Coursolle v. Emc Ins. Group Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. A10–1036.,A10–1036.
• Citation: 31 IER Cases 1483,794 N.W.2d 652
• Parties: John O. COURSOLLE, Appellant,v.EMC INSURANCE GROUP, INC., an Iowa corporation, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

794 N.W.2d 652

31 IER Cases 1483

2011 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 33,119

John O. COURSOLLE, Appellant,

v.EMC INSURANCE GROUP, INC., an Iowa corporation, et al., Respondents.

No. A10–1036.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Feb. 8, 2011.

Syllabus by the Court

Constructive discharge is not an independent cause of action. Constructive discharge is a doctrine that may be invoked by a plaintiff in some employment-related actions to prove that the defendant made an adverse employment action.

Philip G. Villaume, Jeffrey D. Schiek, Villaume & Schiek, P.A., Bloomington, MN, for appellant.V. John Ella, Sara Sidwell, Jackson Lewis LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for respondents.

Considered and decided by JOHNSON, Chief Judge; KLAPHAKE, Judge; and HARTEN, Judge.^*

OPINION

JOHNSON, Chief Judge.

John Coursolle quit his job as a senior claims adjustor at Employers Mutual Casualty Company. He sued his former employer, alleging numerous causes of action. The district court granted the former employer's motion for summary judgment on Coursolle's claims of a violation of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act and breach of contract. We conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the whistleblower claim because, as a matter of law, Coursolle did not engage in conduct protected by the whistleblower act. We further conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the breach-of-contract claim because, as a matter of law, the employee handbook disclaimed an enforceable contract. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS

Employers Mutual Casualty Company is an Iowa-based company engaged in the business of property and casualty insurance. EMC Insurance Group Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Employers Mutual Casualty Company and maintains an office in the city of Minnetonka. For purposes of this opinion, we refer to the two companies collectively as EMC.

We recite the relevant facts in the light most favorable to Coursolle, who was the non-moving party in the district court.¹ Coursolle began working for EMC in April 2000 as a claims adjustor in its Minnetonka office. He received a copy of EMC's employee handbook on his first day of work. He signed an “Employee Handbook Receipt” that same day.

In the summer of 2006, the claims manager in the Minnetonka office retired and was replaced by Michael Huttner. Coursolle reported directly to Huttner. In November 2006, an EMC employee in the Minnetonka office filed a written complaint with EMC's human resources department, alleging that Huttner had harassed her and intimidated her. Lisa Scaglione, an employee-relations consultant in EMC's Iowa office, investigated the complaint by conducting telephone interviews of EMC employees who reported to Huttner. When Scaglione spoke with Coursolle, she asked him questions about Huttner. Coursolle told Scaglione that he believed that Huttner was not a fair manager. Coursolle informed Scaglione that, since Huttner became claims manager, his co-workers were afraid of making mistakes and being reprimanded. He stated, “Everyone looks over their shoulder-they are scared to death.” Coursolle responded “yes” when Scaglione asked him whether he considered Huttner to be “intimidating.”

Coursolle contends that Huttner retaliated against him because he spoke with Scaglione. He stated in his brief that “threats were made,” “folders were shaken,” and “statements were made.” Coursolle alleged that he “experienced harassment, discrimination, intimidation, retaliation, mental anguish, emotional distress, and daily ongoing abuse” from Huttner. In March 2007, Coursolle quit his job after giving EMC two weeks' notice.

In February 2009, Coursolle commenced this action in the Hennepin County District Court. In his complaint, he alleged seven employment-related claims. In March 2009, EMC moved to dismiss Coursolle's claims. In September 2009, the district court granted EMC's motion in part and dismissed four of Coursolle's claims.

