Davidson County v. Rogers

• Decision Date: 11 January 1947
• Parties: DAVIDSON COUNTY et al. v. ROGERS et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

198 S.W.2d 812

184 Tenn. 327

DAVIDSON COUNTY et al. v. ROGERS et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

January 11, 1947

Appeal from Chancery Court, Davidson County; William J. Wade Chancellor.

Action by Davidson County and others against Ralph Rogers and others to enjoin defendants from operating a stone quarry and processing plant on a certain tract of land as being in violation of a zoning regulation. From a decree dissolving a temporary restraining order, on the ground that the zoning regulation was invalid, plaintiffs appeal.

Decree reversed and permanent injunction granted.

Goodpasture, Carpenter & Dale, W. M. Fuqua, and Horace Osment, County Atty., all of Nashville, for appellants.

Walker & Hooker and Armistead, Waller, Davis & Lansden, all of Nashville, for appellees.

GAILOR Justice.

The bill in this cause was filed by Davidson County and a number of home owners in the 6th Civil District of the County, to enjoin defendants from operating a stone quarry and stone processing plant on a tract of land owned by the defendants in the 6th Civil District. The prayer for the injunction was supported by the assertion that the operation of a quarry was a violation of a zoning regulation passed by the County Court and a nuisance.

In a sworn answer, the defendants assailed the resolution as arbitrary and unreasonable under art. I, sec 8, of the Constitution of Tennessee, and on their motion to dissolve a temporary restraining order and dismiss the bill the learned Chancellor found, without stating his reasons, that the resolution was 'null and void because unreasonable, arbitrary and in violation of art. I, sec. 8, of the Constitution of Tennessee.' The complainants reserved exceptions and have perfected their appeal to this Court, and the single question presented is whether the zoning resolution for the enforcement of which the bill was filed, was arbitrary and unreasonable and in violation of art. I, sec. 8, of the Constitution. If the resolution was valid, the injunction should not have been dissolved.

To consider the question, a short account of the development of zoning in Davidson County is necessary. By Chap. 473 of the Private Acts of 1939, the Legislature passed an enabling Act to authorize and empower the County Court to make regulations for zoning the County outside municipal corporations. The caption of the Act sufficiently sets forth its purpose and scope: 'An Act to empower county courts of this State having population of not less than 200,000 and not more than 250,000 according to the Federal Census of 1930 or any subsequent Federal Census; to provide for the establishment of districts or zones within those portions of the counties which lie outside of municipal corporations, and to empower such county courts, by resolution, to regulate, within such zones or districts, the location, height and size of buildings and structures, the percentage of lot occupancy, the required open spaces, and the uses of land, buildings and structures; to provide for the carrying out of such resolutions and penalties for the violations thereof; to provide for county boards of zoning appeals and the powers and procedures thereof; and authorizing establishment of the position of building commissioner in zoned counties.'

By resolution No. 53 of July 1, 1940, the Quarterly County Court accepted this power, set up a Zoning Commission, and provided a comprehensive but incomplete zoning plan for the territory of the County outside municipal corporations lying therein. That part of the County in the 6th Civil District which is here involved, was by resolution No. 53, zoned as 'unclassified' in July 1940, but by resolution of April 1945, an amendatory resolution was passed by the Quarterly County Court and the area of 1,250 acres here involved, was rezoned and classified as 'Residential C.' For the purpose of this opinion, it is sufficient to say that while the area remained as 'unclassified', there were some restrictions on use of the property but the operation of a stone quarry and processing plant was not prohibited; that such operation was prohibited when the area was rezoned as 'Residential C.'

The defendants recognize that the exercise of the police power in furtherance of zoning restrictions has been validated repeatedly by former decisions of this Court, and they do not assail the Act of 1939, nor the general resolution passed in 1940. But they insist that the Resolution of April 1945 was arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional.

