Dowell v. Quiroz

• Decision Date: 02 April 2015
• Docket Number: NUMBER 13–12–00199–CV, NUMBER 13–12–00583–CV
• Citation: 462 S.W.3d 578
• Parties: Grady Dowell, Appellant, v. Gracie Quiroz, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mario Gonzalez Lira, Noe Lira, Maria Angeles Lira, Marilyn Gutierrez, Annette Gutierrez, Nancy Gutierrez and David Gutierrez, Appellees. In the Estate of Mario Gonzalez Lira
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

462 S.W.3d 578

Grady Dowell, Appellant

v.Gracie Quiroz, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mario Gonzalez Lira, Noe Lira, Maria Angeles Lira, Marilyn Gutierrez, Annette Gutierrez, Nancy Gutierrez and David Gutierrez, Appellees.

In the Estate of Mario Gonzalez Lira

NUMBER 13–12–00199–CV, NUMBER 13–12–00583–CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi-Edinburg.

Delivered and filed April 2, 2015

D. Allan Erwin, Jr., Roerig, Oliveira & Fisher, Attorneys at Law, Brownsville, TX, Roger W. Hughes, Adams & Graham, Harlingen, TX, for Appellant in No. 13–12–00199–CV.

Moises R. Hernandez, Hernandez Law Firm, Harlingen, TX, for Appellees in No. 13–12–00199–CV.

Moises R. Hernandez, Hernandez Law Firm, Miguel Salinas, Attorney at Law, Harlingen, TX, for Appellant in No. 13–12–00583–CV

Jacqueline M. Stroh, Attorney at Law, Scott P. Jones, Brock Person Guerra Reyna, San Antonio, TX, Roger W. Hughes, Adams & Graham, Harlingen, TX, D. Allan Erwin, Jr., Roerig, Oliveira & Fisher, Attorneys at Law, Brownsville, TX, for Appellees in No. 13–12–00583–CV.

Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Perkes

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes

On February 26, 2015, this Court issued a memorandum opinion in this case. On March 13, 2015, appellees filed a motion for rehearing, and on March 17, 2015, appellant filed a motion for rehearing. We deny the rehearings, but we withdraw our memorandum opinion of February 26, 2015, and its accompanying judgment, and substitute the following as the opinion and judgment of the court.

In appellate cause number 13–12–00199–CV, Grady Dowell appeals the statutory county court's judgment against him on the survival and wrongful death actions brought by Grade Quiroz, individually and as the administrator of the estate of Mario Gonzalez Lira, Noe Lira, Maria Angeles Lira, Marilyn Gutierrez, Annette Gutierrez, Nancy Gutierrez, and David Gutierrez (collectively “the family”). In appellate cause number 13–12–00583–CV, the family appeals the statutory county court's denial of its turnover request, which the family pursued to recover damages awarded in the survival and wrongful death actions in appellate cause number 13–12–00199–CV. Our analysis of the two cause numbers allows us to consolidate them into one opinion. Because the statutory county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the survival and wrongful death actions in appellate cause number 13–12–00199–CV, we vacate its judgment in that cause number and dismiss the cause. The turnover request in appellate cause number 13–12–00583–CV that was premised on the survival and wrongful death award from appellate cause number 13–12–00199–CV is rendered moot, and we vacate the judgment in appellate cause number 13–12–00583–CV and dismiss the cause.

I. Background

On New Year's Day in Buffalo, New York, Dowell, a New York resident, drove while intoxicated and struck bicyclist Mario Gonzalez Lira, killing him. Quiroz, Mario's sister, began probate proceedings in Cameron County, asserting Mario was a Cameron County resident.¹ The family then brought survival and wrongful death claims against Dowell in Cameron County Court at Law Number 2. As the sole ground for jurisdiction, the family asserted that Cameron County Court at Law Number 2 “possesses jurisdiction because this controversy is incident to an estate.”

Dowell pleaded guilty in New York to driving while intoxicated and criminally negligent homicide. Based on Dowell's guilty plea, the statutory county court granted the family's motion for partial summary judgment, holding Dowell liable on the family's survival and wrongful death claims. The subsequent trial determined the damages on those claims.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

By his supplemental issue in appellate cause number 13–12–00199–CV, Dowell argues that Cameron County Court at Law Number 2 lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the family's survival and wrongful death claims. In attacking the two potential sources of jurisdiction, Dowell contends: (1) Cameron County Court at Law Number 2's probate jurisdiction does not extend to survival and wrongful death claims like a probate court's jurisdiction; and (2) the family pleaded damages in excess of Cameron County Court at Law Number 2's statutory jurisdictional amount limit.

