Ettinger v. City of Lansing, Docket No. 163866

• Decision Date: 13 February 1996
• Docket Number: Docket No. 163866
• Citation: 215 Mich.App. 451,546 N.W.2d 652
• Parties: Mary ETTINGER and Arthur Rinvelt, Plaintiff-Appellants, v. CITY OF LANSING, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 652

546 N.W.2d 652

215 Mich.App. 451

Mary ETTINGER and Arthur Rinvelt, Plaintiff-Appellants, v. CITY OF LANSING, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 163866.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Nov. 22, 1995, at Lansing.

Decided Feb. 13, 1996, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication April 29, 1996.

Denise Arnold and Burt A. Bothell, Okemos, for plaintiffs.

Alvan P. Knot, City Attorney, and John M. Roberts, Jr., Senior Assistant City Attorney, for defendant.

Before MARKMAN, P.J., and CORRIGAN and PAYANT, ^* JJ.

MARKMAN, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiffs appeal as of right a March 29, 1993, order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). We affirm.

This action arises out of plaintiffs' attempts to develop a mobile-home park ¹ on their property. The property at issue consisted of 64.64 acres in a district zoned "A Residential." The applicable city zoning ordinance permitted individual mobile homes in "A Residential" districts but excluded mobile-home parks from such districts. The ordinance permitted mobile-home parks only in districts zoned "DM-1" and upon the grant of a special-use permit. Plaintiffs requested rezoning of their property to "DM-1" and sought a special-use permit. Defendant denied these requests. Plaintiffs then filed the present action. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they had prepared a revised site plan for their mobile-home park that met all the "A Residential" district requirements (e.g., lot area, number of dwellings per lot) but did not present it to defendant because they contended it would have been futile. They claimed that the zoning ordinance violated the Mobile Home Commission Act (MHCA), M.C.L. § 125.2301 et seq.; M.S.A. § 19.855(101) et seq., because it did not permit development of a mobile-home park in an "A Residential" district even when the site plan satisfied all the "A Residential" district requirements. Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). The trial court granted this motion on the basis that the ordinance's exclusion of mobile-home parks from a particular zoning district did not violate the MHCA.

The specific issue on appeal is whether the zoning ordinance provision that excluded mobile-home parks in "A Residential" districts violates M.C.L. § 125.2307(3); M.S.A. § 19.855(107)(3), which states:

A local government ordinance shall not be designed as exclusionary to mobile homes generally whether the mobile homes are located inside or outside of mobile home parks or seasonal mobile home parks.

Plaintiffs contend that defendant's zoning ordinance violates this statute because it excludes mobile-home parks from districts zoned "A Residential." They read the statute as prohibiting zoning ordinance provisions that exclude mobile-home parks from a zoning district. They rely on legislative history to support their reading of the statute. The MHCA was previously enacted as 1976 PA 419. The original version of the provision at issue stated in pertinent part:

An ordinance may not be designed as exclusionary to mobile homes generally. [M.C.L. § 125.1107(2); M.S.A. § 19.855(7)(2).]

Plaintiffs argue that the addition of the phrase "whether the mobile homes are located inside or outside of mobile home parks" to this provision indicates that its present version prohibits zoning ordinance provisions that "generally" exclude mobile homes located in mobile-home parks. They contend that the city ordinance's exclusion of mobile-home parks from "A Residential" districts constitutes a general exclusion of mobile homes located in mobile-home parks. They therefore conclude that the ordinance at issue violates the MHCA.

Defendant contends that the ordinance did not violate M.C.L. § 125.2307(3); M.S.A. § 19.855(107)(3). It reads § 7(3) as prohibiting ordinances that "generally" exclude mobile homes. It argues that the ordinance at issue did not generally exclude mobile homes; it only excluded mobile-home parks from a particular zoning district. Thus, defendant concludes that the trial court correctly found that the ordinance did not violate the MHCA as a matter of law.

"[T]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself." House Speaker v. State Administrative Bd., 441 Mich. 547, 567, 495 N.W.2d 539 (1993). Here, consideration of the language of M.C.L. § 125.2307(3); M.S.A. § 19.855(107)(3) indicates an arguable ambiguity with respect to what limitations it places on zoning ordinances. Plaintiffs contend that the ordinance provision excluding mobile-home parks from a particular zoning district violates § 7(3) while defendant contends that it does not. Their different conclusions turn on their interpretations of the term "generally" in § 7(3).

We must first determine the object of the modifier "generally." Usually, a modifying clause relates only to the last antecedent. Rios v. Dep't of State Police, 188 Mich.App. 166, 169, 469 N.W.2d 71 (1991). Application of this rule indicates that the word "generally" in § 7(3) modifies "mobile homes." Accordingly, we read § 7(3) to prohibit ordinances that generally exclude mobile homes, not those that generally exclude mobile-home parks. ²

We note that plaintiffs correctly state the general proposition that changes in statutory language presumably reflect a change in meaning. Wortelboer v. Benzie Co., 212 Mich.App. 208, 217, 537 N.W.2d 603 (1995). However, changes in statutory language may reflect an attempt to clarify the meaning of a provision rather than change it. Id.; see also Evans v. Hebert, 203 Mich.App. 392, 403, 513 N.W.2d 164 (1994). Here, applying the rule that a modifier relates only to the last antecedent, Rios, supra, we find that both the original and amended versions of the provision prohibit zoning ordinances designed to exclude mobile homes generally. The language added in the amended version more specifically describes the term "mobile home" to include both individual mobile homes and those in mobile-home parks. Therefore, we find that the amendment clarified the term "mobile home" but did not change the object of the modifier "generally" to mobile-home parks. Plaintiffs have shown no contrary legislative history.

Next, we must determine what the modifier "generally" means. "Courts are to accord statutory words their ordinary and generally accepted meaning." Turner v. Auto. Club Ins. Ass'n, 448 Mich. 22, 27, 528 N.W.2d 681 (1995). "Generally" means "in general" and "extensively, though not universally." Webster's Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged Second Edition (1983). Accordingly, we conclude that § 7(3) prohibits zoning ordinance provisions that "generally" exclude mobile homes. Section 7(3) does not prohibit ordinance provisions that merely limit or restrict the placement of mobile homes in particular regards.

The zoning ordinance at issue allowed individual mobile homes in "A Residential" districts but excluded...