Diehl v. Weiser

• Decision Date: 01 July 2019
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 17SA285
• Citation: 444 P.3d 313
• Parties: Scott Edward DIEHL, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Philip J. WEISER, Colorado Attorney General ; Jason Lengerich, Warden of Buena Vista Correctional Facility; and Dean Williams, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections, Respondents-Appellants.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

444 P.3d 313

Scott Edward DIEHL, Petitioner-Appellee,

v.Philip J. WEISER, Colorado Attorney General ; Jason Lengerich, Warden of Buena Vista Correctional Facility; and Dean Williams, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections, Respondents-Appellants.

Supreme Court Case No. 17SA285

Supreme Court of Colorado.

July 1, 2019

Attorneys for Petitioner–Appellee: The Law Office of April M. Elliott, P.C., April M. Elliott, Denver, Colorado, Reppucci Law Firm, P.C., Jonathan D. Reppucci, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondents–Appellants: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Nicole Suzanne Gellar, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE HART delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 This habeas corpus appeal requires us to determine how the Department of Corrections ("DOC") should apply the "one-continuous-sentence" statute, section 17-22.5-101, C.R.S. (2018), to an offender who was eligible for and released to parole, committed additional crimes while on parole, and was sentenced for those subsequent crimes concurrent with his initial sentence. The central question is whether the offender's original prison sentences should be included in the newly calculated continuous sentence for purposes of determining a new parole eligibility date. We conclude today that they should not.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶2 Petitioner-Appellee, Scott Edward Diehl, pleaded guilty to three drug offenses in 2005. For each offense, he received a sentence that required him to serve a designated number of years in prison as well as a period of mandatory parole. He began serving his term of imprisonment for those sentences, which ran concurrently, on September 6, 2005.

¶3 Diehl was released from prison at the discretion of the state board of parole on August 16, 2011, and he immediately began serving a five-year period of mandatory parole. Diehl absconded from parole from February 14 to March 28, 2013. He was arrested and returned to prison to serve the remainder of his mandatory parole term incarcerated. During this period of reincarceration, Diehl pleaded guilty in three additional cases arising from the time when he was on parole. He received new sentences that were to run concurrently with his outstanding sentences.

¶4 On December 8, 2016, Diehl filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the district court, arguing that he was being unlawfully denied consideration for discretionary parole. He contended that the DOC erred in using August 6, 2011, the date on which he was first released to mandatory parole, rather than September 6, 2005, the date on which he was first sentenced to prison, to calculate his parole eligibility date.

¶5 The district court agreed with Diehl. In doing so, the court rejected the DOC's argument that Diehl's "sentence to imprisonment" on his original convictions had been discharged when he began serving his mandatory period of parole and was thus no longer relevant to his new parole eligibility date. The district court concluded that a sentence, for purposes of Colorado's "one-continuous-sentence" rule, see § 17-22.5-101, is comprised of two components—a period of incarceration and a period of mandatory parole. Although the imprisonment component of the sentence was statutorily discharged when Diehl began serving his period of mandatory parole, see § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(D), C.R.S. (2018), the district court noted that the statutory scheme provides that Diehl's overall sentence was not "deemed to have [been] fully discharged" until Diehl "either completed or [had] been discharged by the state board of parole from the mandatory period of parole imposed pursuant to" section 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V). Therefore, the district court concluded that the DOC was required to calculate Diehl's parole eligibility date using his first date of incarceration, September 6, 2005.

¶6 The DOC appealed the district court's order.¹

II. Analysis

¶7 We begin by addressing our jurisdiction to resolve this appeal. We then set out the appropriate standard of review, noting that we give considerable deference to the DOC's interpretation of the statutory scheme for inmate and parole time computations. Finally, we explain why the DOC's interpretation of the relevant statutes is reasonable and the new parole eligibility date for an inmate who was reincarcerated for a parole violation and is then sentenced for additional offenses should be calculated using the beginning of the period of mandatory parole as the start of the inmate's one continuous sentence.

