DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 August 2009
• Docket Number: SJC-10313
• Citation: 910 N.E.2d 889,454 Mass. 486
• Parties: Don DiFIORE & others<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

910 N.E.2d 889

454 Mass. 486

Don DiFIORE & others¹ v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

SJC-10313

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued April 6, 2009.

Decided August 4, 2009.

Shannon Liss-Riordan, Boston (Hillary Schwab with her) for the plaintiffs.

Amy Cashore Mariani, Boston (Michael A. Fitzhugh with her) for the defendant.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

David J. Kerman, Matthew A. Porter, & Douglas J. Hoffman, Boston, for Air Transport Association of America, Inc.

John Pagliaro, Martin J. Newhouse, & Jo Ann Shotwell Kaplan, Boston, for New England Legal Foundation & another.

Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, New York, NY, Philip J. Gordon, Boston, & Audrey R. Richardson, Roslindale, for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association & others.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, CORDY, BOTSFORD, & GANTS, JJ.

GANTS, J.

In the fall of 2005, the defendant, American Airlines, Inc. (American), imposed, at selected airports, a charge of two dollars per bag to its customers who chose to check their luggage at curbside rather than at a ticket counter. The charge did not include any gratuity to the workers who physically handled the curbside baggage check-in, namely, the "skycaps." Before the imposition of this two dollar per bag charge, there had been no cost to American's customers for curbside baggage check-in, although a tip could be given to the skycaps at the discretion of the customer. Ten skycaps filed suit, alleging that American's imposition of the two dollar per bag charge violated the provisions of the Massachusetts Wage Act protecting wages and tips, G.L. c. 149, § 152A (Act), and tortiously interfered with contractual or advantageous relations.² The case was tried in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, and a jury found in favor of nine of the ten skycaps, awarding them a total of $325,056. After the trial, the judge granted a new trial as to the claims brought by the eight plaintiffs not employed by American and certified the following question:

"Does the [Act's] definition of `service charge' encompass two different types of fees, the first of which (a fee charged in lieu of a tip) must be charged by the plaintiff's employer in order to satisfy the definition and the second of which (a fee that patrons reasonably believe will be given to a protected employee) may be charged by anyone?"³

In his certification order, the trial judge also welcomed our advice on "any other questions of Massachusetts law deemed material to this case." See Baird v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 741, 765, 360 N.E.2d 288 (1977). We answer the question in the negative, and do not agree with the interpretation of the Act that resulted in the grant of a new trial.⁴

1. Background. The relevant background and procedural history of the case set forth below is contained in the certification order of the District Court judge, occasionally supplemented by undisputed information in the record. Of the ten plaintiff skycaps, two are directly employed by American, one at Boston's Logan International Airport (Logan), and another at an airport in Missouri. The remaining eight skycaps worked at American's terminal at Logan, but were directly employed by G2 Secure Staff, LLC (G2), a company American contracted with to provide skycap services.

Before 2005, American did not charge its customers for skycap services, but customers were invited to give the skycaps a tip at their discretion. In 2005, American imposed a mandatory two dollar per bag charge for curbside baggage check-in. The skycaps retained no part of this fee. Instead, after collecting the fee, the skycaps employed by G2 were required to remit it to G2, which split the fee with American; those skycaps employed directly by American remitted the fee to American.

In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that American violated the Act by failing to distribute the proceeds of the two dollar per bag service charge to the skycaps, and by not adequately notifying customers in writing that the charge is not a tip for the skycaps.⁵ The plaintiffs' claims for violation of the Act and tortious interference with contractual or advantageous relations were tried to a jury in March and April of 2008. The jury returned a verdict in favor of all but one of the plaintiffs (the skycap directly employed by American in Missouri).⁶

On June 19, 2008, the judge granted, in part, American's motion for a new trial as to the claims brought by the eight plaintiff skycaps employed by G2 (G2 skycaps). The judge concluded that he had erred in instructing the jury on what constituted a "service charge" under the Act.⁷

