Diaz v. State

• Decision Date: 03 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 08-99-00486-CV.,08-99-00486-CV.
• Citation: 68 S.W.3d 680
• Parties: Raul DIAZ, Juan Sanchez, Luis F. Borrego, Elizabeth Rivera, Erasmo T. Payan, and Raul Rodriguez, Appellants, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

68 S.W.3d 680

Raul DIAZ, Juan Sanchez, Luis F. Borrego, Elizabeth Rivera, Erasmo T. Payan, and Raul Rodriguez, Appellants, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 08-99-00486-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.

August 3, 2000.

Ronald L. Jackson, Diamond, Rash, Gordon & Jackson, P.C., El Paso, John R. Batoon, Diamond, Rash, Leslie, Smith & Samaniego, El Paso, for Appellant.

Jose R. Rodrigiez, County Attorney, Jo Anne Bernal, Asst. County Atty., El Paso, for the State.

Before Panel No. 2 BARAJAS, C.J., McCLURE, and CHEW, JJ.

OPINION

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Justice.

This is an accelerated appeal from a judgment entered in a quo warranto proceeding declaring that the City of San Elizario is not lawfully incorporated and removing Raul Diaz (the Mayor), Raul Rodriguez (Town Clerk), Juan Sanchez (Mayor Pro-Tem), Erasmo T. Payan (Alderman), Luis Borrego (Alderman), and Elizabeth Rivera (Alderwoman) from their positions as officeholders in San Elizario.¹ Appellants attack the judgment by a single point of error. We affirm.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

The City of San Elizario² was incorporated by a special act of the Texas Legislature in 1871. Act of April 5, 1871, 12th Leg., R.S., ch. 42, 1871 Tex.Gen.Laws 83, reprinted in 6 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897 at 1221 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898). The 1871 Act also contained provisions for the conveyance of land.³ Thereafter, while purportedly acting as a general law city rather than according to its special charter as provided by the 1871 Act, San Elizario deeded property to its inhabitants. As a result, the titles to the land so deeded became clouded. In order to rectify this situation, the legislature enacted a special law in 1891 validating deeds issued by San Elizario since 1871. Act approved Mar. 17, 1891, 22nd Leg., R.S., ch. 4, 1891 Tex.Gen.Laws 5, reprinted in 10 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897 at 233 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898). Within days of that act, the legislature, expressly finding that many provisions in the 1871 Act of incorporation were oppressive and unjust to persons living and owning property within the corporate limits of San Elizario, repealed the 1871 Act. Act approved Mar. 23, 1891, 22nd Leg., R.S., ch. 11, 1891 Tex.Gen.Laws 24, reprinted in 10 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897 at 252 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898).

Purportedly acting under the charter and authority of the 1871 Act, San Elizario held elections in 1997⁴ and elected city officers who are the subjects of this quo warranto proceeding. The Honorable José Rodriguez, El Paso County Attorney, sought an opinion from the Texas Attorney General on the validity of the 1891 Act, and on August 30, 1999, the Attorney General issued an opinion upholding the constitutionality of the 1891 special law which disincorporated San Elizario. See Op.Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0101 (1999). Thereafter, the State of Texas, acting by and through the El Paso County Attorney,⁵ brought this quo warranto proceeding seeking a declaration that San Elizario is not incorporated and that Appellants lack authority to act on behalf of San Elizario. See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 66.001 (Vernon 1997).⁶ Appellants urged in the trial court, as they do on appeal, that the 1891 Act disincorporating San Elizario is unconstitutional. Following a hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the State. More specifically, the judgment declared that San Elizario is not lawfully incorporated and Appellants are without authority to act on behalf of San Elizario. The judgment also removed Appellants from office.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 1891 ACT

