Earl v. State
| Decision Date | 30 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 12-21-00231-CR |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER RENOR EARL, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
DO NOT PUBLISH
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
Christopher Renor Earl appeals his conviction for murder. He presents four issues on appeal. We modify the judgment and affirm as modified.
In October 2019, Appellant moved in with his mother and stepfather, Retha and Roy Bailey. The Baileys agreed to allow Appellant to reside with them while Appellant looked for a job. By December, Roy was irritated that Appellant had not found employment. During the morning of December 23, Roy and Appellant had several discussions about Appellant looking for a job. At one point, Appellant asked Roy if he could help. And Roy responded, "Yes, get out of my blankety-blank face and get out of my house." Roy also told Appellant Retha heard Appellant respond, "What did you say to me?" Appellant then left the kitchen where Retha was. Retha heard a thump and Roy say, "You done hit me." Retha then left the kitchen to separate the men.
Retha saw Appellant hit Roy in the face and stepped between the men. Appellant picked her up, moved her out of the way, and hit Roy one or two more times. Retha stepped between the men again, at which point she and Roy fell to the ground. Appellant grabbed a cane from the corner of the room and hit Roy in the head. Retha kicked the cane out of Appellant's hand.
Appellant began kicking Roy while he was on the ground. Retha placed her body on top of Roy's to protect him. But Appellant kept kicking, breaking Retha's arm. After Retha told Appellant to leave, he left the house. He attempted to kick Roy one more time as he walked back through the room after retrieving his keys.
Retha and Roy went to the hospital for their injuries and the medical staff insisted the police be contacted. Roy had a subdural hematoma, which required surgical intervention to release the pressure and remove the clot. The next day, Roy had a seizure. A CAT scan showed bleeding inside the frontal lobe of his brain. According to the neurosurgeon, surgery could not repair the bleeding. Due to the severe trauma, Roy became comatose and required both a breathing and feeding tube. Roy eventually died from his injuries.
Appellant was arrested and charged by indictment with murder. He pleaded "not guilty," and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Appellant "guilty" and sentenced him to life in prison. This appeal followed.
In his first issue, Appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, he urges there is no evidence he intended to cause Roy's death.
The Jackson v. Virginia[1] legal sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks v State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Legal sufficiency is the constitutional minimum required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a criminal conviction. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315-16, 99 S.Ct. at 2786-87; see also Escobedo v State, 6 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet ref'd). The standard for reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; see also Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; Johnson, 871 S.W.2d at 186. A jury is free to believe all or any part of a witness's testimony or disbelieve all or any part of that testimony. See Lee v. State, 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff'd, 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A successful legal sufficiency challenge will result in rendition of an acquittal by the reviewing court. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41-42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 2217-18, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982).
Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Rodriguez v. State, 521 S.W.3d 822, 827 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Sorrells v. State, 343 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, provided that the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Juries are permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences so long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 15. Juries are not permitted to reach conclusions based on mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions. Id. An inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them, while speculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and evidence presented. Id. at 16.
The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge would include one that "accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant is tried." Id.
As applicable to this case, a person commits murder if he (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual or (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (2) (West 2019). These methods of committing murder are not separate offenses, but alternative methods of committing the same offense. Smith v. State, 436 S.W.3d 353, 378 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd); Lozano v. State, 359 S.W.3d 790, 821 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref'd); see Aguirre v. State, 732 S.W.2d 320, 325-26 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (op. on reh'g) ( that an indictment alleging theories of both intentional and knowing murder and felony murder did not allege different offenses, but only different ways of committing the same offense); accord Barfield v. State, 202 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. ref'd).
The State's indictment alleged two alternate theories of murder: that he intentionally or knowingly caused Roy's death or that he intentionally caused bodily injury and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused Roy's death. The trial court charged the jury in the disjunctive, tracking the indictment, and the jury returned a general verdict. When a general verdict is returned and there is sufficient evidence to support a finding under any of the alleged theories submitted, we will uphold the verdict. Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919, 931 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc); Aguirre, 732 S.W.2d at 326. We therefore need only determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support a guilty finding under one of the theories submitted to the jury.
A jury may infer intent from the acts and words of the defendant, the manner in which the offense was committed, the nature of the wounds inflicted, and the relative size and strength of the parties. See Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); West v. State, 846 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, pet. ref'd).
The Court of Criminal Appeals has noted that under Section 19.02(b)(2), the required mens rea "is the intent to cause serious bodily injury and the statute does not add a culpable mental state to the conduct that caused the death." Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The State must show that the individual, acting with the conscious objective or desire to create a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of any bodily member or organ, caused the death of an individual. Lugo-Lugo v. State, 650 S.W.2d 72, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
In order to prove the second element of murder, it must be shown that the act intended to cause serious bodily injury was objectively clearly dangerous to human life. Id. Proof of the existence of a culpable mental state most often depends upon circumstantial evidence. Lee v. State, 21 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, pet. ref'd); Morales v. State, 828 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992), aff'd, 853 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Generally, the culpable mental state must be inferred from the acts of the accused or from the surrounding circumstances, including not only acts, but also words and conduct. Montgomery v. State, 198 S.W.3d 67, 87 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref'd); Lee, 21 S.W.3d at 539; Morales, 828 S.W.2d at 263; see Ledesma v. State, 677 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
Appellant urges the evidence is insufficient to show he intended to cause Roy's death. Appellant testified at trial that he intended to hit Roy but did not intend to kill him. According to Appellant, Roy was sitting up...
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