Duffy v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Res.

• Decision Date: 30 July 2011
• Docket Number: Docket No. 140937.
• Citation: 805 N.W.2d 399,490 Mich. 198
• Parties: Beverly DUFFY, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES and State of Michigan, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

490 Mich. 198

805 N.W.2d 399

Beverly DUFFY, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES and State of Michigan, Defendants–Appellees.

Docket No. 140937.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July 30, 2011.

Boyer & Dawson, P.C. (by William G. Boyer and William G. Boyer, Jr.), Sterling Heights, for plaintiff.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, and Ann Sherman and C. Adam Purnell, Assistant Attorneys General, for defendants.

MARKMAN, J.

Plaintiff, Beverly Duffy, was injured while riding an off-road vehicle on what is commonly known as the Little Manistee Trail (“the Trail”). The state of Michigan owns the Trail, and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) maintains it. Plaintiff sued both entities, and throughout this litigation has set forth various theories to avoid the grant of governmental immunity provided to defendants in the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq. In the lower courts, she argued that defendants had a duty to maintain the Trail in reasonable repair pursuant to what is generally referred to as the ‘highway exception’ to governmental immunity because the Trail is a “trailway” that falls within the statutory definition of “highway.” See MCL 691.1401(e); MCL 691.1402(1). In this Court, plaintiff now contends that we should conclude that the Trail is either a “forest road” or a “road” for purposes of the GTLA and that defendants therefore have a duty to maintain this “road” pursuant to the highway exception.

Therefore, this case requires us to determine whether the Little Manistee Trail is a “highway” for the purposes of governmental immunity because the state only has a duty to maintain the Trail in reasonable repair pursuant to the highway exception if it is, in fact, a “highway” under MCL 691.1401(e). We note that this is a question of first impression in the particular context of this case. For although Michigan courts are familiar with the highway exception to governmental immunity, we are unaware of any case in which a person who has been injured while riding an off-road vehicle on a state trail has claimed that the trail constitutes a “highway” for purposes of the highway exception.

We conclude that the Trail is not a “highway” under MCL 691.1401(e). The Trail is properly classified as a “trailway” within the distinct meaning of that word in Michigan's statutory law, and this “trailway”—which is miles away from any highway—is not within the scope of the highway exception because it is not a “trailway ... on the highway.” Id. Furthermore, because the Legislature determined that only trailways on the highway are deemed highways, and because this Trail therefore is clearly not a highway, we refuse plaintiff's invitation to avoid the statute and make the Trail into a highway by calling it a road. In summary, all roads, forest roads, trails, trailways, and highways in this case lead to the conclusion that plaintiff's claim is barred by governmental immunity. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I. FACTS & HISTORY

Plaintiff, together with her husband and friends, were riding off-road vehicles (ORVs) on the Little Manistee Trail, located in Lake County. Just as plaintiff was about to negotiate a left turn, she ran over some exposed wooden boards that had been partially buried. This caused her ORV to bounce into the air, throwing plaintiff against nearby tree trunks and resulting in serious spinal injuries.

The Trail serves mixed uses, and the DNR has designated it variously as an “ORV route,” an “ORV trail,” and a “snowmobile trail.” Plaintiff was injured on the portion of the Trail designated as an “ORV route,” which signifies that any licensed motor vehicle can operate on that part of the Trail. The Trail is part of a comprehensive system of recreational trailways, which by statute the DNR is obligated to maintain and manage for off-road vehicles. See MCL 324.81123. The state funds the ORV Trail Improvement Fund through the state treasury, and the DNR is authorized to provide grants to local units of government, nonprofit agencies, and individuals to maintain this system of trails, routes, and forest roads. The Little Manistee Trail is maintained by the Irons Area Tourist Association, a nonprofit corporation.

