Davis v. State ex rel. Department of Licensing

• Decision Date: 27 May 1999
• Docket Number: No. 65688-6,65688-6
• Citation: 137 Wn.2d 957,977 P.2d 554
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Brett DAVIS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Washington, through its agency the DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING, Respondent.

Page 554

137 Wn.2d 957

977 P.2d 554

Brett DAVIS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Washington, through its agency the DEPARTMENT OF

LICENSING, Respondent.

No. 65688-6.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

Argued Feb. 9, 1999.

Decided May 27, 1999.

Harry Ries, Moses Lake, for Petitioner.

Christine Gregoire, Attorney General, Mary Ann McIntosh, Asst., Wenatchee, for Respondent.

TALMADGE, J.

We are asked in this case to review two statutes that mandate the suspension of a young person's driver's license by the Department of Licensing (Department) upon notification by a court that such young person

                has been convicted of certain drug offenses.  We are also asked to evaluate the statutes to determine if they offend constitutional principles of equal protection of law.  We hold RCW 69.50.420(1) requires a court to notify the Department as to violations of chapter 69.50 RCW by "juveniles" "thirteen years of age or older and under the age of 21."   We further hold the word "juvenile" in RCW 46.20.265(1) takes the definition of the referring statute, in this case, RCW 69.50.420(1).  Finally, we hold the statutes in question do not offend equal protection.  We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dissolving the trial court's injunction preventing revocation of Davis's driver's license
                

ISSUES

1. Do RCW 69.50.420(1) and RCW 46.20.265(1) apply to someone between the ages of 18 and 21 years?

2. If the statutes apply to persons between the ages of 18 and 21, do they violate the right to equal protection of law?

FACTS

Brett Davis, who was 19 years old at the time, pleaded guilty to a charge of possession of marijuana in Grant County District Court and was sentenced. The court sent notice of Davis's conviction to the Department pursuant to RCW 69.50.420(1). Upon receipt of the notice, the Department suspended Davis's driver's license pursuant to RCW 46.20.265(1).

After Davis learned about the suspension of his driver's license, he filed a complaint in Grant County Superior Court for injunctive and declaratory relief, and a motion for a temporary restraining order, all requiring the Department to reinstate his license. He asserted the suspension was improper, alleging ambiguity in the statutes as to the meaning of "juvenile." He noted the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 definition of "juvenile" is: " 'Juvenile,' 'youth,' and 'child' mean any individual who is under the chronological age of eighteen years and who has not been previously transferred to adult court [.]" RCW 13.40.020(14). Because he was 19 when the suspension occurred, he contended the statutes were inapplicable to him. He also contended the statute violated equal protection in applying to persons between 18 and 21 years of age.

The Department responded by acknowledging ambiguity in the two statutes as to the meaning of "juvenile," Clerk's Papers at 16, but argued the court could give effect to the language in RCW 69.50.420(1) describing juveniles as those persons 13 or over but under 21 by assuming the Legislature meant the word "juvenile" to mean "minor" rather than juvenile as defined in the Juvenile Justice Act. Clerk's Papers at 18.

The trial court agreed with Davis in a memorandum opinion, and issued an order staying the revocation of Davis's license. The trial court subsequently granted Davis's motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoined the Department from suspending Davis's license. Division Three of the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the Juvenile Justice Act's definition of juvenile was inapplicable here, and rejecting Davis's equal protection argument. Davis v. Department of Licensing, 90 Wash.App. 370, 952 P.2d 197 (1998). Davis petitioned for discretionary review, which we granted.

ANALYSIS

A. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

The statutory scheme we are asked to consider is embodied in RCW 46.20.265(1) and various statutes set forth therein. RCW 46.20.265(1) provides:

In addition to any other authority to revoke driving privileges under this chapter, the department shall revoke all driving privileges of a juvenile when the department receives notice from a court pursuant to RCW 9.41.040(5), 13.40.265, 66.44.365, 69.41.065, 69.50.420, 69.52.070, or a substantially similar municipal ordinance adopted by a local legislative authority, or from a diversion unit pursuant to RCW 13.40.265. The revocation shall be imposed without hearing.

Under the provisions of RCW 46.20.265(1), the Department receives a notice from the court when enumerated persons are convicted of firearms offenses (RCW 9.41.040(5) or If a juvenile thirteen years of age or older and under the age of twenty-one is found by a court to have committed any offense that is a violation of this chapter, the court shall notify the department of licensing within twenty-four hours after entry of the judgment.

