Curiel v. Env. Management Services

Decision Date20 December 2007
Docket NumberNo. 26409.,26409.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesMario B. CURIEL, Respondent, v. ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES (MS), Employer, Reliance National Insurance Company, and S.C. Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association, Carrier, Appellants.

J. Hubert Wood, III, and Jason A. Williams, both of Wood, Porter & Warder, L.L.C., of Charleston, for appellants Environmental Management Services and Reliance National Insurance.

Darryl D. Smalls, of Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., of Columbia, for appellant S.C. Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association.

J. Kevin Holmes, of The Steinberg Law Firm, of Charleston, for respondent.

Justice MOORE:

This appeal is from the circuit court's order regarding temporary total workers' compensation benefits and a permanent impairment rating. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

Respondent Curiel (Claimant) filed this claim for workers' compensation benefits after he was struck in the right eye on April 12, 2000, while doing demolition work for his employer, appellant Environmental Management Services (Employer). Claimant suffered a detached retina in his right eye. Employer's compensation carrier, Reliance National Insurance Company, is insolvent, and appellant S.C. Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (Fund) is responsible for benefits.

The single commissioner found Claimant had a compensable injury to his right eye and awarded permanent benefits based on a 60% loss of use. The commissioner denied temporary total benefits. Claimant, Employer, and Fund all appealed. The Commission's Appellate Panel (hereinafter "the Commission") adopted the findings of the single commissioner but found Claimant suffered only a 41.5% loss of use of his right eye rather than 60%. Again, all parties appealed.

The circuit court found Claimant should have been awarded temporary total benefits, and the award of permanent benefits should have taken into consideration the combined effect of the injury to Claimant's right eye and the pre-existing loss of vision in his left eye. The circuit court remanded to the Commission to determine benefits accordingly. Employer and Fund appeal.

ISSUES

1. Does federal law preempt entitlement under our Worker's Compensation Act?

2. Is there substantial evidence to support the commissioner's findings regarding maximum medical improvement and temporary total benefits?

3. Did the circuit court err in remanding for the Commission to consider a preexisting impairment to Claimant's left eye?

4. Is the Fund liable for this claim?

DISCUSSION
1. Preemption under federal law

Claimant is a Mexican national and is admittedly an illegal alien worker. He used fraudulent documents to misrepresent his legal status when applying for the job with Employer in 1997. Under S.C.Code Ann. § 42-1-130 (Supp.2006), for purposes of workers' compensation, "employee" is defined as:

Every person engaged in an employment . . . including aliens and also including minors, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed.

(emphasis added). The single commissioner, the Commission, and the circuit court all found Claimant was entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act.

Employer contends Claimant is not entitled to benefits because federal law preempts state law regarding the payment of benefits to an illegal alien worker. Employer cites the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) which prohibits the hiring of unauthorized aliens or the tendering of fraudulent documents to obtain employment. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a & c. Although IRCA contains no specific provision forbidding workers' compensation benefits to illegal alien workers, Employer argues that the policy of IRCA prohibiting the hiring of illegal aliens conflicts with, and therefore preempts, state law allowing such payments.

North Carolina, which has the same statutory language as § 42-1-130 regarding alien employees, has addressed this precise issue and ruled that IRCA does not preempt an award of workers' compensation benefits under state law. Ruiz v. Belk Masonry Co., 148 N.C.App. 675, 559 S.E.2d 249 (2002). We find the analysis in Ruiz persuasive. The Ruiz court noted a Congressional report on IRCA stating "[i]t is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions provisions of [IRCA] be used to undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in existing law. . . ." Id. at 678, 559 S.E.2d 249. IRCA does not expressly preclude an illegal alien from being considered an employee for workers' compensation benefits, and Ruiz concluded there is no indication preemption was intended. Id. Other state courts have ruled the same way. See, e.g., Safeharbor Employer Servs. I, Inc. v. Cinto Velazquez, 860 So.2d 984 (Fla.App.2003); Earth First Grading & Builders Ins. Group/Ass'n Servs., Inc., v. Gutierrez, 270 Ga.App. 328, 606 S.E.2d 332 (2004); Design Kitchen and Baths v. Lagos, 388 Md. 718, 882 A.2d 817 (2005); Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324 (Minn.2003).

