Abraham v. County of Hennepin

• Decision Date: 07 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. CX-00-835, No. C7-00-1652.
• Citation: 639 N.W.2d 342
• Parties: David ABRAHAM, et al., Petitioners, Appellants, v. COUNTY OF HENNEPIN, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

639 N.W.2d 342

David ABRAHAM, et al., Petitioners, Appellants, v. COUNTY OF HENNEPIN, Respondent.

Nos. CX-00-835, C7-00-1652.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

February 7, 2002.

Leslie L. Lienemann, Burnsville, Attorney for Appellants.

Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Martin D. Munic, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Attorneys for Respondent.

Douglas A. Hedin, Hedin & Goldberg, P.A., Minneapolis, Attorney for Amicus Curiae National Employment Lawyers Association.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Justice.

In separate but consolidated actions appellants David Abraham and Scott Lennander brought claims seeking only money damages against their former employer, respondent Hennepin County, for retaliatory discharge in violation of the Whistleblower Act, Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a) (2000), and the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA), Minn. Stat. § 182.654, subd. 9 (2000).¹

The district court initially granted the county's motion for summary judgment, dismissing all claims, and appellants appealed dismissal of the whistleblower and MOSHA claims. The court of appeals remanded, directing the district court to determine whether retaliation more likely than not motivated the county's discharges, even if the county also had a legitimate reason for the discharges.

On remand, the district court granted the county's motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the whistleblower claims, concluding that the whistleblower claims and MOSHA claims arose out of the same facts, involved the same proof and the same damages, and thus, could not be concurrently pursued. The court denied appellants' request for trial by jury. Following trial to the court, the district court concluded that the county had not violated MOSHA by discharging appellants in retaliation for complaining to their supervisors and to the Occupational Safety and Health Division of the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (Safety and Health Division), instead finding that the county discharged appellants for intentionally introducing chemicals into their work area on the day of an inspection by the Safety and Health Division, and entered judgment dismissing appellants' MOSHA claims.

On the second appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision denying appellants the right to trial by jury but reversed the district court's decision dismissing appellants' whistleblower claims and remanded. Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 622 N.W.2d 121, 129-30 (Minn.App.2001). The court of appeals concluded that the Minnesota Constitution generally guarantees a right to jury trial for actions that were recognized as common law actions when the constitution was adopted. 622 N.W.2d at 126. The court also concluded that when the legislature creates a new action that was not recognized as a common law action when the constitution was adopted, it is for the legislature to determine whether the right to a jury trial should be granted or withheld. 622 N.W.2d at 125. The court concluded that because retaliatory discharge actions under the Whistleblower Act and MOSHA did not exist at common law when the constitution was adopted, appellants have no constitutional right to jury trial. 622 N.W.2d at 126.

We conclude that there is a constitutional guarantee to trial by jury for appellants' actions. We affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the court of appeals, vacate the judgment of the district court, and remand for jury trial.

I.

In April 1995 appellants were discharged from employment as offset equipment operators in Hennepin County's print shop. According to the county, appellant Lennander was discharged for intentionally pouring chemicals on carpeting in the work area during an inspection on March 22, 1995, by the Safety and Health Division; appellant Abraham was discharged for intentionally spraying chemicals into the air during the same inspection. Appellants allege that the county discharged them in retaliation for their complaints to their supervisors in February 1995 that fumes in the workplace were making them ill and in retaliation for appellant Abraham's written complaint on March 2, 1995, to the Safety and Health Division, which resulted in the inspection.² Abraham complained to the Safety and Health Division that the employees of the county's print shop believed they were faced with an immediate health threat due to chemicals in the air. Appellants were subsequently discharged, and their claims for retaliatory discharge followed.

II.

We first address the issue of whether an employee may pursue concurrently in the same action a whistleblower³ and a MOSHA⁴ retaliatory discharge claim when both claims seek only money damages and arise out of the same facts.⁵ Whether statutory claims arising out of the same facts may be pursued concurrently is a legal issue, and we review legal issues de novo. See Hibbing Educ. Ass'n v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Minn.1985)

.