RCW 13.40.265), alcohol crimes (RCW 66.44.365), or drug offenses (RCW 69.41.065, 69.50.420, 69.52.070). Upon such notice, the Department must "revoke all driving privileges" of the person. We are concerned here with RCW 69.50.420(1), which states:

We recently reviewed and summarized our principles of statutory interpretation:

In interpreting a statute, we do not construe a statute that is unambiguous. Food Servs. of Am. v. Royal Heights, Inc., 123 Wash.2d 779, 784-85, 871 P.2d 590 (1994). If the statute is ambiguous, the courts must construe the statute so as to effectuate the legislative intent. In so doing, we avoid a literal reading if it would result in unlikely, absurd or strained consequences. State v. Elgin, 118 Wash.2d 551, 555, 825 P.2d 314 (1992). The purpose of an enactment should prevail over express but inept wording. Id.; State ex rel. Royal v. Board of Yakima County Comm'rs, 123 Wash.2d 451, 462, 869 P.2d 56 (1994). The court must give effect to legislative intent determined "within the context of the entire statute." Elgin, 118 Wash.2d at 556, 825 P.2d 314; State ex rel. Royal, 123 Wash.2d at 459, 869 P.2d 56. Statutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous. Stone v. Chelan County Sheriff's Dep't, 110 Wash.2d 806, 810, 756 P.2d 736 (1988); Tommy P. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 97 Wash.2d 385, 391, 645 P.2d 697 (1982). The meaning of a particular word in a statute "is not gleaned from that word alone, because our purpose is to ascertain legislative intent of the statute as a whole." State v. Krall, 125 Wash.2d 146, 148, 881 P.2d 1040 (1994).

Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996).

The initial principle of statutory interpretation is we do not construe unambiguous statutes: "In judicial interpretation of statutes, the first rule is 'the court should assume that the legislature means exactly what it says. Plain words do not require construction'." State v. McCraw, 127 Wash.2d 281, 288, 898 P.2d 838 (1995) (quoting City of Snohomish v. Joslin, 9 Wash.App. 495, 498, 513 P.2d 293 (1973)), superseded by statute as cited in State v. Bolar, 129 Wash.2d 361, 917 P.2d 125 (1996). ¹ Neither statute at issue in this case--RCW 69.50.420(1) or RCW 46.20.265(1)--is ambiguous.

On its face, RCW 69.50.420(1) is not ambiguous. It defines precisely the range of ages that fall within its purview--13 or over and under 21. Ambiguity arises only if one imports the definition of "juvenile" from the Juvenile Justice Act into the statute and claims that definition applies no matter where the word "juvenile" appears in the entire Revised Code of Washington. But the Juvenile Justice Act itself does not indicate any such sweeping legislative declaration. In fact, the definitional section of the Act, RCW 13.40.020, begins with the words, "For the purposes of this chapter." The Legislature thus specifically confined the definition of "juvenile" to chapter 13.40 RCW. ² In the statute under consideration, RCW 69.50.420(1), the Legislature chose another definition of juvenile: those persons 13 or over and under 21 years of age. There is nothing ambiguous or anomalous about the Legislature's choice or the plain language it employed to implement its choice.

The second statute under consideration is also unambiguous. RCW 46.20.265(1) mandates revocation of the driver's license and uses the word "juvenile," but does not specify any age range. Like chapter 69.50 RCW, chapter 46.20 RCW, covering drivers' licenses, does not define the word "juvenile." The meaning of "juvenile" in this section may easily be determined, however, by reference to the individual statutes RCW 46.20.265(1) cites. All of these statutes are notice provisions requiring courts that have found a person guilty of specific offenses to notify the Department within 24 hours after entry of the judgment. They "trigger" the license revocation mandate of RCW 46.20.265(1).

For instance, RCW 46.20.265(1) cites RCW 13.40.265 (firearm, alcohol, or drug violations). ³ Because this section comes from the Juvenile Justice Act, the definition of "juvenile" in that Act applies. RCW 46.20.265(1) also cites RCW 9.41.040(5), unlawful possession of firearms. ⁴ That section applies only to those under 18, so the word "juvenile" in RCW 46.20.265(1), by reference, must mean those under 18.

The next cited statute, RCW 66.44.365, covering juvenile driving privileges and alcohol or drug violations, refers to "a juvenile thirteen years of age or older and under the age of eighteen[.]" It is plain the Legislature intended RCW 66.44.365 to apply only to juveniles as so defined.

The remaining three statutes to which RCW 46.20.265(1) refers contain the following language: "a juvenile thirteen years of age or older and under the age of twenty-one." ⁵ These three statutes agree in more than just their operative language. The Legislature first enacted them in 1988 and one year later amended them identically. The first iteration of these statutes in 1988 read:

If a juvenile under eighteen years of age, but thirteen or...