Department of Public Safety v. Ragsdale

• Decision Date: 28 February 2020
• Docket Number: S19G0422
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. RAGSDALE.

308 Ga. 210

839 S.E.2d 541

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

v.RAGSDALE.

S19G0422

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: February 28, 2020

Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Kathleen M. Pacious, Deputy Attorney General, Loretta L. Pinkston-Pope, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Robert L. Bunner, Assistant Attorney General, Andrew A. Pinson, Solicitor- General, Ross W. Bergethon, Deputy Solicitor-General, for appellant.

Edward V. C. Silverbach, Charles M. Cork III, for appellee.

Ellington, Justice.

We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in Dept. of Public Safety v. Ragsdale , 347 Ga. App. 827, 821 S.E.2d 58 (2018), by holding that the time for filing an ante litem notice under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, see OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1), is subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99, when the tort at issue arises from a crime. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Tort Claims Act's ante litem notice period is not subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99.

Matthew Ragsdale filed this personal injury action against the Georgia Department of Public Safety ("DPS") after he was injured during an October 31, 2014 motor vehicle accident that occurred when Ross Singleton, the driver of another vehicle, fled from law enforcement. As described by the Court of Appeals, the record shows:

Ragsdale sent an ante litem notice to the Department of Administrative Services ("DOAS") on December 3, 2014; however, it is undisputed at this point that the notice provided on that date failed to include all the information required by OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5). Ragsdale filed suit, but dismissed this initial filing based on the deficiency of his first ante litem notice. Thereafter, in March 2017, Ragsdale sent a second ante litem notice to DOAS. Ragsdale then renewed the action, and [DPS] filed its motion to dismiss the appeal, contending that the March 2017 ante litem notice was untimely. In response, Ragsdale argued that because he was the victim of Singleton's crime, the time for filing the ante litem notice had been tolled "from the date of the commission of the alleged crime or the act giving rise to such action in tort until the prosecution of such crime or act has become final or otherwise terminated" pursuant to OCGA § 9-3-99. The trial court agreed and denied the motion to dismiss in a single-sentence order, citing Ragsdale's arguments in response to the motion to dismiss.

Ragsdale , 347 Ga. App. at 827-828, 821 S.E.2d 58. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of DPS's motion to dismiss, following cases in which that court had previously "determined that limitation period tolling statutes apply to the period for filing ante litem notice as well as for filing suit." Id. at 830, 821 S.E.2d 58 (footnote omitted). Thus, the Court of Appeals necessarily concluded that the time for filing an ante litem notice under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1), is subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99. We granted certiorari to consider whether that conclusion was correct.

In the construction of "a statute, we afford the text its plain and ordinary meaning, viewed in the context in which it appears, and read in its most natural and reasonable way." Carpenter v. McMann , 304 Ga. 209, 210, 817 S.E.2d 686 (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). Turning to the statutes at issue here, OCGA § 9-3-99¹ tolls "[t]he running of the period of limitations" with respect to tort actions brought by certain crime victims. A limitations period may be understood as "a statutory period after which a lawsuit or prosecution cannot be brought in court." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining "limitation ... [a]lso termed limitations period").

Statutes setting forth limitation periods are generally referred to as "statutes of limitation."

A statute of limitation has as its purpose the limiting of the time period in which an action may be brought, thereby providing a date certain after which potential defendants can no longer be held liable for claims brought on such actions. ... Prescribing periods of limitation is a legislative, not a judicial, function.

Young v. Williams , 274 Ga. 845, 848, 560 S.E.2d 690 (2002) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining "Statute of Limitations" as "[a] law that bars claims after a specified period ... Also termed ... limitations period."). We have described a statute of limitation as a "rule limiting the time in which a party may bring an action for a right which has already accrued." Amu v. Barnes , 283 Ga. 549, 551, 662 S.E.2d 113 (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). Statutes of limitation "are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Allrid v. Emory University , 249 Ga. 35, 39 (1) (d), 285 S.E.2d 521 (1982) (citation and punctuation omitted). The expiration of the statute of limitation may be raised as a defense to an action. See, e.g., Cleaveland v. Gannon , 284 Ga. 376, 381 (2), 667 S.E.2d 366 (2008) (defense of statute of limitation is an affirmative defense under OCGA § 9-11-8 (c) ).

