Dunn v. Stack
| Decision Date | 05 August 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. AF-217,AF-217 |
| Citation | 418 So.2d 345 |
| Parties | 34 UCC Rep.Serv. 1623 E. L. DUNN and John C. Nix, Jr., Appellants, v. J. E. STACK, Jr., John Barnes, Zeda Barnes Davis, Mathew Barnes, Noah Barnes, Ola Mae Barnes Rawls, Allen W. Lindsay, Sr., Thomas "Dick" Ates, Whitney National Bank and A. B. Walker, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Ronald W. Ritchie, of Reeves, King & Ritchie, Pensacola, for appellants.
Donald H. Partington, of Clark, Partington, Hart, Hart & Johnson, Pensacola, for J. E. Stack, Jr. and Whitney National Bank, appellees.
Oil in Florida's Panhandle is one of our state's treasures, but the rush to exploit this hidden bounty has created some unfortunate legal disputes, such as the case at bar. This quiet title action, which ended in a summary judgment for the appellees, has created a complex mosaic web from which it is difficult for one to discern whether the appellants are in fact bona fide purchasers for value. Because latent factual issues remain, we reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings; at the same time acknowledging that this case has been before us on one previous occasion 1 and surmising that we will in all probability see its visage again.
In 1961 J. E. Barnes passed away leaving an undivided one-half interest in a fourteen-acre tract of land to his wife, who later died in 1967, conveying her interest in undivided one-fifth shares to each of the couple's five children, including Matthew Barnes and Zeda Barnes Davis. In 1968 Matthew Barnes became administrator of the estate.
Part of the fourteen-acre tract was the subject of some collateral quiet title problems. During the pendency of these problems, Matthew Barnes petitioned the probate court for permission to lease the mineral rights to the tract. The court approved, and Barnes was later able to negotiate a lease with Thomas "Dick" Ates, one of the appellees herein. On November 16, 1971, the probate judge approved the lease agreement subject to a final determination on the collateral quiet title action in favor of the Barnes estate. This order was promptly filed in the probate file.
Shortly thereafter, Zeda Barnes Davis negotiated the leasing of her mineral rights of her undivided one-fifth interest. The negotiations involved E. L. Dunn, an appellant herein, and Lee McCormick, Dunn's partner in land-buying activities. The lease was signed on January 17, 1972, and promptly filed in the official public records. Eventually, a suit to quiet title was filed by Dunn against the Barnes' heirs, Ates and other interested parties for the purpose of resolving the parties' interests in the lease.
Depositions were ultimately taken of Dunn and Mrs. Davis, and affidavits from Mrs. Davis were submitted. The depositions and the affidavits give some insight as to what occurred during the lease negotiations in January, 1972 between Dunn and Davis. Dunn claims that he had no knowledge of the probate proceedings or the Ates lease, although he admits knowledge of the collateral quiet title problems. Davis, on the other hand, signed an affidavit claiming that she had fully advised Dunn of the Ates lease, which was consummated as a part of the probate administration proceedings. A second affidavit executed by Davis states that she had no recollection as to any discussion with Dunn about any pending lawsuit, and that she was "strongly persuaded" into executing the first affidavit.
Her deposition adds further confusion. She testified that she was under the impression the probate judge had given Matthew Barnes three months to consummate a lease on the fourteen-acre parcel, but that she didn't think it had gone through. 2 Mrs. Davis indicated that she had discussions with Dunn in January, 1972, pertaining to problems affecting the leasing arrangement, "since a family was involved in the leasing and that there was a lawsuit going on." 3 She also stated that Dunn was aware that the property sought to be leased was implicated in the probate administration proceedings. While we could add more to this discussion of Mrs. Davis' testimony, it is sufficient to say that it was confusing and appears to provide factual conflicts.
The record moreover reveals that the lease between Dunn and Mrs. Davis recited a consideration of $10 and "other considerations." In reality Dunn presented Mrs. Davis with two drafts signed by his business associate Lee McCormick. The drafts were for $1750 and $3000. When Mrs. Davis attempted to cash them, they were dishonored by the bank. Davis demanded her lease back but was apparently refused. On May 11, 1972, the lease between Ates and Matthew Barnes was finally recorded in the public records of Santa Rosa County.
