Estate of Long by and through Long v. Fowler

• Decision Date: 03 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. COA19-785,COA19-785
• Citation: 841 S.E.2d 290,270 N.C.App. 241
• Parties: ESTATE OF Melvin Joseph LONG, BY AND THROUGH Marla Hudson LONG, Administratrix, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James D. FOWLER, Individually, David A. Matthews, Individually, Dennis F. Kinsler, Individually, Robert J. Burns, Individually, Michael T. Vancour, Individually, and Michael S. Scarborough, Individually, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

270 N.C.App. 241

841 S.E.2d 290

ESTATE OF Melvin Joseph LONG, BY AND THROUGH Marla Hudson LONG, Administratrix, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.James D. FOWLER, Individually, David A. Matthews, Individually, Dennis F. Kinsler, Individually, Robert J. Burns, Individually, Michael T. Vancour, Individually, and Michael S. Scarborough, Individually, Defendants-Appellees.

No. COA19-785

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: March 3, 2020

Hardison & Cochran, PLLC, by John Paul Godwin, and Sanford Thompson, PLLC, by Sanford Thompson, IV, for Plaintiff.

Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, Raleigh, by Jonathan E. Hall, Patrick M. Meacham, and Catherine R. L. Lawson, for Defendants.

BROOK, Judge.

Marla Hudson Long ("Plaintiff"), as Administratrix of the Estate of Melvin Joseph Long ("Mr. Long"), appeals from the trial court's order dismissing her claims against James D. Fowler, David A. Matthews, Dennis F. Kinsler, Robert J. Burns, Michael T. Vancour, and Michael S. Scarborough (collectively "Defendants") for the wrongful death of her husband, Mr. Long. For the following reasons, we reverse the order of the trial court.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On 20 January 2017, Mr. Long, a pipefitter with Quate Industrial Services, was tasked with reconnecting the water pipes of a portable chiller machine at North Carolina State University's ("NCSU") Centennial Campus that had been turned off for winter break. When Mr. Long began to loosen a 13.1-pound metal flange on a water pipe, pressurized gas, which had built up within the machine, forcefully projected the flange into his head. Mr. Long suffered severe head trauma

and died five days later at the hospital.

Plaintiff commenced an action in the Industrial Commission on 15 March 2018 for wrongful death on behalf of the estate of her husband, Mr. Long, against NCSU, Randy Woodson, Allen Boyette, and "John Doe," the then-"unidentified employee/agent of [NCSU]’s machine shop and/or Maintenance and Operations Division."¹ Plaintiff alleged that John Doe had improperly shut down the chiller unit, which caused high pressure gas to leak into the water pipes so that when Mr. Long loosened the metal flange, compressed gas was exposed to air and caused the flange to explode.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a wrongful death action in Person County Superior Court on 13 November 2018 against Defendants, employees in the maintenance and HVAC department at NCSU, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.² Plaintiff alleged Defendants negligently shut down the chiller unit on 21 December 2016, which led to the explosion that killed Mr. Long. The complaint's case caption read as follows:

JAMES D. FOWLER, Individually, DAVID A. MATTHEWS, Individually, DENNIS F. KINSLER, Individually, ROBERT J. BURNS, Individually, MICHAEL T. VANCOUR, Individually, and MICHAEL S. SCARBOROUGH, Individually, Defendants.

The complaint sought relief from each of the above-named Defendants, jointly and severally, as follows:

1. Compensatory damages from defendant Fowler in an amount in excess of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000).

2. Punitive damages from defendant Fowler in an amount in excess of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000).

3. Compensatory damages from defendant Matthews in an amount in excess of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000).

4. Punitive damages from defendant Matthews in an amount in excess of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000).

5. Compensatory damages from defendant Kinsler in an amount in excess of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000).

6. Punitive damages from defendant Kinsler in an amount in excess of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000).

7. Compensatory damages from defendant Burns in an amount in excess of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000).

8. Punitive damages from defendant Burns in an amount in excess of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000).

9. Compensatory damages from defendant Vancour in an amount in excess of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000).

10. Punitive damages from defendant Vancour in an amount in excess of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000).

11. Compensatory damages from defendant Scarborough in an amount in excess of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000).

12. Punitive damages from defendant Scarborough in an amount in excess of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000).

