Eisenman v. State

• Decision Date: 06 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 00-204.,00-204.
• Citation: 2000 MT 170,5 P.3d 542,300 Mont. 322
• Parties: Brad D. EISENMAN, Defendant and Petitioner, v. STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

5 P.3d 542

2000 MT 170

300 Mont. 322

Brad D. EISENMAN, Defendant and Petitioner, v. STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent.

No. 00-204.

Supreme Court of Montana.

July 6, 2000.

OPINION and ORDER

¶ 1 Before this Court is Eisenman's pro se application for writ of supervisory control and motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Eisenman grounds his application in our recent decision, MacPheat v. Mahoney, 2000 MT 62, 997 P.2d 753, 57 St.Rep.291, and requests that we remand this case to the District Court for fact-finding as we did in MacPheat.

¶ 2 The State responded to the application for writ of supervisory control and requested that we deny the application on the basis that MacPheat should not be applied retroactively to cases that have already become final. The State also argues that a writ of supervisory control is not appropriate in this case because Eisenman failed to plead that the District Court is proceeding upon a mistake of law; that a writ of habeas corpus is not appropriate here because Eisenman failed to plead he would be entitled to release if he received the "good time" credits he requested; that Eisenman failed to show that his conduct was good while he was incarcerated, thus entitling him to "good time" credits; and that Eisenman is not entitled to "good time" credits for jail time served prior to revocation of his suspended sentence because Eisenman was on probation.

Background

¶ 3 On February 12, 1990, Eisenman pleaded guilty to two counts of felony burglary in violation of § 45-6-204, MCA. Eisenman was sentenced to ten years in the Montana State Prison (MSP) on each count. The sentences were to run concurrent with each other. Eisenman's sentence was suspended on various conditions and he was to receive credit for time served at the Missoula County Jail in the amount of 77 days.

¶ 4 On July 23, 1997, the State petitioned to revoke Eisenman's suspended sentences. A hearing was held on the State's motion on October 15, 1997. The District Court subsequently found that Eisenman had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by testing positive for cocaine, opiates and marijuana on two occasions; by failing to pay restitution and court fees; and by violating the State's condition regarding residence. Consequently, the court revoked Eisenman's suspended sentences and sentenced him to ten years in MSP on each count. The sentences were to run concurrent with each other. The court also designated Eisenman a non-dangerous offender.

¶ 5 In addition, the District Court suspended two years on each of Eisenman's ten-year sentences while imposing various conditions including the payment of restitution and various fees. The court also noted:

Due to the Defendant's failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence while under the supervision of the Department of Probation and Parole, the Court finds that he is not entitled to receive, and shall not receive, credit for any elapsed time between the date of his conviction and the date of this Order, except that he shall receive credit from November 29, 1989, through April 9, 1990; and from August 4, 1997, through date of sentencing, November 3, 1997, for two hundred twenty-four (224) days jail time which he has previously served.

¶ 6 Eisenman filed his Application and Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control with this Court on April 5, 2000. In his application, Eisenman contends that he is entitled to "good time" credits in the amount of 92 days for jail time he served presentence. He requests that this Court enter an order to the records department of MSP directing them to apply that reduction to his sentence pursuant to MacPheat.

¶ 7 We address the following issues:

¶ 8 1. Whether a writ of supervisory control is appropriate in this case.

¶ 9 2. Whether MacPheat should be applied retroactively in this case.

¶ 10 3. Whether Eisenman is entitled to "good time" credits.

Issue 1.

¶ 11 Whether a writ of supervisory control is appropriate in this case.

¶ 12 Supervisory control is an extraordinary remedy that is only appropriate when a district court is proceeding upon a mistake of law which, if uncorrected, would cause significant injustice and the remedy by appeal is inadequate. Evans v. Montana Eleventh Jud. Dist. Court, 2000 MT 38, ¶ 15, 995 P.2d 455, ¶ 15, 57 St.Rep. 175, ¶ 15; Park v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 1998 MT 164, ¶ 13, 289 Mont. 367, ¶ 13, 961 P.2d 1267, ¶ 13 (citations omitted). Our determination of whether supervisory control is appropriate is a case-by-case decision, based on the presence of extraordinary circumstances and the need to prevent an injustice from occurring. Park, ¶ 13 (citing State ex rel. Mazurek v. Fourth Jud. Dist. Court (1996), 277 Mont. 349, 352-53, 922 P.2d 474, 476-77.)