Further, allowing benefits to injured illegal alien workers does not conflict with the IRCA's policy against hiring them. To the contrary, disallowing benefits would mean unscrupulous employers could hire undocumented workers without the burden of insuring them, a consequence that would encourage rather than discourage the hiring of illegal workers.

We find IRCA does not preempt state law and Claimant is not precluded from benefits under our Workers' Compensation Act.

2. Maximum medical improvement and temporary total disability

Employer contends it was error for the circuit court to reverse the commissioner's findings regarding maximum medical improvement and temporary total benefits. We agree.

The single commissioner found Claimant reached maximum medical improvement on October 3, 2002. This is the date of a letter from one of Claimant's treating physicians, Dr. Farr, indicating Claimant's "eye condition is stable at this point." Dr. Farr treated Claimant's eye pressure which was unacceptably high following the retinal detachment injury. Dr. Farr indicated Claimant's eye pressure was controlled with eye drops; he further noted that Claimant should see a low vision specialist to evaluate him for glasses.

On appeal, the circuit court found Claimant could not have reached maximum medical improvement on October 3, 2002, in light of Dr. Farr's recommendation that Claimant's vision could further improve with low vision care. Further, the court found that even if Claimant reached maximum medical improvement on October 3, 2002, as found by the commissioner, Claimant should have been awarded temporary total benefits from the date he was terminated until that date. The circuit court remanded for the commissioner to determine the proper award for temporary total benefits.

Essentially, workers' compensation benefits accrue along a time continuum: temporary total disability benefits are available from the date of injury through the date of maximum medical improvement; post-MMI benefits may then be awarded either as a permanent total or partial disability, or as a percentage of impairment to a scheduled member. Smith v. NCCI, Inc., 369 S.C. 236, 631 S.E.2d 268 (Ct.App.2006). Accordingly, the date of maximum medical improvement signals the end of entitlement to temporary total benefits.

The term "maximum medical improvement" means a person has reached such a plateau that, in the physician's opinion, no further medical care or treatment will lessen the period of impairment. Hall v. United Rentals, Inc., 371 S.C. 69, 89, 636 S.E.2d 876, 887 (Ct.App.2006); Lee v. Harborside Café, 350 S.C. 74, 81, 564 S.E.2d 354, 358 (Ct.App.2002); Dodge v. Bruccoli, Clark, Layman, Inc., 334 S.C. 574, 581, 514 S.E.2d 593, 596 (Ct.App.1999). Maximum medical improvement is a factual determination by the Commission. Hall, supra. Factual determinations by the Commission must be upheld on review unless unsupported by substantial evidence. Shealy v. Aiken County, 341 S.C. 448, 454, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000).

Here, the commissioner found Claimant had reached maximum medical improvement based on Dr. Farr's assessment that his eye condition was stable as of October 3, 2002. The fact that Claimant's sight could have been improved with corrective lenses does not impact his impairment rating. Evidence that loss of vision might be reduced by the use of corrective lenses is not to be considered in determining impairment to vision for purposes of workers' compensation benefits. Dykes v. Daniel Constr. Co., 262 S.C. 98, 106, 202 S.E.2d 646, 650 (1974); see also S.C. Reg. 67-1105A ("Loss of vision is based on reading without corrective lenses."). The commissioner's finding regarding the date of maximum medical improvement is therefore supported by the record and the circuit court erred in reversing this finding.

Further, the circuit court held in the alternative that if Claimant did reach maximum medical improvement on October 3, 2002, he should have received temporary total benefits from the date of his termination until that date.

Claimant was terminated from his job on January 21, 2002, more than two years after his accident. He testified he was fired when Employer learned Claimant's vision was worse than it seemed. Claimant stated that he pretended to see better than he actually could in order to keep his job. Employer's president testified:

A. [Claimant] was told until he got his vision corrected he couldn't work. He came in the office one day and acted like he was drunk, and I, you know, asked him, and he said he couldn't see. . . .

Q. So he was, I guess — are we saying was he terminated, or is it that if his vision is corrected, he's got a job?

A. Yeah, I wouldn't have any problem hiring him back if his vision is corrected.

Claimant's termination form indicates he would be considered for...

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