Cuppy v. Stollwerck Bros. Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 January 1916
• Citation: 216 N.Y. 591,111 N.E. 249
• Parties: CUPPY v. STOLLWERCK BROS., Inc.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

216 N.Y. 591

111 N.E. 249

CUPPY

v.STOLLWERCK BROS., Inc.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 11, 1916.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Action by Hazlitt A. Cuppy against Stollwerck Bros., Incorporated. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (158 App. Div. 628,143 N. Y. Supp. 967), plaintiff appeals. Judgment of the Appellate Division reversed, and judgment of the Trial Term for plaintiff affirmed.

Frank R. Savidge, of New York City (Frederick M. Thompson, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Rambaut & Wilson, of New York City (Edward H. Wilson, of New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

SEABURY, J.

This is an action to recover salary which the plaintiff claims to be due him under an alleged contract of employment for one year. The plaintiff claims to have been discharged at the end of four months. The claim of the plaintiff is that he was employed by the defendant as manager for the year 1910 at the compensation of $15,000, and $1,000 for expenses, and 15 per cent. of the profits of the defendant after the $15,000 should have been deducted. It was the claim of the plaintiff that during the year in question the defendant's profits amounted to $100,000, and that he was entitled to $12,750 thereof. The defendant put in issue the making of the contract either as to the salary or profits, and claimed that the plaintiff was not employed for any definite period, but was employed at the rate of so much a year; that any contract of employment which the plaintiff may have had was subject to the power of the board of directors of the defendant to cancel it at any time; and that after four months' service the board of directors terminated that contract, the plaintiff having been paid in full for services rendered up to that time. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that there was a contract for one year, and that the contract was not terminated by the resolution of the defendant's board of directors. The jury found a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the balance of the salary for the year 1910 for $10,000, with interest.

The Appellant Division held that there was no contract for a year, and that in any event the resolution of the defendant's board of directors terminated any contract that may have existed, and directed that the judgment entered upon the verdict of the jury should be reversed, unless the plaintiff would stipulate to reduce the verdict to $1,520.33, the amount of the salary due from April 30, 1910, to which date it had been paid, to June 6, 1910, when the board of directors of the defendant passed the resolution purporting to terminate the plaintiff's employment.The plaintiff refused so to stipulate, and the judgment was reversed upon the law, the facts being reviewed and affirmed, and the plaintiff now appeals to this court. It is necessary to determine whether the plaintiff was employed for a period of one year, and whether the resolution of the board of directors terminated the plaintiff's employment. These are the grounds upon which the Appellate Division reversed the judgment, and seem to us to present the only questions which require discussion.

[1] A voluminous correspondence in the form of letters and cablegrams passed between the parties, which need not be set out in full. The learned Appellate Division were of the opinion that the employment was at a specified rate per year, and not for the definite term of a year, and was therefore merely at will. It has frequently been held that an employment at a specified rate per year is not an employment for a year. Martin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 148 N. Y. 117, 42 N. E. 416;Watson v. Gugino, 204 N. Y. 535, 98 N. E. 18, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1090, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 215.

[2] The facts of this case, as disclosed by the correspondence of the parties, do not bring the case within the application of this rule. In determining whether there was a contract for the term of a year the whole correspondence must be considered. This question cannot be determined upon one or two extracts from the correspondence considered apart from their context. In the letter which the plaintiff wrote to the defendant on December 8, 1909, he set forth the conditions upon which he proposed to continue in the defendant's employment. In that letter he asked: ‘What am I to receive during the coming year?’ On December 16th the plaintiff again wrote defendant specifying definitely the compensation which ‘I shall expect to receive * * * at the rate of $10,000 per year,’ etc. If the letters of the plaintiff of December 8th and 16th stood alone, there would be room for the contention that the plaintiff proposed that he should be employed at a specified rate ‘per year,’ rather than for a period of a year. These letters, however, do not stand alone. On December 31st the defendant acknowledged the receipt of the two letters which the plaintiff had written, and on January 3, 1910, the plaintiff cabled: ‘Do you confirm the agreement terms as per my letter 16th day of December, 15th day of November, twelve months, also one authority, telegraph immediately.’ To this message the defendant, on January 5th, answered: ‘You have authority with certain limits.’ To this message the plaintiff responded: ‘If you will not agree to abide by the conditions of letters dated 16th December, 15th November, twelve months, I hereby offer my resignation and request its acceptance Monday, will so advise trade, bankers, salesman.’ On January 7th defendant replied: ‘Wish to see you satisfied working...