Craft v. State, 92-04349
| Decision Date | 15 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-04349,92-04349 |
| Citation | 638 So.2d 1011 |
| Parties | 19 Fla. L. Weekly D1326 Jimmy Wayne CRAFT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Domingo G. Alvarez, III, Orlando, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and John M. Klawikofsky, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
Because the state failed to establish an exigent circumstance that would permit law enforcement officers to enter the defendant's home without first knocking and announcing their presence, we reverse the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress filed by the defendant, Jimmy Wayne Craft.
The state argued, and the trial court ruled, that the officer peril exception to the knock-and-announce requirement justified the entry because the officers who were going to execute a search warrant at Craft's residence had reason to believe they would be in peril based on information regarding Craft's possession of a firearm, an intercom system and a police scanner. Testimony presented at a hearing on Craft's motion to suppress established that the back door of Craft's residence was broken open with a sledge hammer within seconds of, or simultaneously with, the officers' announcement, "sheriff's department, search warrant." The trial court ruled, and we agree, that if the officers knocked and announced their authority and purpose, they did so with such haste that Craft did not have a reasonable opportunity to respond. Therefore, the officers did not follow the knock-and-announce procedures set forth in section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1993). 1
The importance of following the knock-and-announce procedures was underscored by the supreme court in State v. Bamber, 630 So.2d 1048, 1051-1052 (Fla.1994), when it reiterated the basis for the knock-and-announce requirement as set forth in its earlier opinion, Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706, 709 (Fla.1964), wherein the court said:
Entering one's home without legal authority and neglect to give the occupants notice have been condemned by the law and the common custom of this country and England from time immemorial. It was condemned by the yearbooks of Edward IV, before the discovery of this country by Columbus. Judge Prettyman for the court of appeals in Accarino v. United States ... discussed the history and reasons for it. William Pitt categorized a man's home as his castle. Paraphrasing one of his speeches in which he apostrophized the home, it was said in about this fashion: The poorest pioneer in his log cabin may bid defiance to the forces of the crown. It may be located so far in the backwoods that the sun rises this side of it; it may be unsteady; the roof may leak; the wind may blow through it; the cold may penetrate it and his dog may sleep beneath the front steps, but it is his castle that the king may not enter and his men dare not cross the threshold without his permission.
This sentiment has moulded our concept of the home as one's castle as well as the law to protect it. The law forbids the law enforcement officers of the state or the United States to enter before knocking at the door, giving his name and the purpose of his call. There is nothing more terrifying to the occupants than to be suddenly confronted in the privacy of their home by a police officer decorated with guns and the insignia of his office. This is why the law protects its entrance so rigidly. The law so interpreted is nothing more than another expression of the moral emphasis placed on liberty and sanctity of the home in a free country. Liberty without virtue is much alike a spirited horse, apt to go berserk on slight provocation if not restrained by a severe bit. (citations omitted).
Against this historical backdrop, we examine the case before us. The officer peril exception was one of four exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule recognized by the supreme court in Benefield. 2 Thirty years later, in Bamber, the supreme court once again recognized that, although a strong presumption exists against the validity of a no-knock search, such searches are lawful when certain exigent circumstances exist at the scene. 630 So.2d at 1052. However, in order to determine whether the circumstances of a given case constitute a valid exception, the court found that a particularity approach was favorable to a blanket approach for assessing the reasonableness of an officer's belief regarding whether an exigent circumstance was present. The court held that an officer's belief must be based on particular circumstances existing at the time of entry and must be grounded on something more than his or her generalized knowledge. Id. at 1055. Thus, in the present case, we must determine whether the officers had good reason to believe they might be in peril at the time of the execution of the search warrant.
The only evidence presented to justify the officer peril exception was the testimony of two narcotics officers regarding their separate contacts with two separate confidential informants who, in turn, had contact with Craft. This evidence was the sole basis of the entry team being told that Craft was known to carry weapons and that the execution of the warrant was to be a no-knock entry. 3 The first officer related two incidents which occurred two years prior to the execution of the search warrant that is the subject of this appeal. This officer testified that he had a confidential informant make a controlled drug buy from Craft in September of 1989. Approximately one week later, the CI attempted a second buy but did not complete it. Over defense objection to the hearsay, the officer testified that the CI stated that Craft ran him away from the house at gunpoint. This officer was unable to establish the CI's reliability. He acknowledged that he had used the CI only once, prior to these encounters with Craft, and that he was never used again. Also, no charges were ever filed against Craft as a result of the controlled buy....
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