The case below terminated by the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of appellees holding: (1) that, as a matter of law, the appellants were not bona fide purchasers for value at the time that they consummated the January, 1972 leasing arrangements with Mrs. Davis, and (2) that the Barnes' estate lease to Ates was prior in time and prior in right.
The appellants argue that the Davis/Dunn lease is superior to the Barnes/Ates lease, because Dunn was a bona fide purchaser for value. Although the two drafts for $1750 and $3000 presented to Mrs. Davis in January, 1972 may have been dishonored, appellants contend that the lease clearly recites that $10 "and other consideration" was given to Mrs. Davis. Therefore, value was given. Implicit in appellants' position is that the Davis/Dunn lease was the first lease to be filed in the official records, thereby making it prior in right to the probate lease. Appellants, without citing any authority for this view, have suggested that the filing of the probate lease in the probate records is insufficient notice to accord one the status of a bona fide purchaser.
The appellees counter that absent actual payment of the consideration to Mrs. Davis, the appellants cannot be bona fide purchasers for value. Myers v. Van Buskirk, 96 Fla. 704, 119 So. 123 (1928). Since the $1750 and $3000 drafts were dishonored, actual payment was never made to Mrs. Davis until after the probate lease had been filed in the official records. Thus, they contend the appellants have failed to carry their required burden of proof of the recited consideration, because one can not rely on the mere recital of consideration in a deed or lease. See Lake v. Hancock, 38 Fla. 53, 20 So. 811 (1896).
The posture of the case now before us is an appeal from the granting of the appellees' motion for summary judgment. "A summary judgment is rendered [only] upon a showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., 410 So.2d 501, 506 (Fla.1982); Correia v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 393 So.2d 1161, 1163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
The burden is upon the movant for summary judgment to negate conclusively every reasonable inference of material fact that could support the nonmoving party. Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So.2d 29, 30 (Fla.1977); see also Burkett v. Parker, 410 So.2d 947, 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In ascertaining whether there is any reasonable inference of material fact that would support the nonmoving party, thereby barring summary judgment, the trial court must consider the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.510(c); see also 30 Fla.Jur. Summary Judgment § 25 (Rev.1974). Because there remain unresolved factual determinations within Dunn's deposition and the affidavits and deposition of Mrs. Davis, we reverse for further proceedings. Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 783 (Fla.1965).
The first factual conflict stems from the question concerning how much Dunn knew about the probate lease either at the time he negotiated his lease with Mrs. Davis or prior to that time. To be accorded the status of a bona fide purchaser for value, one must be without notice as to a transaction which is prior in time. § 695.01, Fla.Stat. (1941). Notice, of course, can be actual or constructive. Sapp v. Warner, 105 Fla. 245, 141 So. 124, reaffm'd. on reh., 105 Fla. 245, 143 So. 648 (1932); Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So.2d 302, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966), cert. denied, 192 So.2d 489 (Fla.1966). We find that there are, at a minimum, reasonable inferences of fact from the record that Dunn had actual notice of the probate lease at the time the Davis/Dunn lease was executed.
Constructive notice is a legal inference, and it is imputed to creditors and subsequent purchasers by virtue of any document filed in the grantor/grantee index--the official records. Sapp, supra, at 141 So. 127; Leffler v. Smith, 388 So.2d 261, 263 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), rev. denied, 397 So.2d 778 (Fla.1981). In this case it appears there was no constructive notice of the probate lease to anyone until May 11, 1972--the date the probate lease was filed in the official records. While it is true that the probate lease was filed in the probate records prior to the time that the Davis/Dunn lease was consummated, "[s]uch proceedings in the probate court do not constitute constructive notice to subsequent purchasers for value." Pierson v. Bill, 138 Fla. 104, 189 So. 679, 684 (1939); see also 66 Am.Jur.2d Records & Recording Laws § 136 (1973). 4
Actual notice, on the other hand, is of two different types. It may be: "(1) Express, which includes what might be called direct information, or (2) implied, which is said to include notice inferred from the fact that the person had [the] means of knowledge, which it was his duty to use and which he did not use ...." Sapp, supra, at 141 So. 127; Hagan, supra, at 313. In the case at bar it is clear that Mrs. Davis' first affidavit indicated that she had fully apprised Dunn of the existence of the probate...
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