In their sole point of error, Appellants contend that the trial court's judgment should be reversed because the Act of 1891 is unconstitutional, reasoning that it is a local or special law which changes the charter of a town in contravention of Article 3, sec. 56 of the Texas Constitution. When reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, we begin our analysis with a presumption of validity. Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conserv. Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 629 (Tex.1996). We further presume that the legislature has not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily; a mere difference of opinion, where reasonable minds could differ, is not a sufficient basis for striking down legislation as arbitrary or unreasonable. Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 330 (Tex.1995); Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex.1968). In construing a statute, our primary aim is to give effect to the legislature's intent. Texas Water Comm'n v. Brushy Creek Mun. Util.Dist., 917 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.1996). A court must attempt to ascertain what the legislature intended and interpret the statute accordingly. Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 629. We consider the objective sought to be attained by the statute, the circumstances of the statute's enactment, legislative history, the common law and former statutory provisions, and the consequences of a particular construction. Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 1998); Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex.1994). When possible, we are to interpret legislative enactments in such a manner as to avoid constitutional infirmities. Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 629. The party attacking the statute bears the burden of establishing its unconstitutionality. Texas Public Bldg. Authority v. Mattox, 686 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. 1985); Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex.1974).

The relevant portion of Article 3, sec. 56 provides:

The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law,

...

Incorporating cities, towns or villages, or changing their charters;

...

And in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no local or special law shall be enacted....

TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 56.

Article 3, sec. 56 was intended to prevent the legislature from enacting laws granting special privileges to particular persons, groups, or locales in the state and to secure uniformity of law throughout the state as far as possible. Maple Run at Austin Mun. Utility Dist. v. Monaghan, 931 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex.1996). It has also been viewed as preventing lawmakers from engaging in the "reprehensible practice of trading and `logrolling,'" i.e., trading votes to advance personal rather than public interests. City of Austin v. City of Cedar Park, 953 S.W.2d 424, 431 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ), quoting Miller v. El Paso County, 136 Tex. 370, 150 S.W.2d 1000, 1001 (1941).

Although the terms "local law" and "special law" have sometimes been used interchangeably, they have distinct meanings. See Maple Run, 931 S.W.2d at 945. A local law is one limited to a specific geographic region of the state, while a special law is limited to a particular class of persons distinguished by some characteristic other than geography. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation, Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 465 (Tex.1997); Maple Run, 931 S.W.2d at 945. Here, the Act disincorporating San Elizario obviously pertains solely to a specific geographic region. However, a law is not a prohibited local law merely because it applies only in a limited geographic area. City of Austin, 953 S.W.2d at 431. Notwithstanding Article 3, sec. 56, the legislature has broad authority to make classifications for legislative purposes, even though the legislation may be applicable only to a particular class or, in fact, affect only the inhabitants of a particular locality. Miller, 150 S.W.2d at 1001; City of Austin, 953 S.W.2d at 431. When a law is limited to a particular class or affects only the inhabitants of a particular locality, however, "the classification must be broad enough to include a substantial class and must be based on characteristics legitimately distinguishing such class from others with respect to the public purpose sought to be accomplished by the proposed legislation." Maple Run, 931 S.W.2d at 945, quoting Miller, 150 S.W.2d at 1001-02. Thus, the correct inquiry is whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification. See Maple Run, 931 S.W.2d at 945.

According to the State, we need not engage in the analysis prescribed by Maple Run because the particular provision of Article 3, sec. 56 applies only to creative statutes and does not apply to a repealing statute. Stating the argument differently, Article 3, sec. 56 does not either expressly or impliedly limit the legislature's inherent power to repeal its own statutes. On the other hand, Appellants vigorously contend that the 1891 Act is an impermissible local law within the meaning of Article 3, sec. 56 because it changed the charter of San Elizario by absolutely nullifying it.

The lawmaking power of the people is vested in our state legislature by virtue of Article 3, sec. 1 of the Texas Constitution. TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 1 ("The Legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, which together shall be styled `The Legislature of the State of Texas'"). The legislature's power and authority is plenary and its extent is limited only by the express or clearly implied restrictions thereon contained in or necessarily arising from the Constitution. Government Services Ins. Underwriters v. Jones, 368 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex.1963); State v. Brownson, 94 Tex. 436, 61 S.W. 114 (1901). The power of the legislature includes the power to make, alter, and repeal laws, when such power is not expressly or impliedly forbidden by other provisions of the state Constitution. Walker v. Baker, 145 Tex. 121, 196 S.W.2d 324, 328 (1946); Brown v. City of Galveston, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S.W. 488, 492 (1903). In order for a reviewing court to hold an act of the legislature unconstitutional, it must be able to point to the specific provision which prohibits the legislation. Brownson, 61 S.W. at 114. If the constitutional provision does not contain an express limitation, then the court must be able to identify a clearly implied limitation on the...