The provision of the Tort Claims Act at issue in this case, OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1),² concerns the time for giving ante litem notice—notice that must be given before the filing of a lawsuit. Under the Tort Claims Act, "a person may not bring a tort claim against the state unless the person first gives the state written notice of the claim within the time, and in the manner, specified in OCGA § 50-21-26." Henderson v. Dept. of Transp., 267 Ga. 90, 91 (1), 475 S.E.2d 614 (1996). The purpose of the Tort Claims Act's ante litem notice provisions "is to ensure that the state receives adequate notice of the claim to facilitate settlement before the filing of a lawsuit." Williams v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources , 272 Ga. 624, 625, 532 S.E.2d 401 (2000) (footnote omitted). "If the ante litem notice requirements [of the Tort Claims Act] are not met, then the State does not waive sovereign immunity, and therefore, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (3)."³ Bd. of Regents of the Univ. System of Ga. v. Myers , 295 Ga. 843, 845, 764 S.E.2d 543 (2014). Thus, compliance with the ante litem notice requirements of OCGA § 50-21-26 is a condition precedent to an action under the Tort Claims Act.

We have described the six-month ante litem notice provision applicable to certain claims against municipalities, see OCGA § 36-33-5, as "a condition precedent to bringing suit against a municipal corporation for damages resulting from injuries to person or property," and "not itself a six-month statute of limitations[.]" City of Chamblee v. Maxwell , 264 Ga. 635, 636, 452 S.E.2d 488 (1994) (citations omitted). Consistent with Maxwell , we conclude that the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 50-21-26, which performs a function different from that of a statute of limitation and compliance with which is a condition precedent to an action against the State, is not a statute of limitation.

As the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 50-21-26 is not a statute of limitation, the Code's statutory tolling provisions, such as OCGA § 9-3-99, do not apply to the Tort Claims Act's 12-month ante litem notice period. This conclusion is bolstered by OCGA § 50-21-27 (c), which separately sets forth the Tort Claims Act's statute of limitation: "[A]ny tort action brought pursuant to this article is forever barred unless it is commenced within two years after the date the loss was or should have been discovered." In the same Code section, OCGA § 50-21-27 (e) expressly provides that "[a]ll provisions relating to the tolling of limitations of actions, as provided elsewhere in this Code, shall apply to causes of action brought pursuant to [the Tort Claims Act]."⁴ OCGA § 50-21-26, on the other hand, contains no provision contemplating that the time for giving ante litem notice is subject to tolling. The General Assembly could have expressly provided for such tolling, as it did in the statute of limitations section immediately following this section and also on some grounds in the case of the ante litem notice requirement applicable to actions against counties, but it did not do so. Compare OCGA § 36-11-1.⁵

Ragsdale argues that any interpretation by this Court of OCGA §§ 50-21-26 and 9-3-99 must take into account that the Court of Appeals has "treated ante litem notice provisions as ‘statutes of limitation’ for purpose of tolling statutes[.]" As Ragsdale notes, we presume that statutes are enacted "by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. They are therefore to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law." Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard , 300 Ga. 848, 852 (2), 797 S.E.2d 814 (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted).

In City of Atlanta v. Barrett , 102 Ga. App. 469, 116 S.E.2d 654 (1960), the Court of Appeals considered whether the six-month ante litem notice requirement for claims for damages against a municipality, as provided by former Ga. Code Ann. § 69-308 (now OCGA § 36-33-5 ), was subject to the general tolling provision of former Ga. Code Ann. § 3-801 (the predecessor to OCGA § 9-3-90 ),⁶ pertaining to the claims of certain disabled persons. The court concluded that the ante litem notice provision was subject to tolling, reasoning that the requirement that "notice be given within six months from the date of the injuries or else that the action therefor be forever barred is itself a statute of limitation and subject to the general law of this State with respect to the tolling of statutes of limitation." Barrett , 102 Ga. App. at 472, 116 S.E.2d 654.

At the time of the enactment of the Tort Claims Act in 1992, Barrett and its progeny had been followed by numerous decisions of ...