In October 2009, EMC moved for summary judgment on Coursolle's remaining claims of a violation of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, tortious interference with contract, and breach of contract. In April 2010, the district court granted the motion for summary judgment. The district court concluded that Coursolle had not created a genuine issue of material fact on his whistleblower claim because he did not identify any law that EMC violated or was suspected of violating. The district court concluded that Coursolle had not created a genuine issue of material fact on his breach-of-contract claim because Coursolle did not prove that he entered into an enforceable contract with EMC. The district court also reasoned that EMC was entitled to summary judgment on Coursolle's allegation of a constructive discharge because Coursolle did not show intolerable working conditions, illegal discrimination, or evidence that EMC intended to force him to quit. Coursolle appeals from the district court's entry of summary judgment.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err by granting EMC's motion for summary judgment on Coursolle's whistleblower claim?

II. Did the district court err by granting EMC's motion for summary judgment on Coursolle's breach-of-contract claim?

III. Did the district court err in its analysis of Coursolle's allegations of constructive discharge?

ANALYSIS

Coursolle raises three issues on appeal, each of which relates to the district court's grant of summary judgment. A district court must grant a motion for summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. A genuine issue of material fact exists if a rational trier of fact, considering the record as a whole, could find for the non-moving party. Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Group, Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Minn.2008). We apply a de novo standard of review to a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Minn.2008).

I.

Coursolle first argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to EMC on his claim that EMC violated the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, Minn.Stat. § 181.932 (2010). More specifically, Coursolle argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether he engaged in conduct that is protected by the whistleblower act because he cooperated with Scaglione's investigation.

The Minnesota Whistleblower Act prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because the employee engaged in conduct that is protected by the act. The statute states, in relevant part:

An employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten, otherwise discriminate against, or penalize an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because:

(1) the employee, or a person acting on behalf of an employee, in good faith, reports a violation or suspected violation of any federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law to an employer or to any governmental body or law enforcement official; [or]

(2) the employee is requested by a public body or office to participate in an investigation, hearing, inquiry[.]

Id., subd. 1. To establish liability under the whistleblower act, an employee must prove three elements: “[1] statutorily protected conduct by the employee, [2] an adverse employment action by the employer, and [3] a causal connection between the two.” Gee v. Minnesota State Colls. & Univs., 700 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Minn.App.2005); see also Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 226–27 (Minn.2010) (plurality opinion); Kratzer v. Welsh Cos., LLC, 771 N.W.2d 14, 18–19 (Minn.2009).

The district court concluded that Coursolle did not create a genuine issue of material fact because he did not produce evidence that he reported a violation or suspected violation of law to EMC. The district court reasoned that Coursolle spoke only with Scaglione, “merely ‘answered her questions,’ ” and did not tell Scaglione that Huttner was engaging in unlawful conduct. On appeal, Coursolle does not challenge this aspect of the district court's reasoning. In fact, Coursolle's brief does not focus on the content of what he said to Scaglione or whether his statements constitute a report of “a violation or suspected violation of any federal or state law.” Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1). Rather, Coursolle contends that he engaged in conduct protected by the whistleblower act simply because he participated in EMC's investigation of another employee's complaint against Huttner. Coursolle reasons that he engaged in protected conduct because the other employee filed a good-faith complaint of a violation of law and because he provided information that tended to corroborate her complaint.

Coursolle relies on paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 181.932, subdivision 1, which are quoted above. Neither of those paragraphs supports Coursolle's argument. The plain language of paragraph (1) requires evidence that “the employee, or a person acting on behalf of an employee,” made a report of “a violation or suspected violation of any federal or state law.” Id. Coursolle essentially concedes that he did not make such a report, and he does not contend that any other employee made a report on his behalf. In fact, the evidentiary record makes clear that the employee who prompted EMC's investigation made a report on her own behalf and that Coursolle merely provided information that may have corroborated her complaint. Coursolle does not take issue with the district court's determination that he did not communicate facts to Scaglione that would state a violation or suspected violation of law. See Kratzer, 771 N.W.2d at 19; Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 354–55 (Minn.2002). Once again, Coursolle's argument...