A. Standard of Review

“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court's power to decide a case.” Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex.2000). It is never presumed and cannot be waived. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex.1993). It can be raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 445. “If the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court can make no order other than reversing the judgment of the court below and dismissing the cause.” City of Garland v. Louton, 691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex.1985).

Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004). We review the family's pleadings to determine whether it has “affirmatively demonstrate[d] the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 ; see Ward v. Malone, 115 S.W.3d 267, 269 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied) (“It is incumbent upon the pleading party to allege sufficient facts to affirmatively show that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction.”). We “construe the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff and look to the pleader's intent.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 ; Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 (citations omitted). Regarding a plaintiff's responsibility to plead an amount in controversy that falls within a court's prescribed jurisdictional limits, it is presumed a trial court has jurisdiction “unless lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears on the face of the petition.” Peek v. Equip. Serv. Co. of San Antonio, 779 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex.1989) (citation omitted).

In reviewing the jurisdiction statutes, our primary objective is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 312.005 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.); Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex.2011). “The plain meaning of the text is the best expression of legislative intent unless a different meaning is apparent from the context or the plain meaning leads to absurd or nonsensical results.” Molinet, 356 S.W.3d at 411 ; see City of Waco v. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d 536, 542 (Tex.2010).

B. Probate Jurisdiction

In its pleadings, the family alleged Cameron County Court of Law Number 2 had jurisdiction because the survival and wrongful death claims were “incident to an estate” that had been opened in Cameron County. As a statutory county court, see Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 25.0331(a)(2),² Cameron County Court at Law Number 2's jurisdiction over matters “incident to an estate” is outlined by section 5A(a) of the Texas Probate Code.³ See Act of May 30, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch.957, § 6, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 4081, 4161–62, repealed by Act of May 31, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1351, § 12(h), 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 4273, 4279 (defining “matters incident to an estate” for statutory county courts). In the absence of the Legislature's inclusion of a matter in the types of claims a court exercising probate jurisdiction can hear, we use the “controlling issue test” to determine whether the matter falls within the court's jurisdiction. See In re Puig, 351 S.W.3d 301, 304 (Tex.2011). Under that test, a suit is “incident to an estate when the controlling issue is the settlement, partition, or distribution of the estate.” Id. (citation omitted). The Texas Supreme Court has determined, however, that “[t]he controlling issue in wrongful death and survival actions is not the settlement, partition, and distribution of the estate.” See Palmer v. Coble Wall Trust Co., 851 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex.1992). If Cameron County Court at Law Number 2 has probate jurisdiction over the survival and wrongful death claims, it must come from the Probate Code's express inclusion of those claims for statutory county courts.

Cameron County Court at Law Number 2 “does not have the jurisdiction of a statutory probate court granted statutory probate courts by the Texas Probate Code.” Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 25.0003(f) ; compare Act of May 30, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 6, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 4081, 4161–62 (repealed 2009) (outlining statutory county courts' jurisdiction), with Act of May 19, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 1035, § 3, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4162, 4163–64, amended by Act of May 30, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 6, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 4081, 4162; Act of May 20, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1302, § 1, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 4954, 4954–55; Act of April 26, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 64, § 1, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 422, 422, Act of May 28, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1060, § 4, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 3052, 3054, repealed by Act of May 31, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1351, § 12(h), 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 4273, 4279 (outlining statutory probate courts' jurisdiction). Unlike statutory county courts, statutory probate courts' probate jurisdiction extends to “actions by or against a person in the person's capacity as a personal representative.” See Act of May 19, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 1035, § 3, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4162, 4164 (repealed 2009).

The Legislature added this jurisdictional grant in response to Seay v. Hall, wherein the Texas Supreme Court held that probate courts did not have jurisdiction over survival and wrongful death claims because those claims were not incident to an estate. See Palmer, 851 S.W.2d at 181 (explaining that the “readily apparent purpose” of adding the language was to overrule Seay v. Hall ); see also Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 875, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 2995, 2996 (adding language), amended by Act of May 19, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 1035, § 3, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4162, 4163–64,⁴ Act of May 30, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 6, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 4081,...