Conservatorship of Chambers

• Decision Date: 29 June 1977
• Docket Number: Cr. 16233
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Conservatorship of the Person and ESTATE of Brad K. CHAMBERS, Conservatee. Michael G. IOAKIMEDES, public guardian, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Brad K. CHAMBERS, Objector and Appellant. In re Brad K. CHAMBERS on Habeas Corpus. Civ. 39978 and

Page 357

139 Cal.Rptr. 357

71 Cal.App.3d 277

Conservatorship of the Person and ESTATE of Brad K. CHAMBERS, Conservatee.

Michael G. IOAKIMEDES, public guardian, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Brad K. CHAMBERS, Objector and Appellant.

In re Brad K. CHAMBERS on Habeas Corpus.

Civ. 39978 and Cr. 16233.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

June 29, 1977.

Hearing Denied Aug. 25, 1977.

Jonathan S. Chasan, Berkeley, for appellant.

Milton Goldinger, County Counsel, Thomas H. Gordinier, Deputy County Counsel, Fairfield, for petitioner-respondent.

TAYLOR, Presiding Justice.

In No. 39978, Brad Chambers (hereafter Chambers) appeals from an order granting the petition for appointment of a conservator, on the ground that he is gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder, pursuant to the provisions of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (hereafter LPS); ¹ in Criminal No. 16233, Chambers seeks ² a writ of habeas corpus in this court to obtain release from his allegedly unlawful confinement. In both of these consolidated proceedings, the major contentions are that: 1) the statutory definition of 'gravely disabled,' absent a finding of dangerousness as demonstrated by an overt act, is an unconstitutionally vague and overbroad standard; ³ 2) Chambers' waiver of the right to a jury trial on the issue of his 'grave disability' was constitutionally deficient. For the reasons set out below, we have concluded that the order appointing the conservator should be affirmed, and the petition for the writ of habeas corpus denied.

As the facts are not in dispute, a brief summary will suffice. Chambers, a life-long resident of Vallego, California, was 24 years old at the time of the initiation of these proceedings on April 8, 1976. He did poorly in school and had been sporadically employed since his graduation from high school; he frequently quit or was fired for absenteeism and inability to complete tasks. In 1973, he worked as a laborer for nine months, but since that time has made little effort to find employment or vocational training.

At the age of 15, he began to drink and reportedly consumed about 36 ounces of beer daily; as an adult, he had been arrested numerous times for drunkenness. Since the age of 19, he reportedly had taken LSD 35 times and had also ingested mescaline, marijuana, methedrine and heroin.

Chambers had six previous admissions to Napa State Hospital (hereafter Napa). His first admission to Napa on January 23, 1973, was the result of a suicide attempt; his subsequent admissions were due to bizarre, violent and destructive behavior, excessive drinking, and failure to respond to and take advantage of treatment available to him at community health services.

After his discharge from several hospitalizations in 1974 and 1975, Chambers unsuccessfully attempted to live independently; each attempt resulted in readmission to Napa. After his discharge on February 23, 1976, he returned to live with his mother and apparently spent his time sleeping, eating, watching television and frequently using drugs and alcohol. On the night of March 23, 1976, his mother flushed his prescribed medications down the toilet because she felt that the medications were making him extremely lethargic. Thereafter, Chambers pushed and punched her. His mother called the police and again he was admitted to Napa pursuant to section 5150, his third admission in 1976. His condition was diagnosed as a type of chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia.

Chambers' mother indicated that he could no longer live with her, as their argument about the medication and his violence led to physical abuse toward her. From ages 8 to 17, Chambers lived with his father and stepmother; however, his father indicated that he gets along better with his son when they do not live together.

By order dated April 7, 1976, the superior court appointed a temporary conservator pursuant to section 5352. By petition filed April 8, 1976, request was made for the appointment of a conservator of the person and estate of Chambers. The petition was accompanied by an affidavit from a Napa staff psychiatrist, setting forth the diagnosis. It related Chambers' inability to provide for his basic personal needs, unwillingness or inability to voluntarily accept treatment and need for supervision. The psychiatrist opined that Chambers was gravely disabled as a result of the severe nature of his mental illness. The conservatorship investigation report filed with the court on April 27, 1976 (§ 5354) set forth the facts summarized above and recommended a conservatorship, as Chambers was gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder (§ 5350 et seq.). After consulting with his counsel, Chambers waived an adversary hearing and agreed to be bound by the decision of the court (§ 5350, subd. (d)). The court granted the petition on Mary 5, 1976; the order appointing the conservator was filed on Mary 7, 1976. At the present time, Chambers is confined at the direction of his conservator at the Petaluma Care and Guidance Center.

