O'Daniel v. Messier

Decision Date05 April 1995
Citation905 S.W.2d 182
PartiesJohn Julian O'DANIEL and wife Laquitta Gail O'Daniel, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. Jeanette Marie MESSIER, Defendant/Appellant.
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

John R. Bradley, Hendersonville, for plaintiffs/appellees.

Phillip A. George, Gallatin, for defendant/appellant.

OPINION

KOCH, Judge.

This appeal involves a biological mother's efforts to preserve her parental relationship with her five-year-old daughter. The child's paternal grandparents filed an adoption petition in the Circuit Court for Sumner County after obtaining temporary custody of their granddaughter. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found that the mother had abandoned her daughter and granted the grandparents' adoption petition. We reverse the order of adoption because the grandparents have not proved by clear and convincing evidence that the mother has abandoned her daughter.

I.

Jeanette Marie Messier was eighteen-years-old when she gave birth to her first child, Amanda Jean, in November 1988. She was single, unemployed, and estranged from Troy O'Daniel, the child's father. Realizing that she would be unable to support herself and Amanda after Mr. O'Daniel refused to support his daughter, 1 Ms. Messier moved in with her mother, Nancy Messier. Ms. Messier and Amanda lived with Nancy Messier until April 1990, except for two intervals when they stayed with Ms. Messier's father in California and then with one of Ms. Messier's male acquaintances.

Ms. Messier began a relationship with Bobby Smith in December 1989. Her mother strongly disapproved of Mr. Smith and eventually demanded that Ms. Messier either end her relationship with Mr. Smith or move out. Ms. Messier refused to stop seeing Mr. Smith and moved in with him in April 1990. Nancy Messier filed a petition in the Sumner County Juvenile Court seeking custody of her granddaughter in June 1990 but later requested the juvenile court to continue the case indefinitely.

Mr. Smith physically abused both Ms. Messier and Amanda. The authorities investigated several abuse reports between May and November 1990 but could not substantiate that abuse had occurred. Mr. Smith was finally charged with assault in November 1990 when Ms. Messier informed the police that he had hurt Amanda. Mr. Smith was convicted and sentenced to ninety days in jail. These developments prompted Nancy Messier to renew her efforts to gain custody of her granddaughter. On December 17, 1990, the juvenile court granted the Department of Human Services's petition for protective custody, and the department placed Amanda in Nancy Messier's custody.

Nancy Messier was raising two teenage sons on her own when she received custody of Amanda. At first Amanda stayed with Nancy Messier's mother who lived nearby. Amanda began living with Nancy Messier and her two sons in September 1991 when her great-grandmother moved back to Illinois. Ms. Messier visited her daughter frequently while Amanda lived with her grandmother and great-grandmother. Amanda even lived with her mother while Mr. Smith was incarcerated.

Ms. Messier gave birth to Mr. Smith's son, Brian Smith, in March 1991. In April 1991, Ms. Messier filed the first of four petitions seeking to regain custody of Amanda. The juvenile court never acted on the petition, and Amanda remained in the care of her grandmother and great-grandmother. Ms. Messier visited Amanda almost daily and occasionally kept her overnight.

Mr. Smith continued to abuse Ms. Messier after his release from jail. Nancy Messier cut off all communications with her daughter in November 1991 after Ms. Messier ignored her entreaties to leave Mr. Smith. Ms. Messier filed her second custody petition, but again the juvenile court did not act. After intervention by the Department of Human Services, Nancy Messier relented and permitted her daughter to resume visiting Amanda in late February 1992.

Ms. Messier and Mr. Smith moved in with Mr. Smith's mother. Ms. Messier felt obligated to Mr. Smith because she had given birth to his child and could not bring herself to leave the abusive relationship. Her visits with Amanda became less frequent because Mr. Smith discouraged contacts with Amanda and the other members of her family and because Mr. Smith's mother would not drive her to see her daughter. She obtained several part-time jobs but did not earn enough to support herself or her daughter.

Nancy Messier was experiencing serious financial problems in early 1992. After appealing unsuccessfully for help from Amanda's paternal grandparents, John and Gail O'Daniel, she sent the juvenile court a letter on March 21, 1992, requesting that Amanda be returned to Ms. Messier. The letter prompted Ms. Messier to file her third petition seeking custody of her daughter. Instead of reuniting Amanda and her mother, the juvenile court directed the Department of Human Services to evaluate Ms. Messier's parental fitness and to place Amanda in temporary foster care until the evaluation was complete.

Ms. Messier did not wish her daughter to be placed in a foster home. Both she and her mother suggested that Amanda could live temporarily with her paternal grandparents. John and Gail O'Daniel agreed to take Amanda in and also agreed not to interfere with Ms. Messier's relationship with her daughter. On April 27, 1992, the juvenile court awarded Mr. and Mrs. O'Daniel temporary custody of their granddaughter. Despite their earlier promises, Mr. and Mrs. O'Daniel declined to permit telephone calls between Amanda and her mother and permitted visits only at times when Ms. Messier was working. As a result, Ms. Messier did not see Amanda until July 16, 1992, when Mr. and Mrs. O'Daniel permitted a thirty-minute visit.