¶ 13 In the case sub judice, the State argues that supervisory control is not appropriate because Eisenman failed to plead that the District Court is proceeding upon a mistake of law. We agree with the State that supervisory control is not appropriate in this case, albeit for a different reason. This Court's power of supervisory control extends only to inferior courts, not to other government agencies. Art. VII, § 2, Mont. Const. It is the Department of Corrections (the DOC) that awards "good time" credits, not the District Court. Thus, Eisenman's claims are more appropriately asserted by a writ of habeas corpus because habeas corpus relief is available to every person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of their liberty. MacPheat, ¶ 5 (citing § 46-22-101, MCA).

¶ 14 Even so, the State argues that a writ of habeas corpus, while the appropriate remedy in a case of this nature, is not available to Eisenman because Eisenman failed to plead that he would be entitled to release if he received the "good time" credits he requested. Contrary to the State's suggestion, it is not premature to consider a habeas petition prior to the time the inmate is entitled to release. In Peyton v. Rowe (1968), 391 U.S. 54, 63, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 1554, 20 L.Ed.2d 426, the United States Supreme Court noted that

a principal aim of the writ [of habeas corpus] is to provide for swift judicial review of alleged unlawful restraints on liberty. Calendar congestion ... and the exigencies of appellate review account for largely unavoidable delays in the processing of criminal cases. But the prematurity rule... in many instances extends without practical justification the time a prisoner entitled to release must remain in confinement.

Hence, the Supreme Court determined in Peyton and later in Garlotte v. Fordice (1995), 515 U.S. 39, 115 S.Ct. 1948, 132 L.Ed.2d 36, that immediate physical release is not the only remedy available under a writ of habeas corpus. Peyton, 391 U.S. at 67, 88 S.Ct. at 1556. Granted, Peyton and Garlotte deal with challenges to convictions while the case before us on appeal deals with the application of "good time" credits. Nevertheless, the distinction appears to be without a difference.

¶ 15 Therefore, we deem Eisenman's application for writ of supervisory control a petition for writ of habeas corpus and we proceed on that basis.

Issue 2.

¶ 16 Whether MacPheat should be applied retroactively in this case.

¶ 17 In MacPheat, an MSP inmate argued that he was entitled to "good time" credits for the time he spent in the county jail awaiting sentencing. He alleged that because he was indigent and unable to post bail, he was subject to a greater length of imprisonment than other convicted felons who were able to post bail. We held in MacPheat that

if the criminal defendant, for no other reason than his indigency, is unable to secure his pre-sentence freedom by posting bail, then he is entitled to good-time credit for the time he spends in the county detention facility, pre-sentence, to the same extent that the law allows good-time credit to the criminal defendant who is able to post bail and, thus, serve the entirety of his sentence in the state correctional facility.

MacPheat, ¶ 22.

¶ 18 The State argues that we should not apply the new rule which we announced in MacPheat retroactively to cases that have already become final.

¶ 19 The United States Supreme Court ruled in Teague v. Lane (1989), 489 U.S. 288, 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1070, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, that retroactivity analysis pertains when the court announces a new rule of law that "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government." The Supreme Court determined that courts must apply new rules of constitutional law to cases pending on direct appeal and all subsequent cases, but it cannot apply the new rule on collateral attack to final convictions unless it meets one of two exceptions:

First, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe." Second, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of "those procedures that ... are `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'"

Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 109 S.Ct. at 1073 (citations omitted).

¶ 20 We adopted the Teague standard in State v. Egelhoff (1995), 272 Mont. 114, 900 P.2d 260, rev'd on other grounds sub nom Montana v. Egelhoff (1996), 518 U.S. 37, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361; and State v. Nichols, 1999 MT 212, 295 Mont. 489, 986 P.2d 1093. In Egelhoff, we held that the defendant was denied due process when the jury was instructed that voluntary intoxication may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense. Egelhoff, 272 Mont. at 125, 900 P.2d at 266. We concluded in Egelhoff, that our decision in that case was applicable to all cases still subject to direct review by this Court on the date of that opinion, but that our decision was not applicable to those cases which had become final before the new rule was announced. Egelhoff, 272 Mont. at 126, 900...