Cooper v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 12 March 1941
• Docket Number: 36318
• Parties: Melvern A. Cooper v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

148 S.W.2d 773

347 Mo. 555

Melvern A. Cooper v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, Appellant

No. 36318

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 12, 1941

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court; Hon. Marion D. Waltner Judge.

Affirmed.

Cyrus Crane, Geo. J. Mersereau, John N. Monteith, James F. Walsh Dean Wood and Horace F. Blackwell, Jr., for appellant.

(1) The trial court erred in refusing defendant's requested peremptory Instruction B in the nature of a demurrer to all the evidence. (a) The evidence clearly shows, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was at the time of his injury engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely connected therewith as to be a part of it, so that his rights are governed and controlled exclusively by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, because plaintiff, when hurt was engaged in making up an interstate train, the movement toward which had already begun. Secs. 44-506, 44-544, General Statutes Kansas 1935; Schaefer v. Lowden, 147 Kan. 520, 78 P.2d 48; Howard v. Mobile & Ohio Ry. Co., 335 Mo. 295, 73 S.W.2d 272; Gieseking v. Litchfield & Madison Ry. Co., 339 Mo. 1, 94 S.W.2d 375; Secs. 51-59, 45 U.S.C. A.; Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 36 S.Ct. 188; Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Bolle, 284 U.S. 74, 52 S.Ct. 59; Chicago & E. I. Railroad Co. v. Industrial Comm., 284 U.S. 296, 52 S.Ct. 151; N. Y., N. H. & Hartford Railroad Co. v. Bezue, 284 U.S. 415, 52 S.Ct. 205; Rogers v. M. & O. Ry. Co., 337 Mo. 140, 85 S.W.2d 581; Siegal v. M., K & T. Ry. Co., 342 Mo. 1130, 119 S.W.2d 376; Toussiant v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 340 Mo. 578, 104 S.W.2d 263; New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. Carr, 238 U.S. 260, 35 S.Ct. 780; Penn. Railroad Co. v. Morrison, 3 F.2d 986; Baltimore & O. Railroad Co. v. Darling, 3 F.2d 987; Penn. Railroad Co. v. Logansport Loan & Trust Co., 29 F.2d 1; McNatt v. Wabash Ry. Co., 341 Mo. 516, 108 S.W.2d 33; Midway Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Davis, 288 Mo. 563, 233 S.W. 406; Aly v. Term. Railroad Assn., 336 Mo. 340, 78 S.W.2d 851; Southern Ry. Co. v. Jacobs, 81 S.E. 99; Coll v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., 130 A. 225; Sullivan v. B. & O. Ry. Co., 116 A. 369; Birmingham Belt Railroad Co. v. Dunlap, 58 F.2d 951; Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co. v. Boylen, 81 F.2d 91; Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Reid, 42 F.2d 403; North Carolina Railroad Co. v. Zachary, 232 U.S. 248, 34 S.Ct. 305; Wabash Ry. Co. v. Bridal, 94 F.2d 117; St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Seale, 229 U.S. 156, 33 S.Ct. 651; Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. Hancock, 253 U.S. 284, 40 S.Ct. 512; Wheeling Terminal Ry. Co. v. Russell, 209 F. 795; Penn. Railroad Co. v. Donat, 239 U.S. 50, 36 S.Ct. 4; Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Parker, 242 U.S. 13, 37 S.Ct. 4; Youngstown & O. Railroad Co. v. Halverstodt, 12 F.2d 995; Davis v. Dowling, 284 F. 670; Reap v. Hines, 273 F. 88; Sullivan v. Wabash Ry. Co., 23 F.2d 323; Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Quin, 85 F.2d 485. (b) The evidence clearly shows, as a matter of law, that plaintiff assumed the risk of his injury because the risk of injury from the close clearance between tracks 9 and 10 was an ordinary one incidental to plaintiff's employment and known and assumed by him, or, if extraordinary, the risk was obvious and plaintiff knew of it and appreciated the danger from it. Sec. 54, 45 U.S.C. A.; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Leonidas, 305 U.S. 1, 59 S.Ct. 51; Jacobs v. Southern Ry. Co., 241 U.S. 229, 36 S.Ct. 588; Delaware, L. & W. Railroad Co. v. Koske, 279 U.S. 7, 49 S.Ct. 202; Toledo, St. L. & W. Railroad Co. v. Allen, 276 U.S. 165, 48 S.Ct. 215; Martin v. Wabash Ry. Co., 325 Mo. 1107, 30 C. W. (2d) 735; Schaefer v. Lowden, 147 Kan. 520, 78 P.2d 48; York v. St. L.