State v. Posey

• Decision Date: 08 November 2005
• Docket Number: No. 23041-4-III.,23041-4-III.
• Citation: 122 P.3d 914,130 Wn. App. 262
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Daniel Alfred POSEY Jr., Appellant.

Page 914

122 P.3d 914

130 Wn. App. 262

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Daniel Alfred POSEY Jr., Appellant.

No. 23041-4-III.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3, Panel Three.

November 8, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Stephanie C. Cunningham, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Kenneth L. Ramm, Yakima, WA, for Respondent.

SWEENEY, A.C.J.

¶ 1 This appeal follows convictions for rape in adult criminal court. The problem is the defendant is (or was) a minor when these crimes were committed and when he was convicted. And he was charged but acquitted of the crime (first degree assault) that required the juvenile court to automatically decline juvenile jurisdiction. He challenges the automatic decline on a number of grounds, including violations of his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process of law. We conclude, however, that the automatic decline statute affords equal protection of law if the class to be protected is all juveniles charged with a "serious violent offense." State v. Handley, 115 Wash.2d 275, 289-92, 796 P.2d 1266 (1990). And the Supreme Court has already held that the statute does not deny due process of law. In re Boot, 130 Wash.2d 553, 570-71, 925 P.2d 964 (1996). We also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit evidence of an e-mail suggesting that the victim here would have consented to violence and rape. We therefore affirm the conviction.

FACTS

¶ 2 Daniel Alfred Posey Jr. and H.A.H. were high school students and classmates. They became involved romantically and sexually. H.A.H. tried to end the relationship. Mr. Posey refused and forced H.A.H. to have sexual intercourse twice. The State alleged he threatened her with a gun.

¶ 3 Police arrested Mr. Posey and the State charged him with three counts of second degree rape — domestic violence, and one count of first degree assault — domestic violence, with a firearm. Mr. Posey was 16 years old when he committed these crimes and when the State charged him with these crimes.

¶ 4 Police made copies of e-mails on H.A.H.'s computer. Mr. Posey tried to admit one particular e-mail at trial. H.A.H. wrote the e-mail prior to or around the same time that she met Mr. Posey. This very explicit e-mail mentioned "her [H.A.H.] being raped and how much she would enjoy that." Report of Proceedings (Jan. 12, 2004) (RP) at 52. It also mentioned her "wanting to have the perfect boyfriend to choke her, do all sorts of things and then beat her harder[,][a]nd if he chokes her that she will just love him more." RP at 52. Mr. Posey wanted to show that H.A.H. consented to the violence and the sexual intercourse and rebut her showing that she was afraid of him. The court refused the offer citing the rape shield statute.

¶ 5 Mr. Posey was tried in the adult criminal court by a jury. The jury found him guilty of two counts of second degree rape — domestic violence. Significantly for this appeal, the jury did not find him guilty of first degree assault — domestic violence (the crime prompting the automatic decline), or the third count of second degree rape — domestic violence. The adult criminal court sentenced Mr. Posey to a life sentence with a minimum term of 119 months.

DISCUSSION

ADULT CRIMINAL COURT JURISDICTION

¶ 6 Mr. Posey argues that the automatic decline provision in former RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v) "hinges on the nature of the charges for which the juvenile is to be held accountable." Appellant's Br. at 20. And here the charge Mr. Posey was held accountable for (second degree rape) was not the crime which prompted the decline of juvenile jurisdiction (first degree assault).

¶ 7 The State responds by noting the language of the automatic decline statute. The statute uses the words "alleged" offense. Resp't's Br. at 13. From this the State argues that it is not the conviction that dictates adult court jurisdiction but the charge.

¶ 8 We must interpret a statute and apply constitutional rights. Our review is then de novo. State v. Salavea, 151 Wash.2d 133, 140, 86 P.3d 125 (2004); State v. Manro, 125 Wash.App. 165, 170, 104 P.3d 708 (2005), review denied, 155 Wash.2d 1010, ___ P.3d ___ (Wash. Oct. 5, 2005) (No. 76707-6).

¶ 9 Washington's juvenile courts are generally vested with exclusive original jurisdiction over juvenile defendants. RCW 13.04.030(1). Jurisdiction over a juvenile defendant transfers to adult court in one of two ways: following a hearing and findings (RCW 13.40.110) or automatically following certain charges (former RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v) (2000)). State v. Mora, 138 Wash.2d 43, 49, 977 P.2d 564 (1999). "Serious violent offenses" require automatic decline of juvenile jurisdiction. Former RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A). And serious violent offenses include first degree assault. Former RCW 9.94A.030(37)(v) (2002).