General Laws c. 149, § 152A (a), defines a "[s]ervice charge" as "a fee charged by an employer to a patron in lieu of a tip to any wait staff employee, service employee, or service bartender, including any fee designated as a service charge, tip, gratuity, or a fee that a patron or other consumer would reasonably expect to be given to a wait staff employee, service employee, or service bartender in lieu of, or in addition to, a tip." In his memorandum and order granting a new trial, the judge interpreted the definition of service charge to encompass two separate fees: (1) "a fee charged by an employer to a patron in lieu of a tip to any ... service employee ..., including any fee designated as a service charge, tip, [or] gratuity,"⁸ and (2) "a fee that a patron or other consumer would reasonably expect to be given to a ... service employee ... in lieu of, or in addition to, a tip." Based on his parsing of the statutory language, he concluded that the first category — a fee designated as a service charge — falls within the statutory definition of "service charge" only when the fee is imposed by the employer of the service employee, but the second category — a fee that a customer would reasonably expect to be given to a service employee — is a "service charge" under the Act regardless of who imposes it. He determined that he erred in instructing the jury regarding the meaning of a "service charge" by failing to limit the definition of the first category of fee to a fee charged by an employer. Because the jury could have relied on his instruction in determining American's liability, the judge concluded that a new trial is required.⁹ On October 1, 2008, the judge issued the certification order that essentially asked us to determine whether his posttrial interpretation of the Act was correct.¹⁰

2. Discussion. The question before us is one of statutory construction. Where the meaning of a statute is not plain from its language, familiar principles of statutory construction guide our interpretation. We look to the intent of the Legislature "ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated." Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360, 364, 326 N.E.2d 1 (1975), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447, 190 N.E. 606 (1934). In addition, our respect for the Legislature's considered judgment dictates that we interpret the statute to be sensible, rejecting unreasonable interpretations unless the clear meaning of the language requires such an interpretation. See Commonwealth v. Dodge, 428 Mass. 860, 865, 705 N.E.2d 612 (1999), quoting Beeler v. Downey, 387 Mass. 609, 616, 442 N.E.2d 19 (1982) ("we must read the statute in a way to give it a sensible meaning"). Where possible, we construe the various provisions of a statute in harmony with one another, recognizing that the Legislature did not intend internal contradiction. Locator Servs. Group, Ltd. v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 443 Mass. 837, 859, 825 N.E.2d 78 (2005).

The Legislature's intent in enacting the Act can be plainly discerned from its language and history — to ensure that service employees receive the tips, gratuities, and service charges that customers intend them to receive. Before the September 8, 2004, amendment that applies in this case, the Act, as amended in 1983, read in relevant part:

"No employer or other person shall solicit, demand, request or accept from any employee engaged in the serving of food or beverage any payment of any nature from tips or gratuities received by such employee during the course of his employment, or from wages earned by such employee or retain for himself any tips or gratuities given directly to the employer for the benefit of the employee, as a condition of employment; and no contract or agreement between an employer or other person and an employee providing for either of such payments shall afford any basis for the granting of legal or equitable relief by any court against a party to such contract or agreement. If an employer or other person submits a bill or invoice indicating a service charge, the total proceeds of such charge shall be remitted to the employees in proportion to the service provided by them. Whoever violates any provision of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars and the court may require such employer or other person to make restitution for any tips or gratuities accepted or retained by him in violation of this section."

St.1983, c. 343.

The plain meaning of the language in the Act as appearing in St.1983, c. 343, is that no employer or other person may take any tip or gratuity received by any employee engaged in serving food or beverages, even with the agreement of the server. See Cooney v. Compass Group Foodservice, 69 Mass.App.Ct. 632, 637, 870 N.E.2d 668 (2007). If the employer or other person includes a service charge in the bill, the entirety of that service charge must be remitted to the food and beverage servers who provided the service. Id. ("the statutory language reflects legislative intent to regard...