-S. F. Ry. Co., 333 Mo. 105, 62 S.W.2d 475. The close clearance between tracks 9 and 10 was not negligence because defendant owed plaintiff no duty with respect to the space between the tracks, and, therefore, the risk of injury from the close clearance was an ordinary one incidental to plaintiff's employment as switchman and known and assumed by him. Tuttle v. Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Ry., 122 U.S. 189; Delaware, L. & W. Railroad Co. v. Koske, 279 U.S. 7, 49 S.Ct. 202; Toledo, St. L. & W. Railroad Co. v. Allen, 276 U.S. 165, 48 S.Ct. 215; Randall v. B. & O. Ry. Co., 109 U.S. 478; Morris v. Pryor, 272 Mo. 350, 198 S.W. 817; Ford v. Dickinson, 280 Mo. 206, 217 S.W. 294; Schaefer v. Lowden, 147 Kan. 520, 78 P.2d 48; Martin v. Wabash Ry. Co., 325 Mo. 1107, 30 S.W.2d 735; Jones v. St. L.-S. F. Ry. Co., 325 Mo. 1153, 30 S.W.2d 481. Even if the construction and maintenance of tracks 9 and 10 were negligence and defendant owed plaintiff a duty to warn him of the presence of cars on track 9 and the resulting close clearance, plaintiff knew (or must be presumed to have known) the danger of injury therefrom and appreciated the risk thereof. Delaware, L. & W. Railroad Co. v. Koske, 279 U.S. 7, 49 S.Ct. 202; Toledo, St. L. & W. Railroad Co. v. Allen, 276 U.S. 165, 48 S.Ct. 215; York v. St. L.-S. F. Ry. Co., 333 Mo. 105, 62 S.W.2d 475; Mathy v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 262 N.W. 917; Stone v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 222 N.W. 641. (2) The trial court erred in refusing defendant's instructions I, J and K, requesting the submission of the questions of assumption of risk and contributory negligence to the jury, and in giving, over defendant's objection, plaintiff's Instruction 1, withdrawing these questions from the jury, because there was substantial evidence of both defenses. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Swearingen, 196 U.S. 51, 25 S.Ct. 164; Davis v. Crane, 12 F.2d 355; Westover v. Wabash Ry. Co., 6 S.W.2d 843; McDaniel v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 338 Mo. 481, 92 S.W.2d 118; Ford v. Dickinson, 280 Mo. 206, 217 S.W. 294; Sec. 53, 45 U.S.C. A.; Gilbert v. Burlington C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 128 F. 529; Johns-Manville, Inc., v. Pocker, 26 F.2d 204; St. Louis, K. C. & C. Railroad Co. v. Conway, 156 F. 234; Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Hane, 56 F.2d 909; George v. St. L.-S. F. Ry. Co., 225 Mo. 364, 125 S.W. 196; Moore v. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co., 146 Mo. 572, 48 S.W. 487; Morris v. Pryor, 272 Mo. 350, 198 S.W. 817; Smelser v. M., K. & T. Ry. Co., 262 Mo. 25, 170 S.W. 1124; Pankey v. A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 180 Mo.App. 185, 168 S.W. 274. (3) The trial court erred in giving, over defendant's objection, plaintiff's Instruction 4, which instructed the jury that, in determining plaintiff's damages, the jury should take into consideration, among other things, plaintiff's ability to work and earn money in the future, since nowhere in the record is there any testimony within the hearing of the jury, and the jury was never advised, as to plaintiff's age, either at the time of the accident, at the time of trial or at any other time, and since all of plaintiff's testimony was to the effect that his injuries rendered him totally and permanently disabled, any verdict arrived at would necessarily be purely speculative. Phelps v. Salisbury, 161 Mo. 1, 61 S.W. 582; Gessley v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 26 Mo.App. 156; Hinds v. Marshall, 22 Mo.App. 208; Cole v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 340 Mo. 277, 100 S.W.2d 311; Midway Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Davis, 288 Mo. 563, 233 S.W. 406.