Chambers first argues that the standard of 'gravely disabled,' as defined in section 5008, ⁴ is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as it purports to provide for the incarceration of individuals who have committed no overt act demonstrating dangerousness to themselves or others. Chambers' contention is based on several recent challenges to the civil commitment statutes of other jurisdictions. He relies on authorities which permitted commitment for an indefinite period and did not provide for: 1) the presence of the individual at the commitment hearing; 2) representation by counsel; 3) advisement of the evidence or charges; and 4) a jury trial. In each instance, the constitutional challenges to the civil commitment proceedings were upheld on grounds of vagueness or overbroadness in language or failure to provide for certain rights required to afford due process. In these cases, the courts held that civil commitment requires a finding that an individual be an immediate danger to himself or to others, as evidenced by an overt act (Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital at Eloise, D.C., 384 F.Supp. 1085; Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.Supp. 1078, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473, 94 S.Ct. 713, 38 L.Ed.2d 661; Lynch v. Baxley, D.C., 386 F.Supp. 378).

In the field of mental health, state Legislatures have had to choose between 'the medical objectives of treating sick people without legal delays and the equally valid legal aim of insuring that persons are not deprived of their liberties without due process of law' (The Dilemma of Mental Commitments in California: 'A Background Document,' Subcommittee on Mental Health Services, Assembly Interim Committee on Ways and Means, p. 7 (Nov. 1970) (hereafter Subcommittee Report)). After intensive research, our Legislature incorporated these diverse objectives into the LPS. The statute is designed to provide prompt, short-term, community-based intensive treatment, without stigma or loss of liberty, to individuals with mental disorders ⁵ who are dangerous to themselves or to others, or who are gravely disabled (Subcommittee Report, supra). Although the LPS is more medically oriented than the former commitment statute, the California Legislature enacted procedural safeguards to protect an individual against erroneous commitment (Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 666, 674, 83 Cal.Rptr. 600, 464, P.2d 56).

The professional person in charge of an LPS evaluation or treatment facility may recommend the appointment of a conservator for any person he determines is gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder and who is unwilling or incapable of voluntarily accepting treatment (§§ 5350, 5352). A comprehensive investigation report containing all relevant information pertaining to the patient's medical, psychological, social, family, vocational and financial condition, must be prepared before the hearing (§ 5354). Conservatorship will be recommended only when there are no suitable alternatives available (§ 5354). The citation and a copy of the petition must be served upon the proposed conservatee at least 10 days before the hearing date (Prob.Code, § 1754). ⁶ Where appropriate, the petition must specifically request that the proposed conservatee be deprived of his right to enter contracts and be denied the use of a driver's license (§ 5357).

Within 30 days from the date of the filing of the petition, a hearing must be held and the proposed conservatee must have counsel appointed within five days after the date of the petition (§ 5365). ⁷ The proposed conservatee, on the advice of counsel, can demand a court or jury trial on the issue of grave disability, thereby waiving the hearing, or he can proceed with the hearing and be bound by the decision of the court (§ 5350, subd. (d)). On the advice of counsel, the proposed conservatee may waive the presence of the professional person who urged conservatorship, and the medical records and recommendation may be entered into evidence (§ 5365.1).

Upon the establishment of a conservatorship, the conservatee may be placed in an approved medical or nonmedical facility pursuant to the court order. Family placement with outpatient treatment is preferred (§ 5358.6); if the conservatee cannot remain at home, or be placed with relatives, great care must be taken to place him in a suitable facility as close as possible to his home or that of a relative (§ 5358). To insure short-term commitment, the conservatorship automatically terminates at the end of one year. The conservator may be appointed for an additional one-year period but the petition must include the opinion of two physicians that the conservatee is still gravely disabled as the result of a mental disorder. When the conservatorship terminates, any facility in which the conservatee has been placed must release him (§ 5361). Additionally, the conservatee may request a rehearing every six months (§ 5364). ...