Cooper v. Sacco

• Decision Date: 11 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. 72,72
• Citation: 357 Md. 622,745 A.2d 1074
• Parties: Sophia COOPER v. Michael J. SACCO et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

745 A.2d 1074

357 Md. 622

Sophia COOPER v. Michael J. SACCO et al.

No. 72, Sept. Term, 1999.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

February 11, 2000.

Darren Margolis (Bierer, Allentoff & Margolis, P.A., on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Karen A. Besok (Karen S. Byard, Karen A. Besok & Associates, on brief), Baltimore, for respondents.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ.

CATHELL, Judge.

Sophia Cooper, petitioner, seeks review of an order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County affirming, on the record, a judgment for respondents Gregory Vlachos and Robert Sacco in the District Court of Maryland. At trial, after petitioner, the plaintiff before the District Court, closed her case-in-chief, respondents moved for judgment, alleging that petitioner failed to prove that either of the respondents drove or owned the motor vehicle involved in the alleged accident. Petitioner requested that the trial judge reopen the case and allow her to read a portion of respondents' answers to interrogatories into the record in order to prove the identity of the driver and owner of the vehicle.¹ The trial judge refused and entered judgment for respondents. Petitioner presented two issues to this Court in her Petition for Writ of Certiorari:

[I.] Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in refusing to allow the [p]etitioner to reopen her case?

[II.] Was [p]etitioner required to present evidence of ownership of the [r]espondent's motor vehicle, or identify the driver, when [r]espondents did not demand specific proof of those issues... ?

In our order granting the petition, we added a third question: "Was Maryland Rule 3-308 satisfied by the Respondents' Notice of Intention to Defend which contained a demand for strict proof of Petitioner's claim?" Because we answer the first question in the affirmative and the second and third questions in the negative, we reverse and remand this case for a new trial.

I. Background

While driving home from work on May 29, 1996, petitioner attempted to make a left-hand turn from Eastern Avenue onto Marlyn Avenue to reach a gas station. As she waited for traffic to pass before turning, petitioner was struck from behind by a car allegedly driven by respondent Sacco and owned by respondent Vlachos, who was a passenger. Asserting that the impact of this collision caused her neck injuries and migraine headaches, petitioner filed suit in the District Court seeking $20,000 in damages. In her complaint, petitioner specifically alleged that "[t]he vehicle driven by [respondent] Sacco was owned by [respondent] Vlachos, and [respondent] Sacco was operating the vehicle as the agent, servant and/or employee of [respondent] Vlachos, or, in the alternative, with the latter's permission."

Respondents filed a Notice of Intention to Defend as required by Maryland Rule 3-307. They did not file the standard form notice supplied by the District Court with the Writ of Summons; instead, counsel for respondents drafted her own notice, in pleading form, which stated that respondents "demand[ed] strict proof from [petitioner] of her claim." No demand was made specifically for petitioner to prove ownership of the vehicle.

At trial, petitioner's case-in-chief consisted solely of her testimony, during which she described the accident and her alleged injuries, but never specifically identified either respondent as a negligent party. As noted, supra, respondents moved for judgment upon conclusion of petitioner's case, arguing that she had not proved who caused the accident or owned the vehicle. The following exchange occurred:

[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I'm going to make a motion and I'm going to specifically request judgment based on the fact that the Plaintiff has not identified any individual in this courtroom as being the person who may have caused any injury to his client and on the rest of the issues I'll submit.

COURT: Do you wish to be heard as to that point?

[Plaintiff's Counsel]: If necessary, Your Honor, I'd request that we reopen the case. I have the Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories and I can read from them into evidence. I've never had this come up as a dispute before. There was no genuine dispute prior to trial that this was the driver. That's the only reason why I didn't bother to do that. I mean if I thought it was going to be an issue I would have certainly presented it.

COURT: Well, Counselor, proving your case is always an issue.... The proof of your case is to identify the parties that are responsible. Whether you thought or have ever had to do that in the past is of little or no consequence here and your case rises and falls based upon the evidence which has been presented thus far.