Before considering the defendants' contentions, the very limited scope of judicial review must be kept in mind lest this Court in error, substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature. 'It is said that the courts have the right to determine whether such law is reasonable. By this expression, however, it is not meant that they have power to pass upon the act with a view to determining whether it was dictated by a wise or a foolish policy, or whether it will ultimately redound to the public good, or whether it is contrary to natural justice and equity. These are considerations solely for the Legislature. In determining whether such act is reasonable the courts decide merely whether it has any real tendency to carry into effect the purposes designed--that is, the protection of the public safety, the public health, or the public morals--and whether that is really the end had in view, and whether the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and whether the act in question violates any provision of the state or federal Constitution.' Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 589, 590, 145 S.W. 177, 188, L.R.A. 1916F, 177.

We have said that when a Quarterly County Court is acting in its legislative capacity in matters political and municipal in character, that there will be no judicial review unless the action is clearly unconstitutional. Donnelly v. Fritts, 159 Tenn. 605, 609, 21 S.W.2d 619; Gamble v. Paine, 141 Tenn. 548, 551, 552, 213 S.W. 419; County Court of Obion v. Marr, 27 Tenn. 634; Carey v. Justices of Campbell County, 37 Tenn. 515.

We may not say that such legislative action is 'unreasonable' when it is taken in pursuance of a specific enabling Act, as here. Rutherford v. City of Nashville, 168 Tenn. 499, 508, 79 S.W.2d 581. That the passage of a zoning regulation such as the one before us, is a valid exercise of the police power, has long been settled in this State. Spencer-Sturla Co. v. City of Memphis, 155 Tenn. 70, 290 S.W. 608.

In the case of Village of Euclid et al., v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 118, 71 L.Ed. 311, 54 A.L.R. 1016, which established the same rule for the United States, it was said:

'If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control. Radice v. People of State of New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294, 44 S.Ct. 325, 68 L.Ed. 690 [694].'

'One who assails classification made in a police measure must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but that such classification is essentially arbitrary. Thomas v. State, 136 Tenn. 47, 188 S.W. 617; City of Memphis v. State ex rel., 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S.W. 631, L.R.A.1916B, 1151, Ann.Cas.1917C, 1056; Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 145 S.W. 177, L.R.A.1916F, 177.

' If any possible reason can be conceived to justify such classification, it will be upheld and deemed reasonable. Peters v. O'Brien, 152 Tenn. 466, 278 S.W. 660; Hunter v. Conner, 152 Tenn. 258, 277 S.W. 71; Caldwell & Co. v. Lea, 152 Tenn. 48, 272 S.W. 715; Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Senter, 149 Tenn. 569, 260 S.W. 144; Ogilvie v. Hailey, 141 Tenn. 392, 210 S.W. 645.' Darnell v. Shapard, 156 Tenn. 544, 553, 3 S.W.2d 661, 663. (Italics ours.)

If the reasonableness of the legislative classification be 'fairly debatable', it must be upheld. Foster v. Mayor of City of Beverly, 315 Mass. 567, 53 N.E.2d 693, 151 A.L.R. 737; Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516, 141 A.L.R. 688.

Neither the 'motives' of the County Court (Soukup v. Sell, 171 Tenn. 437, 441, 104 S.W.2d 830; Madison v. City of Maryville, 173 Tenn. 489, 493, 121 S.W.2d 540), nor the methods (Leonard v. Haynes, 82 Tenn. 447; Donnelly v. Fritts, 159 Tenn. 605, 21 S.W.2d 619) are subject to our review.

From the foregoing authorities it is clear that the scope of judicial review is very limited. The line of demarcation between the legislation which is 'arbitrary' and 'confiscatory' and which, therefore, the Courts may strike down, and that legislation which is beyond judicial reach because finally lodged in the legislative power, is hard to draw. Here the Court would be justified in striking down the resolution under attack, only if it was made clear beyond doubt, that the restrictions imposed by the resolution were directed at these defendants and not imposed in the general public interest. The Court, of course, can not indulge in speculation or suspicion, but must determine the question on the evidence as it is presented in this record.

Some facts are clear. After the defendants acquired the land in the fall of 1944, and before the County Court met in January of 1945, a large number of home owners in the general vicinity of defendants' property protested to the Zoning Commission and County Court against the installation and operation of a stone quarry on defendants' property. As a result of these protests, both parties were notified that the Quarterly County Court would consider the re-zoning of that part of the 6th Civil District in which the defendants' property lies, so that the operation of a commercial stone quarry would be forbidden. At the meeting of the Court in...