¶ 10 We determine legislative intent by starting with the language of the statute. Salavea, 151 Wash.2d at 142, 86 P.3d 125. We derive the legislature's intent from the plain language of the statute if the statute is clear. Id.; Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 565, 925 P.2d 964. This is because the legislature is presumed to "`mean[] exactly what it says.'" State v. Delgado, 148 Wash.2d 723, 727, 63 P.3d 792 (2003) (quoting Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wash.2d 957, 964, 977 P.2d 554 (1999)). A statute is clear on its face if there is only one reasonable interpretation. State v. Beaver, 148 Wash.2d 338, 345, 60 P.3d 586 (2002).

¶ 11 The statute here says:

Except as provided in this section, the juvenile courts in this state shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings:

....

(e) Relating to juveniles alleged or found to have committed offenses, traffic or civil infractions, or violations as provided in RCW 13.40.020 through 13.40.230, unless:

....

(v) The juvenile is sixteen or seventeen years old and the alleged offense is:

(A) A serious violent offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030;

....

In such a case the adult criminal court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction.

Former RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A) (emphasis added). The statute is then clear. Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 565, 925 P.2d 964; Salavea, 151 Wash.2d at 142-43, 86 P.3d 125; Manro, 125 Wash.App. at 173-74, 104 P.3d 708. The juvenile court loses jurisdiction over 16- or 17-year-old juveniles when a serious violent offense is "alleged." Former RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A). It is then the nature of the charge that dictates jurisdiction, not the final outcome. Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 562-63, 575, 925 P.2d 964; Manro, 125 Wash.App. at 174, 104 P.3d 708. The statute also provides that the "adult criminal court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction" where a juvenile defendant is alleged to have committed an enumerated offense. Former RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(E) (emphasis added). And it does not provide for transfer back to juvenile court if the defendant is acquitted of the charge prompting the automatic decline. A "juvenile" is "any individual who is under the chronological age of eighteen years and who has not been previously transferred to adult court pursuant to RCW 13.40.110 or who is otherwise under adult court jurisdiction." RCW 13.40.020(14) (emphasis added); RCW 13.04.011(2).

¶ 12 The legislature amended this definition to include the phrase "or who is otherwise under adult court jurisdiction" in 1994. Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 565, 925 P.2d 964; Mora, 138 Wash.2d at 51, 977 P.2d 564. This is the same year the legislature enacted the automatic decline provisions. Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 560-62, 925 P.2d 964; Mora, 138 Wash.2d at 51, 977 P.2d 564. And our Supreme Court held that a defendant in adult court following a statutorily mandated automatic declination is "otherwise under adult court jurisdiction." Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 563, 925 P.2d 964. The defendant no longer falls within the definition of a "juvenile" for juvenile court jurisdiction. Id. The adult criminal court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over all pending charges. Salavea, 151 Wash.2d at 141 n. 3, 86 P.3d 125; Mora, 138 Wash.2d at 52, 977 P.2d 564; Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 562-65, 575, 925 P.2d 964.

¶ 13 Mr. Posey was transferred to the adult criminal court based on the charge of first degree assault. He was then "otherwise under adult court jurisdiction." RCW 13.40.020(14).

¶ 14 All charges were then properly in adult court; he no longer fell within the statutory definition of a juvenile. Salavea, 151 Wash.2d at 141 n. 3, 86 P.3d 125; Mora, 138 Wash.2d at 52, 977 P.2d 564; Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 562-65, 575, 925 P.2d 964; Manro, 125 Wash.App. at 173-74, 104 P.3d 708. In sum, the charge confers jurisdiction, not the conviction. Salavea, 151 Wash.2d at 141 n. 3, 86 P.3d 125; Mora, 138 Wash.2d at 52, 977 P.2d 564; Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 562-65, 575, 925 P.2d 964; Manro, 125 Wash.App. at 173-74, 104 P.3d 708.

AUTOMATIC DECLINE PROVISION — CONSTITUTIONALITY

¶ 15 Mr. Posey argues that the automatic decline provision in former RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A) violates his rights to equal protection and due process of law. Equal protection requires that defendants similarly situated receive like treatment. State v. Simmons, 152 Wash.2d 450, 458, 98 P.3d 789 (2004); Handley, 115 Wash.2d at 289, 796 P.2d 1266. Mr. Posey points out that other juveniles convicted of these same crimes (second degree rape) wind up being sentenced in juvenile court. And, he argues, this is inconsistent with the legislative purpose of the decline statute which is to punish juveniles more severely who have committed serious violent offenses.

¶ 16 The State responds that equal protection only requires that the law apply equally to persons "similarly situated." And Mr. Posey is not "similarly situated" with other juveniles convicted of these same crimes because he was charged with first degree assault with a firearm in addition to second degree rape.

¶ 17 Our review of these constitutional challenges is de novo. State v. Eckblad, 152 Wash.2d 515, 518, 98 P.3d 1184 (20...