A. Jurisdiction

¶8 This case comes to us on appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding. Habeas corpus is available to review claims that a petitioner is being denied the opportunity to be considered for parole. Naranjo v. Johnson , 770 P.2d 784, 787 (Colo. 1989). Diehl filed a writ of habeas corpus challenging the DOC's calculation of his projected parole eligibility date and arguing that he had effectively been denied at least six opportunities for discretionary parole consideration. The district court agreed that Diehl was eligible for parole consideration, and the DOC appealed. We have jurisdiction over appeals from habeas corpus proceedings. Nowak v. Suthers , 2014 CO 14, ¶ 11, 320 P.3d 340, 343 ; see also Colo. Const. art. VI, § 2 (providing that the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction and a "general superintending control over all inferior courts"); § 13-4-102(1)(e), C.R.S. (2018) (prohibiting the Colorado Court of Appeals from having initial jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of writs of habeas corpus).

¶9 While awaiting the resolution of this appeal, Diehl was released on parole. The DOC asks us to remand this case to the district court to consider whether this case is now moot. We need not remand to make this determination. Mootness is a jurisdictional prerequisite that can be addressed at any stage during the proceedings. See People v. Shank , 2018 CO 51, ¶ 9, 420 P.3d 240, 243 ("[J]urisdictional prerequisite[s] ... can be raised at any time during the proceedings."); see also Nowak , ¶ 12, 320 P.3d at 343 (electing to address mootness, despite not being raised by the parties, because it could affect the existence of a justiciable controversy).

¶10 A case is moot when a judgment would have no practical legal effect on the existing controversy. Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd. v. Fulenwider , 798 P.2d 424, 426 (Colo. 1990). When issues become moot because of subsequent events, as here where Diehl no longer has a claim that he is being unlawfully denied parole consideration, appellate courts will generally decline to render an opinion on the merits. Id. at 426–27. However, when the moot issue is one that is capable of repetition, yet evading review, we may address the merits of the appeal. Nowak , ¶ 13, 320 P.3d at 343–44 ; see also State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs v. Stjernholm, 935 P.2d 959, 971 (Colo. 1997).

¶11 This is one of those instances. During the DOC's 2018 budget hearing, then DOC Executive Director Rick Raemisch explained that there are "roughly 2,700 offenders that could potentially be affected by" our decision in Executive Director of Colorado Department of Corrections v. Fetzer , 2017 CO 77, 396 P.3d 1108, as well as our ruling in the present case. Colo. Dep't of Corr., Budget Hearing 11–12 (2018), http://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/fy2018-19_corhrg.pdf[http://perma.cc/EX3A-RSUQ] ("[T]he [department] is ... awaiting clarification on the court's opinion on the Deihl [sic] case which could impact these same recalculations."). Due to the vast number of potentially impacted offenders, this issue is capable of repetition. Additionally, because habeas petitions are generally subject to short statutory time periods, this issue may continue to evade review. See Nowak , ¶¶ 15–16, 320 P.3d at 344 (addressing habeas petition even though the inmate reached his parole eligibility date and was paroled at the time of appeal); see also Colo. Dep't of Corr., Parole Div. v. Madison , 85 P.3d 542, 544 n.2 (Colo. 2004) (noting that the relatively short statutory time periods associated with habeas proceedings make otherwise moot issues capable of repetition, yet likely to evade review). Therefore, we will address the arguments presented here.

B. Standard of Review

¶12 Because the parties do not contest Diehl's underlying sentences or time credits, the sole issue we must address is the application of sections 17-22.5-101 and 18-1.3-401 to the calculation of Diehl's parole eligibility date. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, giving deference to the DOC's interpretation of statutes pertaining to its responsibilities and authority when that interpretation is reasonable. See Fetzer , ¶ 17, 396 P.3d at 1113 ("[T]he department's interpretation of its responsibilities to administer relevant statutory mandates is entitled to great weight ....").

¶13 Our primary responsibility when interpreting statutes is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent. Bostelman v. People , 162 P.3d 686, 689 (Colo. 2007). We do so by first looking to the plain language of the statute, reading words and phrases in context, and construing them according to their common usage. Id. at 690. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it is unnecessary to resort to rules of statutory construction, and our inquiry ends. "When statutory language conflicts with other provisions, we may rely on other factors such as legislative history, the consequences of a given construction and the goal of the statutory scheme to determine a statute's meaning." Frazier v. People , 90 P.3d 807, 811 (Colo. 2004).

C. Parole Eligibility Calculations

¶14 As pertinent here, a defendant who receives a sentence for a class 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 felony is eligible for parole when that person has served "fifty percent of the sentence imposed ... less any time authorized for earned time granted pursuant to section 17-22.5-405." § 17-22.5-403(1), C.R.S. (2018). This...