Edgerson v. State

• Decision Date: 01 October 1974
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 598
• Citation: 53 Ala.App. 581,302 So.2d 556
• Parties: Paul EDGERSON, alias v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 556

302 So.2d 556

53 Ala.App. 581

Paul EDGERSON, alias v. STATE.

6 Div. 598.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Oct. 1, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 29, 1974.

Edward M. Selfe, Birmingham, for appellant.

William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., Montgomery, and Jonathan Prince Gardberg, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Mobile, for the State.

ALMON, Judge.

Appellant, a male age thirty-six was found guilty of indecent molestation of a six-year old female. He was sentenced to serve five years in the penitentiary.

The evidence was without contradiction that the appellant did, in fact, sexually molest the child. Fortunately, the record shows no serious harm was done to the young girl, because the appellant was frightened away by the approach of a third person. The testimony shows he 'skipped' away from the scene.

The jury rejected appellant's plea of insanity after the trial judge had properly charged them on the Parsons Rule. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854. Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to quash the indictment, averring inter alia that the appellant was unable to defend himself and unable to help his attorney present his defense. This motion was heard prior to the trial, where the following occurred:

'THE COURT: Let's show that it is stipulated between the State and the defense, as to the motion to quash the indictment, or to transfer the case to juvenile court, that the defendant, the movant--is thirty eight years old?

(Thereupon, ensued an off-the-record discussion, following which the following proceedings were had and done:)

'THE COURT: Thirty six? All right. Anyway, is in his thirties, is over thirty years of age.

'MR. SELFE: Yes, sir.

'THE COURT: That Dr. Blankenship, who is a psychiatrist, on August 23, 1972, examined the defendant and reported:

"This individual is mentally retarded, is functioning in the pre-school range of intelligence and has no judgment or inside (sic) to the nature of this crime. However, at this time I do not see as to where he could benefit from Partlow. My only recommendation at this time is a structured environment (close supervision at home) and vocational training.'

'It is further stipulated that on February 23, 1973, Dr. George Turner, a psychiatrist, stated:

"This individual is not psychotic and my only recommendation at this time is a structured environment with close supervision at home.'

'Now, does that cover substantially what--the fact that he is over thirty years of age and that this is what the doctor said?

'MR. SELFE: Pre-school intelligence. That is what I wanted to get in.

'THE COURT: Gentlemen, based on this, it is the Court's ruling that the motion to quash is overruled, and the alternate request that the case be transferred to juvenile court is overruled, and that movant, or the defendant, excepts.

'Is that correct?

'MR. SELFE: I do, yes, sir.

'THE COURT: All right.'

After the state rested its case, the appellant introduced several witnesses tending to support the defense of insanity. This evidence was presented in addition to the evidence of the appellant's competency to stand trial at the hearing of the pre-trial motion.

A psychiatrist who had examined the appellant during his confinement in the county jail testified that the appellant functioned at a pre-school intellectual capacity and did not have any 'judgment or inside (sic) into the nature of this crime.' The psychiatrist noted that although the appellant had gone through the fourth grade in school, he still had a pre-school mentality. No evidence concerning the performance of the appellant in grammar school was presented. The witness stated that the appellant could not profit from institutional confinement but that he should be placed in a structured environment and subject to planned vocational training. The expert concluded that the appellant should be supervised as a pre-school child would be inasmuch as he lacked the 'internal controls' necessary to govern his behavior; but that the appellant showed no signs of psychosis or other mental illness. The psychiatrist also made it clear that his examination of the appellant was not long and he could form no opinion on whether the appellant knew right from wrong on such summary analysis.

A psychiatric social worker testified that she had observed the appellant when talking with him on several occasions. She testified that the appellant was mentally retarded.

The appellant's mother testified that the appellant fell from a housetop when he was three or four years of age and that the trauma occasioned a lapse of consciousness lasting some 15--20 minutes. She also testified that the appellant had received another blow on the head with a 'ricket bat' a few years later. The appellant's mother stated that he displayed eccentric behavior during noctural slumber, to-wit: walking, talking, laughing and teeth gritting; that appellant spent eleven years at the Partlow State School and five years at Searcy Hospital. She also stated that the appellant often imagined things that were untrue.

Oliver Gray testified that he owned Gray's Funeral Home in Birmingham. He stated that his brother, a minister, had gotten the appellant out of Partlow some years ago; that appellant stayed with him and worked for him and that he was 'just a handy fellow, just to give him something to do', such as sweeping the floor and cleaning up. He further stated that appellant was not capable of doing anything more than that. He testified that appellant liked to play as a child likes to play. Gray stated that on occasion he would let appellant cook for himself and that he would cook meals for two people, set a table for two people, and act and talk as though he was dining with another person when, in fact, he was dining alone.

Appellant's counsel first contends the court was in error in refusing to give the following written requested charge:

'I charge you that if you find the Defendant has a mental age of approximately 6 years you must find the Defendant not guilty.'

This contention has support at common law. In IV Blackstone Commentaries, *23, we find on page 1229:

'But by the law, as it now stands, and has stood at least ever since the time of Edward the Third, the capacity of doing ill, or contracting guilt, is not so much measured by years and days, as by the strength of the delinquent's understanding and judgment. For one lad of eleven years old may have as much cunning as another of fourteen; and in these cases our maxim is, that 'malitia supplet aetatem' (malice is held equivalent to age). Under seven years of age indeed an infant cannot be guilty of felony; for then a felonious discretion is almost an impossibility in nature; but at eight years old he may be guilty of felony. Also, under fourteen, though an infant shall be prima facie adjudged to be doli incapax (incapable of guile); yet, if it appear to the court and jury that he was doli capax (capable of guile), and could discern between good and evil, he may be convicted and suffer death. * * *'

However, our Supreme Court has taken the view that actual age controls when applying the common law presumptions as to criminal mental capacity, preferring instead to approach the problem by submitting the matter to a jury under the Parsons Rule, supra. In Hall v. State, 248 Ala. 33, 26 So.2d 566, the court stated:

'Defendant offered the testimony of several physicians who had more or less expert knowledge in mental diseases. Among them was Dr. Mayfield, who was permitted to testify that defendant was, in his opinion, born with a low mentality and a handicapped mind; that it reached a peak of development at a mental age of around six or seven years and then stopped; that he had been subnormal in comparison with other children of his age, always handicapped and inferior mentally. The doctor had previously testified that upon his interview with the defendant he manifested nothing that reflected insanity. He was 'just mentally deficient.' The question, therefore, propounded to Dr. Mayfield to which objection was interposed and sustained, as to whether or not the defendant in his opinion had a mind of about a 'six or seven year old chap,' was in fact answered in that portion of Dr. Mayfield's testimony above-noted.

'We may add here, however, our agreement with the authorities to the effect that criminal responsibility does not depend upon the mental age of the defendant, and that a comparison of an adult person with the mental age of a child is not the proper method of proof in cases of this character. Such was the holding of the Massachusetts Court in Commonwealth v. Trippi, 268 Mass. 227, 167 N.E. 354, and of the New Jersey Court in State v. Schilling, 95 N.J.L. 145, 112 A. 400. See also the cases found cited in the note to the text of 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 58, p. 122.

'We prefer to adhere to the rule announced in the Parsons case, Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am.Rep. 193, recently re-affirmed in Reedy v. State, 246 Ala. 363, 20 So.2d 528, which requires in insanity cases that the proof should show, that at the time of the commission of the crime the defendant was afflicted with a diseased mind to the extent: (1) He did not know right from wrong as applied to the particular act in question, or (2) if he did have such knowledge, he nevertheless, by reason of the duress of such mental disease had so far lost the power to select the right and to avoid doing the act in question as that his free agency was at the time destroyed, and (3) that, at the same time, the crime was so connected with such mental disease, in the relation of cause and effect, as to have been the product of it solely.'

The trial judge therefore correctly refused the written requested charge.

Appellant further contends that committing him to the state penitentiary constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Alabama Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to the...