Crews v. State

• Decision Date: 25 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. SC14–319.,SC14–319.
• Parties: William R. CREWS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

183 So.3d 329

William R. CREWS, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC14–319.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 25, 2015.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 19, 2016.

Nancy Ann Daniels, Public Defender, and Glen Phillip Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, Jennifer Johnson Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Donna Antoinette Gerace, Assistant Attorney General, and Justin Derek Chapman, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.

Pamela Langston Cooper, General Counsel, and William Alexander Spillias, Assistant Director of Legal Services, Florida Education Association, Tallahassee, FL, for Amicus Curiae Florida Education Association.

CANADY, J.

In this case we are asked to decide a question of law which the First District Court of Appeal certified to be of great public importance:

DOES THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR "MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE" BY A PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE IN SECTION 775.15(12)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES, APPLY TO A PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER?

Crews v. State, No. 1D12–4703 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 4, 2014). The district court held that the statutory provision in question, which extends the statute of limitations in certain circumstances, applied in this case and on that basis affirmed Petitioner's convictions of several offenses. Crews v. State, 130 So.3d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Petitioner seeks review. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. In addition to considering Petitioner's claim that the district court erred in holding that the statute applies to public school teachers, we also consider his alternative argument that the statute in question is inapplicable in this case because the charged criminal conduct was not connected to the performance of his duties as a teacher. We hold that the statutory provision applies to public school teachers and that it applies in this case.

FACTS

In August 2012, the State filed an information against Petitioner, a public school teacher, charging him with sexual offenses against minors over the age of twelve, including eight counts charging second- or third-degree felonies alleged to have been committed between June 2001 and June 2006.¹ Ordinarily these charges would have been barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to second- and third-degree felonies. See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001).² However, the State also charged that when he committed the offenses, Petitioner was a public employee and that by committing them, he engaged in "misconduct in office" under section 775.15(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2001).³ Section 775.15(3)(b) extended the limitation period for offenses "based upon misconduct in office by a public officer or employee."⁴

Petitioner moved to dismiss all eight charges under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired and the provision that extended the limitation period did not apply. The bringing of charges within the limitation period is a factual matter which the State must prove just as it must prove all other elements of the offense. See Sturdivan v. State, 419 So.2d 300, 301–02 (Fla.1982) ; State v. King, 282 So.2d 162 (Fla.1973) ; Gray v. State, 803 So.2d 755, 756 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). A motion to dismiss under rule 3.190(c)(4) asserts that "[t]here are no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant." The purpose of a motion to dismiss under rule 3.190(c)(4) is to determine whether the facts which the State has alleged and upon which it will offer evidence show a prima facie case of guilt on the part of the defendant. See Styron v. State, 662 So.2d 965, 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

The State filed traverses to the motions to dismiss. The State's traverses disputed Petitioner's claim that the undisputed facts showed that the statute of limitations had expired. The State's traverses disputed certain factual statements in Petitioner's motion and alleged additional facts supporting its position that the extension statute was applicable. These filings framed for the trial court's determination the issue of whether the State had established a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant. See, e.g., Dixon v. State, 112 So.3d 721, 723 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ; State v. Yarn, 63 So.3d 82, 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). Finding that there were disputed facts or that the undisputed facts established a prima facie case of defendant's guilt, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss. Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motions to dismiss. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty of the charged offenses. By pleading nolo contendere, Petitioner admitted the facts alleged in the information. See, e.g., Vernold v. State, 376 So.2d 1166, 1167 (Fla.1979). A defendant pleading nolo contendere can reserve only legal issues for appeal. See Falco v. State, 407 So.2d 203, 206 (Fla.1981). Whether a statute applies to a given set of facts is a legal issue. See Koile v. State, 934 So.2d 1226, 1229 (Fla.2006).

Thus the legal issue framed for appellate review was whether the statute of limitations' extension provision for "misconduct in office by a public officer or employee" was applicable in this case. The district court of appeal affirmed the convictions. Crews v. State, 130 So.3d at 702. Then it certified the question set out above.

ANALYSIS

I.

First we address the certified question. The certified question asks whether a statute applies to a given set of facts. This is a question of law calling for de novo review. See Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Fla.2006). The district court held that the offenses were "misconduct in office" and that the statute applied to Petitioner because he was a public school teacher. Petitioner argues that the statutory language is ambiguous and in need of judicial construction to ascertain its meaning. Petitioner argues that we should look to the rules of statutory construction and that applying the appropriate rules of construction leads to the conclusion that the statute does not apply to public school teachers. The State responds that the language of the statute is clear and therefore no resort to rules of construction is necessary. If the language requires interpretation to determine its intended meaning, the State argues, applying the rules of construction leads to the conclusion that the statute is intended to apply to public school teachers.

The object of statutory interpretation is to determine legislative intent. See, e.g., Raymond James Fin. Servs. v. Phillips, 126 So.3d 186 (Fla.2013) ; Larimore v. State, 2 So.3d 101, 106 (Fla.2008) ; Kasischke v. State, 991 So.2d 803 (Fla.2008). We look first to the words of the statute to determine legislative intent. See, e.g., Kephart, 932 So.2d at 1091 ; Zuckerman v. Alter, 615 So.2d 661, 663 (Fla.1993) ; S.R.G. Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 365 So.2d 687, 689 (Fla.1978). "[W]ords of common usage, when used in a statute, should be construed in their plain and ordinary sense." Pedersen v. Green, 105 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1958).

The relevant language of section 775.15(12)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), provides:

(12) If the period prescribed in subsection (2) ... has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for:

....

(b) Any offense based upon misconduct in office by a public officer or employee at any time when the defendant is in public office or employment, within 2 years from the time he or she leaves public office or employment, or during any time permitted by any other part of this section, whichever time is greater.

(Emphasis added.) The certified question asks us to determine whether this statute applies to public school teachers. In LaMorte v. State, 984 So.2d 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), a public school teacher was charged with several offenses and the charging document included the allegation that the offenses constituted misconduct in office by a public employee. The defendant moved to dismiss for expiration of the statute of limitations. When his motion to dismiss was denied, defendant pled nolo contendere and was convicted. On appeal he argued that the limitation extension statute applied only to persons holding public office and was therefore inapplicable. The district court found that the words "public officer or employee" were clear in meaning. Id. at 552. The court held that the extension statute applied to public employees as well to public officers and that it applied to public school teachers. Id. at 550, 552–53.

To support his contention that the meaning of the provision is unclear, Petitioner suggests that the words "misconduct in office," when juxtaposed with the words "public office or employment" are discordant because of the inference that to commit "misconduct in office," one needs to hold or be in a "public office." Petitioner argues that this creates an ambiguity and that under the rule of lenity,⁵ an ambiguity in a criminal statute must be resolved in favor of the defendant.

Petitioner points out that in the public education statutes, teachers are not defined as "employees" but as "instructional personnel."⁶ Relying on the canon of statutory construction in pari materia,⁷ i.e., that statutes on the same subject matter should be read together, he argues that the limitation extension statute should be construed in light of the definitions found in the education statute, under which, according to the argument, a public school teacher would not be considered a public employee. For further support of this argument, Petitioner relies on the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius ,⁸ the rule that in a statute, the inclusion of one thing indicates the exclusion of others. The argument is that the Legislature's choice to include classroom teachers within the defined category of "instructional personnel" in the public education statute...