People v. Huckabay

• Decision Date: 18 May 2020
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 20SA31
• Citation: 463 P.3d 283
• Parties: In Re The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff v. Donald Eugene HUCKABAY, Defendant.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

463 P.3d 283

In Re The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff

v.Donald Eugene HUCKABAY, Defendant.

Supreme Court Case No. 20SA31

Supreme Court of Colorado.

May 18, 2020

Attorneys for Plaintiff: J.E. Chostner, District Attorney, Tenth Judicial District, Eric R. Bellas, Deputy District Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado

Attorneys for Defendant: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, Emily E. Follansbee, Deputy Public Defender, Pueblo, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE HART delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Last year, in People v. Tafoya , 2019 CO 13, 434 P.3d 1193, we were asked to decide whether a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing on the charge of driving under the influence ("DUI"), a class four felony, where the defendant is held in custody on that charge. Based on the plain language of the felony DUI statute, we concluded that a defendant does indeed have the right to a preliminary hearing under such circumstances. Tafoya , ¶¶ 2, 16–20, 29, 434 P.3d at 1194, 1196–97.

¶2 In this case, we find ourselves confronted with a question left open in Tafoya : Is a defendant charged with felony DUI entitled to demand and receive a preliminary hearing where the defendant is not in custody, but the offense requires "mandatory sentencing"? Today we answer this question in the affirmative. A defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing whenever he is charged with a class four, five, or six felony and the charge requires the imposition of mandatory sentencing. Further, by its plain meaning, "mandatory sentencing" involves any period of incarceration required by law. Applying these principles to this case, we hold that Donald Eugene Huckabay is entitled to a preliminary hearing because he was charged with felony DUI—a class four felony that carries mandatory sentencing.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶3 The facts of this case are straightforward and undisputed. On May 25, 2019, Huckabay was arrested in Pueblo County and charged initially with misdemeanor DUI, DUI per se, and careless driving. The following day, Huckabay was granted release from custody on personal recognizance.

¶4 On June 4, 2019, the People filed an amended complaint and information charging Huckabay with DUI—fourth or subsequent offense, a class four felony under section 42-4-1301(1)(a), C.R.S. (2019). The People also dismissed the other charges against Huckabay.

¶5 On December 30, 2019, Huckabay moved for a preliminary hearing pursuant to section 16-5-301(1)(a), C.R.S. (2019), and Crim. P. 7(h)(1), noting that, according to both of these provisions, a defendant charged with a class four felony requiring "mandatory sentencing" is entitled to a preliminary hearing. Further, Huckabay argued that that the statute setting forth the penalties for felony DUI, section 42-4-1307(6.5)(b), C.R.S. (2019), in fact requires "mandatory sentencing"—at a minimum, a sentence to probation, plus either 90 days' incarceration in county jail or 120 days in county jail through a work- or education-release program. As such, Huckabay contended that because his class four felony DUI charge required mandatory sentencing, he was entitled to a preliminary hearing on that charge.

¶6 On January 6, 2020, one week after Huckabay filed his motion, the district court issued an oral ruling summarily denying Huckabay's preliminary hearing request. Huckabay then initiated this C.A.R. 21 matter, relying essentially on the arguments he had advanced in his earlier motion. We issued a rule to show cause and, for the reasons set forth below, we now make the rule absolute.

II. Analysis

¶7 We begin with a discussion of our jurisdiction to consider this matter. We then analyze the preliminary hearing statute, section 16-5-301(1)(a) ; the statute defining felony DUI, section 42-4-1301(1)(a) ; the general felony classification statute, section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2019); and the statute outlining the penalties for felony DUI, section 42-4-1307(6.5). Reading all of these provisions together, as we must, we conclude that a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing whenever he is charged with a class four, five, or six felony and this charge requires the imposition of a mandatory period of incarceration. Because felony DUI is a class four felony that requires an offender to serve time in jail, Huckabay is entitled to a preliminary hearing.

A. Original Jurisdiction

¶8 We first address whether relief in the nature of an original proceeding is the appropriate vehicle for resolution of Huckabay's claim that the district court improperly denied his request for a preliminary hearing. We conclude that it is.

