Eggman v. Scurr

• Decision Date: 21 October 1981
• Docket Number: No. 66051,66051
• Parties: George Alden EGGMAN, Petitioner, v. David SCURR, Warden, Iowa State Penitentiary, Respondent.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 77

311 N.W.2d 77

George Alden EGGMAN, Petitioner, v. David SCURR, Warden, Iowa State Penitentiary, Respondent.

No. 66051.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 21, 1981.

John P. Roehrick, Des Moines, for petitioner.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Thomas McGrane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and UHLENHOPP, McCORMICK, ALLBEE and McGIVERIN, JJ.

McGIVERIN, Justice.

The United States District Court, Southern District of Iowa, has certified to us two questions concerning the necessary criminal intent element under section 714.1(2), The Code 1979. The questions are, first, whether general criminal intent is an element of the offense of theft by misappropriation under section 714.1(2) and second, whether specific intent to defraud is an element of the same offense. We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative.

These questions were certified to us pursuant to chapter 684A, The Code 1981, and Iowa R.App.P. 451-61.

The certified facts indicate that petitioner, George Alden Eggman, entered into a written contract for the leasing of a 1978 Dodge Aspen automobile from Hartwig Leasing Company of Iowa City on January 11, 1979. Eggman was to return the vehicle on January 15. As of February 1 the vehicle had not been returned and all efforts to contact the defendant were fruitless. The address he gave on the contract was fictitious. The vehicle was subsequently recovered in Galesburg, Illinois, and Eggman was arrested.

On February 14 Eggman was charged by trial information with the crime of theft in the second degree in violation of sections 714.1(2) and 714.2(2). He appeared with counsel and pled guilty to the offense as charged. Thereafter, judgment of conviction and sentence were entered.

After his direct appeal and a post conviction relief application were dismissed in state court, Eggman brought a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976) in United States District Court challenging the federal constitutionality of his state court conviction. The gravamen of Eggman's theory was that when he pled guilty he was not advised of and did not understand the nature of the charge to which he pled guilty and that he did not admit to the intent element of section 714.1(2). Because the United States District Court could not adequately address Eggman's federal constitutional claims without resolution of the question concerning the intent element of section 714.1(2), it certified the two questions of law to this court.

Section 714.1(2) provides:

A person commits theft when the person does any of the following:

....

2. Misappropriates property which the person has in trust, or property of another which the person has in his or her possession or control, whether such possession or control is lawful or unlawful, by using or disposing of it in a manner which is inconsistent with or a denial of the trust or of the owner's rights in such property, or conceals found property, or appropriates such property to his or her own use, when the owner of such property is known to him or her. Failure by a bailee or lessee of personal property to return the property within seventy-two hours after a time specified in a written agreement of lease or bailment shall be evidence of misappropriation.

I. Is general criminal intent an element of section 714.1(2)? On its face section 714.1(2) has no express requirement of a general criminal intent. However, a basic premise of criminal liability, expressed in the maxim actus not facit reum nisi mens sit rea, is that an act alone does not make one guilty unless his mind is also guilty. W. La Fave & A. Scott, Jr., Handbook on Criminal Law § 27 at 192 (1972). Thus, we are faced with an ambiguity between the language of the statute and a generally accepted element of theft offenses.

This court first articulated in State v. Dunn, 202 Iowa 1188, 1189, 211 N.W. 850, 851 (1927) the principle, "Whether a criminal intent or guilty knowledge is an essential element of a statutory offense is to be determined as a matter of construction from the language of the act, in connection with its manifest purpose and design." State v. Conner, 292 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Iowa 1980). We have applied this rule on several occasions to construe a statute to include a criminal intent element absent from its face. Id., See e. g., State v. Miller, 308 N.W.2d 4, 6-7 (Iowa 1981) (defendant's knowledge of the accident an implied element in statute requiring driver involved in accident resulting in injury or death to stop and remain at scene); State v. Christopher, 176 N.W.2d 777, 778 (Iowa 1970) (damage apparent to defendant an implied element in statute requiring driver who collides with unattended vehicle to leave his name and address); State v. Ramos, 260 Iowa 590, 594-95, 149 N.W.2d 862, 864-65 (1967) (scienter implied in obscenity statute); State v. Drummer, 254 Iowa 324, 330, 117 N.W.2d 505, 508-09 (1962) (guilty knowledge implied in statutory crime of operating motor vehicle without owner's consent); State v. Schultz, 242 Iowa 1328, 1334, 50 N.W.2d 9, 12 (1951) (guilty knowledge implied in statute prohibiting sale of beer to minors).

