurisdiction. The plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to G.L. c. 71, § 34, G.L. c. 71B, § 5, and G.L. c. 231A. Although we hold that the plaintiffs may not maintain this action under G.L. c. 71, § 34, or G.L. c. 71B, § 5, we agree with the trial judge that the parties are entitled to a declaration of the respective rights of the school committee and city officials concerning the funding of special needs programs. We believe that in this case "involving questions of pressing public importance we should indicate our views where a vista of avoidable litigation among administrative officials is disclosed and the issues have been fully argued." School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 697, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 572, 88 S.Ct. 692, 19 L.Ed.2d 778 (1968). The case presents an important public question and its resolution will affect many besides the immediate litigants; it also reduces to a matter of statutory interpretation, not dependent on the present facts. Department of Community Affairs v. Massachusetts State College Bldg. Auth., --- Mass. ---, ---, ^a 392 N.E.2d 1006 (1979); Lahey Clinic Foundation, Inc. v. Health Facilities Appeals Bd., 376 Mass. 359, 371-372, ^b 380 N.E.2d 675 (1978). But see LITTON BUSINESS SYSTEMS, INC. V. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE, --- MASS. ---, 420 N.E.2D 339 (1981)^C (where plaintiffs' ten-taxpayer action jurisdictionally defective, declaratory relief unavailable absent special circumstances).

4. G.L. c. 71, § 34. The plaintiffs purport to bring this action pursuant to G.L. c. 71, § 34, ⁹ seeking to compel the city to appropriate funds in excess of the amount the school committee is authorized to appropriate directly under St.1936, c. 224. The defendants allege that the ten-taxpayer remedy provided in G.L. c. 71, § 34, is inapplicable to the city of Boston and that this case is controlled by our decision in Pirrone v. Boston, 364 Mass. 403, 305 N.E.2d 96 (1973). We agree.

In Pirrone, we held that the unique Boston public school financing system set forth in St.1936, c. 224, is incompatible with the remedy provided by G.L. c. 71, § 34. Our decision was based on a review of the historical development of the special legislation applicable to school financing in Boston and a consideration of the purpose of G.L. c. 71, § 34.

Under St.1936, c. 224, as amended, the school committee is empowered to appropriate funds for general school purposes up to a certain limit "essentially, an amount equal to the amount of funds which was required to finance the school system in the preceding year." Pirrone v. Boston, supra at 409, 305 N.E.2d 96. If the committee requires additional funds, it must ask the mayor to submit a request for a supplemental appropriation to the city council. Id. See Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. Boston, --- Mass. ---, --- - ---, ^d 416 N.E.2d 1363 (1981); Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Comm. of Boston, 370 Mass. 455, 472, 350 N.E.2d 707 (1976). However, under St.1909, c. 486, § 3, the mayor may decline to make such a submission, provided the request is not for an amount needed to fund executed collective bargaining agreements. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, v. School Comm. of Boston, supra at 472, 474, 350 N.E.2d 707. BOSTON TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 66 V. BOSTON, SUPRA AT --- - ---, 416 N.E.2D 1363^E.

This scheme gives the Boston school committee less budgetary control than school committees in other cities and towns, which have the authority to determine the financial needs of the public schools. ¹⁰ Amherst-Pelham Regional School Comm. v. Department of Educ., 376 Mass. 480, 494-495, ^f 381 N.E.2d 922 (1978). Pirrone v. Boston, supra 364 Mass. at 406, 305 N.E.2d 96. Nevertheless, we have determined that it represents a reasoned attempt on the part of the Legislature to balance the responsibilities of the school committee and the city officials responsible for Boston's financial condition. Id. at 409-410, 305 N.E.2d 96.

To allow the plaintiffs in the present case to compel appropriation in excess of that authorized by St.1936, c. 224, would be to negate the Legislature's statutory limit on the Boston school committee's appropriating power. The plaintiffs have no cause of action under G.L. c. 71, § 34, because that section was designed to protect school committee budgetary autonomy in cities and towns other than the city of Boston. Pirrone v. Boston, supra at 412, 305 N.E.2d 96. Casey v. Everett, 330 Mass. 220, 222, 112 N.E.2d 420 (1953). Since such school committee autonomy does not exist in Boston, and has not existed since 1898, Pirrone v. Boston, supra 364 Mass. at 411-412, 305 N.E.2d 96, G.L. c. 71, § 34, has no application to the city of Boston. Consequently, the plaintiffs have no remedy available to them under G.L. c. 71, § 34.

5. G.L. c. 71B, § 5. The plaintiffs also purport to bring this action pursuant to G.L. c. 71B, § 5. ¹¹ Their contention, accepted by...