¶9 The exercise of original jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 21 is within our sole discretion. Fognani v. Young , 115 P.3d 1268, 1271 (Colo. 2005). Any relief granted under Rule 21 is "an extraordinary remedy that is limited in both purpose and availability." Villas at Highland Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Villas at Highland Park, LLC , 2017 CO 53, ¶ 22, 394 P.3d 1144, 1151. In the past, we have deemed such relief appropriate "when an appellate remedy would be inadequate, when a party may otherwise suffer irreparable harm, [or] when a petition raises issues of significant public importance that we have not yet considered." People v. Kilgore , 2020 CO 6, ¶ 8, 455 P.3d 746, 748 (citations and quotations omitted).

¶10 Given these considerations, relief under Rule 21 is appropriate for several reasons. First, we have observed previously that where the error alleged involves the right to a preliminary hearing, any appellate remedy that a defendant might have would be inadequate because his right to a preliminary hearing—that is, a judicial determination of whether there is probable cause sufficient to subject the defendant to trial—would clearly be moot after trial. See Tafoya , ¶¶ 14–15, 434 P.3d at 1195. Second, the issue now before us is one of first impression. As discussed earlier, while we have previously opined on the question whether an in-custody defendant charged with felony DUI is entitled to a preliminary hearing, see id. at ¶ 29, 434 P.3d at 1197, we have yet to speak on whether an out-of-custody defendant is similarly entitled. And third, this issue is one of significant public importance. The crime of felony DUI results from a recent statutory amendment, cf. id. at ¶ 15, 434 P.3d at 1195–96, and whether an out-of-custody defendant charged with felony DUI has the right to a preliminary hearing is a question likely to recur across all judicial districts.

¶11 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that our exercise of jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Rule 21 is warranted.

B. A Felony DUI Conviction Requires "Mandatory Sentencing," Thereby Triggering a Defendant's Right to a Preliminary Hearing.

¶12 Huckabay contends that because his felony DUI charge requires mandatory sentencing, the plain language of both section 16-5-301(1)(a) and Crim. P. 7(h)(1) entitles him to a preliminary hearing. We agree.

¶13 At the outset, we observe that "mandatory sentencing" is not expressly defined in either the statute or the rule. See People v. Austin , 2018 CO 47, ¶ 7, 419 P.3d 587, 588. The meaning of this term therefore presents a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. McCoy v. People , 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379, 389. In interpreting a statute, we begin with the statute's plain language. Wolf Ranch, LLC v. City of Colo. Springs , 220 P.3d 559, 563 (Colo. 2009). If the language is clear and unambiguous on its face, we simply apply it as written and will not resort to other interpretive aids. See Blooming Terrace No. 1, LLC v. KH Blake St., LLC , 2019 CO 58, ¶ 11, 444 P.3d 749, 752. Further, we regard the statutory scheme "as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts." McCoy , ¶ 38, 442 P.3d at 389.

¶14 The preliminary hearing statute provides in relevant part:

[O]nly those persons accused of a class 4, 5, or 6 felony by direct information or felony complaint which felony requires mandatory sentencing ... shall have the right to demand and receive a preliminary hearing within a reasonable time to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the offense charged in the information or felony complaint was committed by the defendant.

§ 16-5-301(1)(a) (emphases added); see also Crim. P. 7(h)(1) ("In cases in which a direct information was filed pursuant to Rule 7(c), charging ... a class 4, 5, or 6 felony ... if such felony requires mandatory sentencing ... a preliminary hearing is authorized.").

¶15 Thus, a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing where two conditions are satisfied: (1) the defendant is accused of a class four, five, or six felony; and (2) the charge requires mandatory sentencing. For Huckabay—a defendant facing a DUI charge with at least three prior DUI convictions under his belt—we know with certainty that the first condition has been met. According to the DUI statute, "[d]riving under the influence is a misdemeanor, but it is a class 4 felony if the violation occurred after three or more prior convictions , arising out of separate and distinct criminal episodes, for DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI." § 42-4-1301(1)(a) (emphasis added). The remaining question before us, therefore, is whether Huckabay's felony DUI charge carries "mandatory sentencing," thereby triggering his right to a preliminary hearing.

¶16 To answer this question, we look to the statute outlining the various penalties for DUI. Section 42-4-1307(6.5)(a) specifies that "[a] person who commits a felony DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI offense shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of section 18-1.3-401 and this subsection (6.5)." (Emphasis added.) Here, we note that "[t]here is a presumption that the word ‘shall’ when used in a statute is mandatory." Mook v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs , 2020 CO 12, ¶ 80, 457 P.3d 568, 583 (quoting Riley v. People , 104 P.3d 218, 221 (Colo. 2004) ). And based on the usage of the word "shall" in the DUI penalty statute, a sentencing court...