Proceedings in the Industrial Commission were stayed pending final adjudication of the superior court matter.

On 19 February 2019, Defendants filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court heard arguments on Defendants’ motions to dismiss on 8 April 2019. Defense counsel argued that Defendants were sued in their official capacity, which meant they were entitled to share in their government-employer's sovereign immunity, and the Industrial Commission maintained exclusive jurisdiction over the action. Defense counsel also argued that the complaint failed as a matter of law to properly allege negligence, gross negligence, and state a claim for punitive damages. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss on 3 May 2019.

Plaintiff timely appealed.

II. Analysis

On appeal, Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) because Defendants were sued in their individual, not official, capacities, and, as such, sovereign immunity does not apply to the case at bar.

Plaintiff next argues the trial court erred in allowing Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) because the complaint gave sufficient notice of a legally cognizable claim of negligence and gross negligence as well as, based on allegations of willful and wanton conduct by Defendants, punitive damages.

For the following reasons, we agree with Plaintiff.

A. Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(2) Motions to Dismiss

First, we consider whether the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff's claim pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, which requires determining whether Defendants were sued in their official capacity and are thus protected from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.³

i. Standard of Review

The standard of review of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is de novo. Brown v. N.C. Dept. of Public Safety , 256 N.C. App. 425, 427, 808 S.E.2d 322, 324 (2017). When a trial court grants a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the standard of review is "whether the record contains evidence that would support the Court's determination that the exercise of jurisdiction over defendants would be inappropriate." Stacy , 191 N.C. App. at 134, 664 S.E.2d at 567 (citation omitted).

ii. Merits

At common law, the doctrine of sovereign immunity protected the state from any liability for negligent or tortious conduct on the part of the state or its agents. See Moody v. State Prison , 128 N.C. 12, 38 S.E. 131, 132 (1901), superseded by statute , N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-291 (2019), as recognized in Hochheiser v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp. , 82 N.C. App. 712, 715, 348 S.E.2d 140, 141 (1986).

The North Carolina Tort Claims Act partially waived state immunity and allows tort claims against state agencies to be maintained in the exclusive jurisdiction of the North Carolina Industrial Commission. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-291 (2019). The Tort Claims Act provides in pertinent part:

The North Carolina Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for the purpose of hearing and passing upon tort claims against the State Board of Education, the Board of Transportation, and all other departments, institutions and agencies of the State. The Industrial Commission shall determine whether or not each individual claim arose as a result of the negligence of any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State while acting within the scope of his office, employment, service, agency or authority, under circumstances where the State of North Carolina, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the laws of North Carolina.

Id. § 143-291(a). "[A] statutory waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed." Meyer v. Walls , 347 N.C. 97, 107, 489 S.E.2d 880, 885 (1997). "Therefore, the Tort Claims Act applies only to actions against state departments, institutions, and agencies and does not apply to claims against officers, employees, involuntary servants, and agents of the State." Id. at 107, 489 S.E.2d at 885-86.

As a corollary, "[a] plaintiff may maintain both a suit against a state agency in the Industrial Commission under the Tort Claims Act and a suit against the negligent agent or employee in the General Court of Justice for common-law negligence." Id. at 108, 489 S.E.2d at 886 (citation omitted); see also Chastain v. Arndt , 253 N.C. App. 8, 15, 800 S.E.2d 68, 75 (2017) (explaining plaintiff could bring suit against the state agency in the Industrial Commission and suit against the negligent employee in his individual capacity alleging gross negligence and willful and wanton conduct). The "threshold issue to be determined" in a common law action is whether the negligence suit is brought against the employee in an official or individual capacity. Mullis v. Sechrest , 347 N.C. 548, 551, 495 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1998). When an actor is sued in his or her official capacity, the suit is effectively one against his or her employer, and the defendant is immune to the same extent as the government entity itself unless there has been a waiver of immunity. Wright v. Town of Zebulon , 202 N.C. App. 540, 543, 688 S.E.2d 786, 789 (2010) (citation omitted). In an individual capacity suit, on the other hand, a plaintiff seeks recovery from the defendant directly and sovereign immunity does not protect the negligent employee. See Chastain , 253 N.C. App. at 15, 800 S.E.2d at 74.⁴

Differentiating between an official and individual capacity...