Clarence C. Chilcott for respondent.

(1) Plaintiff was not engaged in interstate transportation as a matter of law. Johnson v. So. Pac., 248 P. 501, 49 A. L. R. 1327; Bradbury v. Railroad Co., 149 Iowa 51, 128 N.W. 1, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 684; Osborne v Gray, 241 U.S. 16, 36 S.Ct. 486, 60 L.Ed. 865; Myers v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 246 S.W. 257; Martin v. St. L.-S. F. Ry. Co., 258 S.W. 1023; Shidloski v. N. Y. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 64 S.W.2d 259; Wise v. Lehigh V. Ry. Co., 43 F.2d 692; Penn. Railroad Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 53 S.Ct. 391; C. & N.W. v. Bolle, 52 S.Ct. 59, 284 U.S. 74; Jarvis v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 37 S.W.2d 602; Risselle v. St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co., 81 S.W.2d 621; East St. L. J. Ry. Co. v. Armour & Co., 247 Ill.App. 528; Ill. Cent. Railroad Co. v. Behrens, 233 U.S. 473, 34 S.Ct. 647. (2) It was negligence for the defendant to maintain and place cars upon railroad tracks in such close proximity to other tracks or structures that the lives and limbs of the employees were endangered in the performance of their duty to defendant. Kanawha, M. & R. Co. v. Kerse, 239 U.S. 579, 36 S.Ct. 174; T. & P. v. Swearingen, 196 U.S. 51, 25 S.Ct. 164, 49 L.Ed. 382; Choctaw, O. & G. Railroad v. McDade, 191 U.S. 64, 48 L.Ed. 96; Ill. Cent. Railroad Co. v. Skaggs, 240 U.S. 66, 36 S.Ct. 249; Emch v. Pa. Ry. Co., 37 F.2d 828; Brown v. M. K. T., 212 S.W. 26; Howser v. C. G. W., 5 S.W.2d 59; Westover v. Wabash Ry. Co., 6 S.W.2d 843; Vaughan v. St. L., M. B. T. Ry. Co., 18 S.W.2d 62; Wilson v. D. G. of Railroads, 112 A. 732; N. Y. & St. L. v. Peele, 164 N.E. 705; McIntyre v. St. L. & S. F., 227 S.W. 1047; M. O. & G. v. Overmyer, 160 P. 933. (3) As a matter of law there was no assumption of the risk by plaintiff either at common law or under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Godwin v. Mo. Pac., 72 S.W.2d 988; Roberson v. St. L. M. B. T. Co., 213 S.W. 873; Yazoo & Miss. V. Railroad Co. v. Wright, 235 U.S. 375, 35 S.Ct. 130. (4) The trial court did not err in refusing defendant's Instructions I, J and K, requesting the submission of questions of assumption of risk and contributory negligence to the jury, because the defendant offered no instruction requiring the jury to find under the evidence that plaintiff was engaged in interstate transportation. Western Industries Co. v. Mason, M. W. D. Co., 205 P. 466; L. & N. v. Nathan Parker, 242 U.S. 13, 37 S.Ct. 4. (5) The court did not err in permitting counsel for the plaintiff to use a medical textbook in framing his questions on cross-examination, and the point was not sufficiently preserved in appellant's motion for new trial. Bach v....