The polestar of statutory interpretation or construction is legislative intent. Connor, 292 N.W.2d at 684; Loras College v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 285 N.W.2d 143, 147 (Iowa 1979). "While this rule should be used to the exclusion of all other rules of statutory construction, the other rules must be applied together in light of the particular facts of each case when used to help us find the true legislative intent." Loras College, 285 N.W.2d at 147.

Although there is no constitutional requirement that mens rea be an element of a criminal offense, Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 2156, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254, 1269 (1968), we conclude that a general criminal intent is a requisite element of section 714.1(2). This conclusion is supported by the following reasons. First, pursuant to the rule of statutory construction, "(a)ll parts of the enactment should be considered together and undue importance should not be given to any single or isolated portion", Loras College, 285 N.W.2d at 148, when section 714.1(2) is compared with other sections of chapter 714, it is apparent that at least general criminal intent is an element of all theft offenses. For example, section 714.7, which does not expressly list criminal intent as an element of operating a vehicle without the owner's consent, has been interpreted to require a general criminal intent. State v. McCormack, 293 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1980). Other subsections of section 714.1 on theft committed by other means also require varying degrees of intent: 714.1(1) requires intent to deprive; 714.1(3) requires deception; 714.1(4) requires knowledge; 714.1(5) requires intent to defraud; and 714.1(6) requires knowledge.

Second, the intent of the legislature appears to be to require something more than a mere failure to perform according to the terms of a motor vehicle rental contract to impose criminal liability. The necessity to assume the legislature intended that some level of intent be found was noted in State v. Billings, 242 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Iowa 1976).

Third, offenses which have no express intent elements may be characterized as general intent crimes. K. Dunahoo, The New Iowa Criminal Code, 29 Drake L.Rev. 237, 296 (1979). Section 714.1(2) has no express intent element and thus may be said to be a general intent crime. Accord, Connor, 292 N.W.2d at 686 (§ 707.5(1), involuntary manslaughter, which has no express mental element, construed, in part on basis of prior common law, to require recklessness.)

Fourth, for the reasons stated in division II we find section 714.1(2) is not a special intent crime and thus is a general intent crime.

In sum, we hold that a general criminal intent is an element of the offense of theft by misappropriation in violation of section 714.1(2).

II. Is a specific intent to defraud an element of section 714.1(2)? The degree of intent required for culpability under a criminal statute is a matter of statutory construction. Connor, 292 N.W.2d at 685. The distinction between general intent and specific intent has not always been made with the utmost clarity. Some scholars are critical of attempts to distinguish between the two intents. "Much of the existing uncertainty as to the precise meaning of the word 'intent' is attributable to the fact that courts have often used such phrases as 'criminal intent', 'general intent', 'specific intent', 'constructive intent', and 'presumed intent.' " W. La Fave & A. Scott, Jr., supra § 28 at 201. Others have traced the source of confusion over specific and general intent to jury instructions that focus on intent instead of specific or general intent. K. Dunahoo, 29 Drake L.Rev. at 298.

"(T)he most common usage of 'specific intent' is to designate a special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime." W. La Fave & A. Scott, Jr., supra § 28 at 202.

When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a further consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence; the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.

P. Johnson, Criminal Law, 329 (1975).

This court has differentiated between specific and general intent in the past. In State v. Hobbs, 252 Iowa 432, 435-37, 107 N.W.2d 238, 240-41 (1961), we held that only a "general burglarious intent" and not a specific intention to use burglary tools at a particular time or place was an element of section 708.7, The Code 1958 (possession of burglary tools with intent to commit burglary). In...