I would certainly anticipate that Counsel would ... vehemently object to your reopening your case since you have closed it ... and she has raised the argument that you have not identified any of the parties as being the parties who are responsible. And I'm going to grant her motion. Judgment is denied.

Petitioner appealed the ruling of the District Court to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. That court affirmed, holding that petitioner had not preserved the issue of whether respondents were required to demand specifically that petitioner prove ownership rather than making a general demand for strict proof. The court also held that the decision of the District Court not to reopen the case was "within its sound discretion and will not be grounds for appeal." Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari from this Court, which we granted.

II. Discussion

A. Demand for Proof

Maryland Rule 3-307 requires defendants in the District Court to file a notice of intention to defend within fifteen days of receiving service of the complaint:

Rule 3-307. Notice of Intention to Defend.

(a) To be filed with court—Service not required. The defendant, including a counter-defendant, cross-defendant, and third-party defendant, shall file with the court a notice of intention to defend which may include any explanation or ground of defense. The defendant need not serve the notice on any party.

(b) Time for filing. The notice shall be filed within 15 days after service of the complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, except if service is made outside this State or upon a statutory agent for a defendant, the notice shall be filed within 60 days after service.

Maryland Rule 3-308 requires the defendant to make a "specific demand" that certain issues be proven by the plaintiff or they are admitted:

Rule 3-308. Demand for proof.

When the defendant desires to raise an issue as to (1) the legal existence of a party, including a partnership or a corporation, (2) the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, (3) the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, (4) the averment of the execution of a written instrument, or (5) the averment of the ownership of a motor vehicle, the defendant shall do so by specific demand for proof. The demand may be made at any time before the trial is concluded. If not raised by specific demand for proof, these matters are admitted for the purpose of the pending action. Upon motion of a party upon whom a specific demand for proof is made, the court may continue the trial for a reasonable time to enable the party to obtain the demanded proof.

The second question presented by petitioner hinges on whether compliance with Rule 3-308 requires defendants in the District Court to specify which of the five issues listed, or any combination thereof, they request that a plaintiff prove at trial. Respondents suggest that a broad demand for "strict proof," such as the one they filed in the case sub judice, satisfies the rule. Petitioner argues that such a demand does not satisfy the edicts of Rule 3-308. We hold that a broad demand for "strict proof" does not suffice and that, to demand that a plaintiff prove any of the five issues listed in Rule 3-308, defendants must state specifically which issues they wish the plaintiff to prove at trial. Otherwise, the issue or issues for which proof is not sought are admitted.

The rationale behind this holding is the separate and distinct origins of the issues listed in Rule 3-308 and the similarity of Rule 3-308 to Rule 2-323(f), its companion rule in the circuit courts, which requires greater detail in pleading these five issues. We begin this analysis by noting the general tenets of statutory construction, which apply to the drafting of the Maryland Rules as well. See State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 717, 720 A.2d 311, 315 (1998); State v. Harrell, 348 Md. 69, 79, 702 A.2d 723, 728 (1997); In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94, 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994).

We have repeatedly stated that "[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the true intention of the legislature." Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753[, 757] (1993). To discern the legislative intent, we must consider the "general purpose, aim, or policy behind the statute." Id. While great weight is given to the plain meaning of the statute's language, Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730[, 731-32] (1986), we examine this language in the context in which it was adopted. Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Mohler, 318 Md. 219, 225, 567 A.2d 929[, 932] (1990). In this light, "[i]t is often necessary to look at the development of a statute to discern legislative intent that may not be as clear upon initial examination of the current language of the statute." Condon, supra, 332 Md. at 492, 632 A.2d [at 758] (citing Mohler, supra, 318 Md. at 225-27, 567 A.2d 929).

C.S. v. Prince George's County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 343 Md. 14, 24, 680 A.2d 470, 475 (1996) (some alterations in original). We have also said that statutes and rules "relating to the same subject matter or sharing a common purpose should be read together." Farris v. State, 351 Md. 24, 29, 716 A.2d 237, 240 (1998) (citing ...