Plaintiff sued defendants on the basis of the highway exception to governmental immunity.¹ Defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that the Trail is not a “highway” and, as a result, that they had no duty to maintain it in reasonable repair pursuant to the highway exception. The trial court denied this motion, ruling that the Trail fits within the definition of a “highway” in MCL 691.1401(e), which specifically includes “trailways.” According to the trial court, “there is no dispute that the Little Manistee is a trailway,” and it proceeded to hold that defendants were not exempt from the duty to maintain the Trail. The Court of Appeals reversed. Duffy v. Dep't of Natural Resources, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 9, 2010 (Docket No. 289644, 2010 WL 785949). The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the Trail is properly classified as a “trailway” and falls within the definition of “highway” in MCL 691.1401(e). According to the Court of Appeals, “[t]here can be no real dispute that this is a trailway....” Id. at 3. However, the panel concluded that the limited liability granted to the state in MCL 691.1402(1) applies to all trailways. As a result, it ruled that the highway exception did not apply to plaintiff's suit. Plaintiff then filed an application for leave to appeal, which this Court granted. Duffy v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 488 Mich. 861, 788 N.W.2d 15 (2010).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Ostroth v. Warren Regency, GP, LLC, 474 Mich. 36, 40, 709 N.W.2d 589 (2006). Matters of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. Id.

III. HIGHWAY EXCEPTION TO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

The GTLA shields a governmental agency from tort liability “if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” ² MCL 691.1407(1). The existence and scope of governmental immunity was solely a creation of the courts until the Legislature enacted the GTLA in 1964, which codified several exceptions to governmental immunity that permit a plaintiff to pursue a claim against a governmental agency. This case concerns the highway exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1402(1), which provides in relevant part:

[E]ach governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. A person who sustains bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of a governmental agency to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency. The liability, procedure, and remedy as to county roads under the jurisdiction of a county road commission shall be as provided in [MCL 224.21]. The duty of the state and the county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability for that duty, extends only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and does not include sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.The reference to “trailways” in the fourth and final sentence was added by 1999 PA 205. The GTLA further provides in MCL 691.1401(e) its own definition of “highway,” which states that [as] used in this act:

* * *

(e) “Highway” means a public highway, road, or street that is open for public travel and includes bridges, sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, and culverts on the highway. The term highway does not include alleys, trees, and utility poles.

The inclusion of “trailways” in the definition of “highway” was also done in 1999 PA 205. The GTLA does not define other terms in MCL 691.1401(e), including in particular “road” or “trailways.”

Although this Court has never before considered the exact issues presented in this case, it has on many occasions interpreted the highway exception. See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Lansing, 486 Mich. 1, 782 N.W.2d 171 (2010); Grimes v. Dep't of Transp., 475 Mich. 72, 715 N.W.2d 275 (2006); Nawrocki v. Macomb Co. Rd. Comm., 463 Mich. 143, 615 N.W.2d 702 (2000); Suttles v. Dep't of Transp., 457 Mich. 635, 578 N.W.2d 295 (1998). These decisions are instructive and offer some general principles to guide us.

First, this Court has recognized that the language of the highway exception is not altogether clear. Indeed, we have described the highway exception as “problematic,” Nawrocki, 463 Mich. at 167 n. 24, 615 N.W.2d 702, and have noted that its language is “confusing for several reasons,” Suttles, 457 Mich. at 643 n. 5, 578 N.W.2d 295 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In Grimes, 475 Mich. at 78, 715 N.W.2d 275, we identified a particular problem in the act, which we encounter again today—that is, “[b]eyond defining the term ‘highway,’ the GTLA does not define [the] additional terms [in MCL 691.1401(e) ].” The absence of statutory definitions for these terms is particularly troublesome in this case because not only are “road” and “trailway” undefined by the GTLA, but “trailway” is undefined in many general dictionaries as well. In determining whether defendants have a duty to maintain the Trail in reasonable repair because the Trail constitutes a “highway,” we remain cognizant of the challenges presented by the drafting of the highway exception and mindful that we are “[c]onstrained to apply the statutory language as best as possible as written....” Nawrocki, 463 Mich. at 171, 615 N.W.2d 702.

Second, as we...