In the meantime, Ms. Messier reconciled with her mother and completed the parenting classes sponsored by the Department of Human Services. With her mother's support, she ended her relationship with Mr. Smith in July 1992. She also obtained employment, found subsidized housing, and filed her fourth petition to regain custody of Amanda. The juvenile court continued the petition and directed the Department of Human Services to supervise Ms. Messier's visits. Mr. and Mrs. O'Daniel permitted Ms. Messier to visit Amanda approximately eight times between July and November 1992 but required the visits to take place in their home and under their supervision.

On October 23, 1992, Mr. and Mrs. O'Daniel filed an adoption petition in the Circuit Court for Sumner County, alleging that Ms. Messier had abandoned her daughter. Their son consented to the adoption, but Ms. Messier opposed it. Following a trial on June 24, 1993, the trial court found that Ms. Messier had abandoned her daughter by failing to visit her and to support her financially. The trial court also determined that permitting Mr. and Mrs. O'Daniel to adopt Amanda would be in her best interests because of (1) the substantial likelihood that Ms. Messier would expose Amanda to further abuse, (2) the remote possibility that Ms. Messier would be able to regain custody of Amanda in the near future, and (3) the likelihood that continuing Ms. Messier's parental relationship with Amanda would diminish Amanda's chances of early integration into a stable and permanent home. Accordingly, the trial court terminated Ms. Messier's and Troy O'Daniel's parental rights and permitted Mr and Mrs. O'Daniel to adopt Amanda. Ms. Messier then perfected this appeal.

II.

Biological parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their children under both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re Adoption of Female Child (Bond v. McKenzie), 896 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tenn.1995); Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tenn.1994); In re Riggs, 612 S.W.2d 461, 469 (Tenn.Ct.App.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921, 101 S.Ct. 1370, 67 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981). These parental rights are superior to the rights of others and continue without interruption unless a biological parent consents to relinquish them, abandons his or her child, or forfeits his or her parental rights by some conduct that substantially harms the child. State ex rel. "A" v. A Licensed or Chartered Child-Placing Agency, 194 Tenn. 400, 406, 250 S.W.2d 776, 778 (1952); In re Rigsby, App. No. 01-A-01-9304-CV-00171, slip op. at 4-5, 19 T.A.M. 9-12, 8 T.F.L.L. 6-8, (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb. 4, 1994) (No Tenn.R.App.P. 11 application filed).

Adoption proceedings profoundly affect not only the rights of the biological parents but also the rights of the child and the adoptive parents. The biological parents whose rights are terminated are reduced to the role of complete strangers as far as the child is concerned. In re Knott, 138 Tenn. 349, 355, 197 S.W. 1097, 1098 (1917); In re Adoption of Dearing, 572 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tenn.Ct.App.1978). At the same time, the adoptive parents acquire all the parental rights and responsibilities "as if the child had been born to them in lawful wedlock." Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-126(a) (Supp.1994); Grider v. Grider, 182 Tenn. 406, 409-10, 187 S.W.2d 613, 614 (1945).

The constitutional protection afforded the parent-child relationship demands that adoption proceedings contain safeguards against unwarranted termination or interference with a biological parent's parental rights. These safeguards generally take three forms. The first safeguard is the requirement that parents receive notice of the adoption proceeding. The second safeguard is that the parents' rights cannot be terminated without proof of surrender, abandonment, or other misconduct that substantially harms the child. The third safeguard is the requirement that the abandonment or misconduct be proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re Rigsby, supra, slip op. at 5.

Ms. Messier's appeal involves the latter...

To continue reading

Request your trial
265 cases
  • In re Adoption of AMH, No. W2004-01225-COA-R3-PT (TN 11/23/2005)
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 23 Noviembre 2005
    ...the "clear and convincing evidence" standard is more exacting than the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. O'Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tenn. App. 1995); Brandon v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tenn. App. 1992). In order to be clear and convincing, evidence must eliminate......
  • Blair v. Badenhope
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 3 Mayo 2002
    ...his or her child, or forfeits his or her parental rights by some conduct that substantially harms the child." See O'Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). Importantly, however, unlike our previous cases addressing parents' rights to the care and custody of their children......
  • In re Audrey S.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • 25 Agosto 2005
    ...in different parts of the code, and significant aspects of the law could be found only in court decisions. O'Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182, 186 & n. 2 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995).28 The 1995 legislation consolidated the grounds for termination of parental rights in a single statute: Tenn.Code A......
  • In re Conservatorship of Groves
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • 11 Febrero 2003
    ...factual propositions sought to be established by the evidence. Fruge v. Doe, 952 S.W.2d 408, 412 n. 2 (Tenn.1997); O'Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). B. The appointment of conservators in Tennessee no longer hinges on a determination of incompetency.28 For the past......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT