Edwards v. Penix

• Decision Date: 24 July 2019
• Docket Number: 5:18-CV-1287
• Citation: 388 F.Supp.3d 135
• Parties: Jasmine Grace-Louise EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. Tim PENIX and Christopher Montgomery, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

388 F.Supp.3d 135

Jasmine Grace-Louise EDWARDS, Plaintiff,

v.Tim PENIX and Christopher Montgomery, Defendants.

5:18-CV-1287

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Signed July 24, 2019

JASMINE GRACE-LOUISE EDWARDS, Plaintiff, Pro Se, 335 Valley Drive, Syracuse, NY 13207

HON. LETITIA JAMES, Attorney General of the State of New York, OF COUNSEL: MELISSA A. LATINO, ESQ., Ass't Attorney General, Attorneys for Defendants, The Capitol, Albany, NY 12224

MEMORANDUM–DECISION and ORDER

DAVID N. HURD, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 2, 2018, pro se plaintiff Jasmine Grace-Louise Edwards ("Edwards" or "plaintiff"), a graduate of a certificate program at the State University of New York's ("SUNY") Educational Opportunity Center ("EOC") in Syracuse, New York, filed this action against defendants Christopher Montgomery ("Montgomery"), an EOC staff assistant, and Tim Penix ("Penix"), Vice President of the Syracuse EOC.

According to Edwards's complaint, Montgomery and Penix (collectively "defendants") violated her rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution while she was enrolled in the EOC's clinical health training program. Plaintiff accompanied her pleading with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"); that is, for permission to continue this action without pre-paying the filing fees that are otherwise required.

On December 4, 2018, U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew T. Baxter granted Edwards's request for IFP status, conducted an initial review of plaintiff's complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and ordered the issuance of summonses for service of process upon the two named defendants. Edwards v. Penix , 2018 WL 7290827 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2018) (Baxter, M.J.).

On February 14, 2019, defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) to dismiss Edwards's complaint in its entirety. According to defendants' motion, plaintiff has failed to plead any plausible violations of her federal constitutional rights. The motion has been fully briefed and will be considered on the basis of the submissions without oral argument.

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Edwards's complaint and supplemented¹ by her response in opposition to defendants' motion. These facts are assumed true for the purpose of resolving defendants' motion to dismiss.

In late 2016, Edwards signed up to participate in the EOC's clinical health training program. Compl. at 4. SUNY operates EOCs across the state as a free service to adult learners who meet certain eligibility requirements. See http://www.suny.edu/features/eoc/.

Edwards alleges the program she signed up for was originally slated to run from November 28, 2016 through December 9, 2016, with a week of job interviews to follow thereafter. Pl.'s Opp'n, Dk. No. 5-1, 8. However, the first day of the program was cancelled because of a snowstorm. Id. Pl.'s Opp'n at 8.

Edwards alleges that Montgomery, an EOC staff assistant, called to tell her "that the class would resume on the following day and lead into the following week." Pl.'s Opp'n at 8. Plaintiff also alleges that Penix's assistant instructed plaintiff to "leave a message with her" about Montgomery's "harassment." Id. According to plaintiff, Penix returned her call but the "line disconnected" and he did not pick up when she called him back.² Id.

On December 6, 2016, and again on December 12, 2016, Montgomery allegedly prevented Edwards from participating in class. Compl. at 2. According to plaintiff, Montgomery asked her "to stay after class for a meeting with him and another employee." Id. at 3. At that time, Montgomery told plaintiff she would be released from the training program because he believed she was passing notes to other students.³ Id. Plaintiff offered to show Montgomery the notes at issue but he refused to look at them. Id.

Edwards challenged her removal from the program, seeking out and receiving a meeting with the Syracuse EOC's Director of Student Services (the "EOC Director"). Compl. at 4. According to plaintiff, the EOC Director reversed Montgomery's decision but told plaintiff she would have to ask for employer interviews separately from the rest of the class. Id. Montgomery accepted the Director's decision, but stated that he would not be giving her a "referral" from his program. Id.

Thereafter, Montgomery gave to Edwards a certificate signifying her successful completion of the training program. Compl. at 4, 8-9. However, during one of plaintiff's later employer interviews Montgomery "interrupted" the meeting and directed his "security guard" to remove plaintiff from the building. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that this amounts to a violation of her constitutional rights, and asserts that Penix, as Vice President, should have done more to provide "fair procedures" at the EOC. Compl. at 6. Plaintiff seeks "130 million dollars" in damages. Id.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

"To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ " Ginsburg v. City of Ithaca , 839 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "Dismissal is appropriate only where plaintiff has failed to provide some basis for the allegations that support the elements of his claims." Id.

"When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor." Faiaz v. Colgate Univ. , 64 F. Supp. 3d 336, 344 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (Baxter, M.J.). In making this determination, a court generally confines itself to the "facts stated on the face of the complaint, ... documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and ... matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Goel v. Bunge, Ltd. , 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

When a plaintiff is proceeding without the benefit of an attorney, the complaint "must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s]." Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ahlers v. Rabinowitz , 684 F.3d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 2012) ("A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ " (citation omitted)).

"This is particularly so when the pro se plaintiff alleges that [her] civil rights have been violated." Ahlers , 684 F.3d at 60. Importantly, however, "the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Leon v. Rockland Psychiatric Ctr. , 232 F. Supp. 3d 420, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Bell v. Jendell , 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ); see also Ruggiero v. City of Cortland , 2019 WL 1978623, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. May 3, 2019) ("Although pro se plaintiffs are entitled to a significant measure of latitude when it comes to pleading and in matters of procedure, the solicitude afforded to a party who chooses to proceed without the benefit of a lawyer is not boundless.").

Liberally construed, Edwards seeks money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her constitutional rights. In particular, plaintiff alleges Montgomery violated her rights to "equality and rights to education and labor" when he (1) removed her from the program for passing notes; and later, following her reinstatement, when he (2) directed a security guard to remove her from an interview. Plaintiff further alleges Montgomery violated her First Amendment rights by restricting her "academic freedom of expression." Finally, plaintiff alleges Penix violated her rights by failing to provide "fair procedures, causing deprivation of life."

"The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails." Kisembo v. NYS Office of Children & Family Servs. , 285 F. Supp. 3d 509, 518 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Wyatt v. Cole , 504 U.S. 158, 161, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992) ).

However, "[s]ection 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." Kisembo , 285 F. Supp. 3d at 518 (quoting Sykes v. James , 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir.1993) ). Thus, a § 1983 claim requires a plaintiff to show (1) the deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and its laws by (2) a person acting under the color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A. Constitutional Due Process ⁴

Edwards alleges Montgomery violated her due process rights to "equality and rights to education and labor" when he (1) removed her for passing notes; and later, following her reinstatement, by (2) directing a security guard to remove her from the job interview. Plaintiff further alleges Penix violated her due process rights by failing to provide "fair procedures, causing deprivation of life."

"The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and ‘those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.’ " Horton v. Westling , 284 F. Supp. 3d 213, 219 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (D'Agostino, J.) (quoting Victory v. Pataki , 814 F.3d 47, 59 (2d Cir. 2016) ), aff'd , 765 F. App'x 531 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order). " ‘[S]tandard analysis under that provision proceeds in two steps: We first ask whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures followed by the State were...