Dunn v. City of Boynton Beach

• Decision Date: 14 June 2016
• Docket Number: NO. 15-81499-CIV-MARRA,15-81499-CIV-MARRA
• Citation: 192 F.Supp.3d 1310
• Parties: Jonathan Vanquise DUNN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH, Florida and Christopher Munro, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

192 F.Supp.3d 1310

Jonathan Vanquise DUNN, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH, Florida and Christopher Munro, Defendants.

NO. 15-81499-CIV-MARRA

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed June 14, 2016

Jonathan Vanquise Dunn, Jacksonville, FL, pro se.

Andrew Michael Bonderud, The Bonderud Law Firm, P.A., Ponte Vedra Beach, FL, for Plaintiff.

Tracey A. DeCarlo, Goren Cherof Doody & Ezrol, Michael Thomas Burke, Johnson Anselmo Murdoch Burke Piper & Hochman PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

KENNETH A. MARRA, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (DE 14; DE 15). For the following reasons, Defendant Christopher Munro's motion is denied and Defendant City of Boynton Beach's motion is granted in part.

I. Background

Plaintiff Jonathan Vanquise Dunn borrowed tools from his friend Benjamin Schwartz to make general household repairs before vacating his apartment. (DE 1 ¶ 12.) On the afternoon that Dunn sought to return the tools, Schwartz was at a friend's home. (DE 1 ¶ 13.) Dunn started walking toward the residential neighborhood where the friend's home was located, but he did not have the exact address because Schwartz's cell phone battery died before he could tell the address to Dunn. (DE 1 ¶ 14.) Dunn knew the home was one of the first homes in the neighborhood. (DE 1 ¶ 15.)

Dunn arrived at a home that he believed was the one where Schwartz was, knocked on the door, and waited a few moments for someone to answer. (DE 1 ¶ 16.) No one answered and Dunn was unable to find Schwartz or otherwise contact him. (DE 1 ¶ 17.) Dunn started to walk away from the neighborhood while carrying the tool bag he intended to return to Schwartz. (DE 1 ¶ 17.)

After walking about a quarter mile, several officers from the Boynton Beach Police Department, including Defendant Officer Christopher Munro, approached Dunn in their patrol vehicles and detained him for questioning. (DE 1 ¶ 18.) Dunn explained his presence and conduct in the area to Officer Munro. (DE 1 ¶ 19.) Officer Munro believed that Dunn was in the area to commit a burglary and arrested Dunn for possession of burglary tools and for loitering or prowling. (DE 1 ¶ 20.) Though the complaint is silent on the issue and the fact does not affect the outcome of the motions, the Court notes that the parties' briefs make clear that Dunn ultimately was not prosecuted for either offense.

Dunn sued Officer Munro in his individual capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause. Dunn also sued the City of Boynton Beach ("the City") for false arrest¹ under state law based on a theory of vicarious liability. Additionally, Dunn brought a claim for a declaratory judgment against both Defendants that sections 810.06 (possession of burglary tools) and 856.021 (loitering or prowling) of the Florida statutes were unconstitutionally applied to him. Officer Munro moved to dismiss the § 1983 claim and the City moved to dismiss the remaining claims.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires "a short and plain statement of the claim" that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground on which it rests. The Supreme Court has held that "[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citation and alteration omitted).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Thus, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The Court must accept all of the plaintiff's factual allegations as true in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for which relief could be granted. Hishon v. King & Spalding , 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).

III. Discussion

A. Section 1983 Claim Against Officer Munro

Officer Munro asserts that the § 1983 claim against him should be dismissed because he is cloaked with qualified immunity. A public official performing a discretionary function enjoys qualified immunity in a civil action for damages if his or her conduct "does not violate clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). "The purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation." Lee v. Ferraro , 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.2002). Qualified immunity may be raised in a motion to dismiss. Skrtich v. Thornton , 280 F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir.2002).²

For qualified immunity to apply, the public official must first show that he or she "was acting within the scope of his or her discretionary authority." Moore v. Pederson , 806 F.3d 1036, 1042 (11th Cir.2015) (en banc). The term "discretionary authority" "include[s] all actions of a governmental official that (1) were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties, and (2) were within the scope of his authority." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jordan v. Doe , 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir.1994) ). Here, Dunn concedes that Officer Munro was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when he arrested Dunn. (DE 16 at 6.)

Once it is established that the governmental official was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is inappropriate. Moore , 806 F.3d at 1042. To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must show that (1) the facts demonstrate that the governmental official violated his constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the government official's alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). The Court may address these inquiries in whichever order it chooses, though it is often advantageous to first determine whether a violation of the right occurred. Id. at 242, 129 S.Ct. 808.

1. Whether Officer Munro Had Probable Cause to Arrest Dunn

Turning to the first inquiry, the Court must determine whether, taking the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Officer Munro violated Dunn's constitutional right. An officer may "arrest a suspect without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense." Michigan v. DeFillippo , 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979). "The validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime; the mere fact that the suspect is later acquitted of the offense for which he is arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest." Id. Accordingly, whether Officer Munro violated Dunn's constitutional right turns on whether probable cause existed when Officer Munro arrested Dunn. See Madiwale v. Savaiko , 117 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir.1997) ("There is no question that an arrest without probable cause to believe a crime has been committed violates the Fourth Amendment.").³

Probable cause means more than bare suspicion. Brinegar v. United States , 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) ; Durruthy v. Pastor , 351 F.3d 1080, 1088 (11th Cir.2003). Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. Durruthy , 351 F.3d at 1088.

Here, the complaint is unclear as to the facts and circumstances within Officer Munro's knowledge at the time of arrest. Specifically, the complaint does not specify whether Officer Munro merely saw Dunn walking away from the neighborhood with a tool bag or also knew that Dunn approached and left the house. Under either scenario, however, the Court concludes that Officer Dunn lacked probable cause for the arrest.

a. Probable Cause for Loitering or Prowling

The Court first considers whether Officer Munro had probable cause to arrest Dunn for loitering or prowling. Florida's "loitering or prowling" statute provides:

(1) It is unlawful for any person to loiter or prowl in a place, at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals, under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.

(2) Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such alarm or immediate concern is warranted is the fact that the person takes flight upon appearance of a law enforcement officer, refuses to identify himself or herself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or herself or any object. Unless flight by the person or other circumstance makes it impracticable, a law enforcement officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this section, afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm or immediate concern which would otherwise

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