Ordinarily, unless a statute provides that its remedy is exclusive, a party should not be prevented from bringing concurrent claims. See, e.g., Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 377-79 (Minn.1990)

(holding that both statutory cause of action for sexual harassment and common law cause of action for battery can be maintained even though both claims arise from same set of operative facts); Cox v. Crown CoCo, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 490, 496-97 (Minn.App.1996) (allowing claim for retaliatory discharge under both the Whistleblower Act and MOSHA); State by Humphrey v. Baillon Co., 503 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn.App.1993) (rejecting argument that attorney fee provisions of Minn.Stat. ch. 117 are exclusive method of recovering attorney fees in eminent domain proceedings because those provisions do not expressly provide that they are exclusive method of recovering attorney fees in eminent domain proceedings). It is not for this court to deny a plaintiff the right to pursue a claim that the legislature has provided. Of course, a plaintiff may not recover duplicative money damages. Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 379.

In Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center, 551 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. 1996), we held that an employee may not seek redress for the same allegedly discriminatory practices on the same facts under both the MHRA and the Whistleblower Act, because the MHRA expressly provides that its procedure, while pending, shall be exclusive.⁶ 551 N.W.2d at 486. Williams is clearly distinguishable from the instant case in that neither the Whistleblower Act nor MOSHA includes an exclusive remedy provision. See Minn.Stat. §§ 181.935 & 182.669, subd. 1. In fact, the Whistleblower Act expressly provides that its remedies will be "[i]n addition to any remedies otherwise provided by law."⁷ Minn.Stat. § 181.935(a).

The district court concluded that appellants could pursue claims only under MOSHA because the specific provisions of MOSHA prevail over the more general provisions of the Whistleblower Act. The district court relied on the rule of statutory construction that provides that if an irreconcilable conflict exists between a general provision of law and a specific provision of law, then the specific provision of law prevails, unless the general provision was enacted later in time and the legislature made it clear that the general provision was to prevail, Minn.Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2000). Section 645.26, subdivision 1, however, is applicable only when laws are irreconcilable. The provisions of the Whistleblower Act and MOSHA are not irreconcilable. We noted in Williams that the MHRA and the Whistleblower Act are irreconcilable because of the MHRA's exclusive remedy provision. 551 N.W.2d at 485. Here, neither the Whistleblower Act nor MOSHA has an exclusive remedy provision; in fact, the Whistleblower Act expressly provides that its remedies are not exclusive. Minn.Stat. § 181.935(a).

We hold that claims for retaliatory discharge, seeking only money damages, brought under the remedy provisions of both the Whistleblower Act, Minn.Stat. § 181.935(a), and MOSHA, Minn.Stat. § 182.669, subd. 1, may be pursued concurrently in one action.

III.

We turn next to the issue of whether Article I, Section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution guarantees the right to trial by jury in an action, such as this, in which an employee seeks only money damages for retaliatory discharge from employment in violation of the Whistleblower Act and MOSHA. This court reviews de novo a lower court's interpretation and application of the Minnesota Constitution. Olson v. Synergistic Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 148 (Minn.2001).

Neither the Whistleblower Act nor MOSHA specifically provides for the right to jury trial in its remedy provision, see Minn.Stat. §§ 181.935, 182.669, subd. 1, so that right, if it exists, must arise under the constitution, Ewert v. City of Winthrop, 278 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Minn.1979). Article I, Section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution guarantees that, "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy." Minn. Const. art. I, § 4. This provision is intended to continue, unimpaired and inviolate, the right to trial by jury as it existed in the Territory of Minnesota when our constitution was adopted in 1857. See Olson, 628 N.W.2d at 148

(holding that promissory estoppel is equitable action in Minnesota and therefore does not carry attendant right to jury trial); Whallon v. Bancroft, 4 Minn. 109, 111 (Gil.70, 74) (1860).

Appellants argue that they are entitled to have their actions tried to a jury because their actions are legal in nature and seek the recovery of money only.⁸ The county argues that neither the Whistleblower Act nor MOSHA provides for trial by jury, and that there is no constitutional right to trial by jury since these actions, created by statute, did not exist when the constitution was...