Evans v. State, 55765

• Decision Date: 14 June 1971
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 55765,55765,1
• Citation: 467 S.W.2d 920
• Parties: Edna Lee EVANS, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 920

467 S.W.2d 920

Edna Lee EVANS, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. 55765.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

June 14, 1971.

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court En Banc Denied

June 28, 1971.

George R. Wilhoit, Jr., Hyde, Purcell & Wilhoit, Poplar Bluff, for appellant.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., G. Michael O'Neal, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

HOUSER, Commissioner.

This is a proceeding under Criminal Rule 27.26, V.A.M.R., to vacate and set aside a judgment of convicting and sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon Edna Lee Evans by the Circuit Court of Butler County on October 28, 1968, upon a plea of guilty to a charge of murder in the first degree. The original motion to vacate as amended alleged six grounds, four of which were abandoned during the proceedings. The motion was tried and an evidentiary hearing conducted by a circuit judge transferred to sit in the place of the sentencing judge, who was disqualified. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed and the motion was overruled.

On this appeal Evans seeks a reversal of the judgment on the ground that the trial court's findings, conclusions and judgment are clearly erroneous for two alleged reasons: That the evidence clearly proved (1) that appellant was mentally incompetent to enter a plea of guilty, and the sentencing judge failed to determine the mental competence of appellant to enter a plea of guilty and thereby failed to ascertain whether the plea was voluntary, and (2) that appellant's request that his court-appointed counsel be dismissed was erroneously denied.

I. Mental Incompetence?

Appellant contends that he was mentally incompetent to make the decision to plead guilty; that the record shows that he was and is mentally deficient and retarded; that he has the mind of a child, with an IQ of 69; that he is on the borderline range of intellectual functioning; that he cannot read and write, is psychotic, becomes profoundly depressed and has often done harm to others and to himself; that he cannot competently handle sums of money larger than $10; that one medical record shows that 'he may not make good decisions when his emotions interfere, at which time he may become impulsive'; that he did not understand what he was doing when he pleaded guilty and that he did not do so voluntarily. Appellant cites State v. Williams, Mo.Sup. en banc, 361 S.W.2d 772, for the proposition that in taking a plea of guilty in a capital case the sentencing court 'should proceed with care, cautioning the defendant as to the gravity of his admission and making sure that he voluntarily and understandingly desires to enter a plea of guilty.' Appellant claims that the sentencing judge made no such inquiry and that appellant's plea of guilty was not freely and voluntarily made, but was entered with misapprehension and as a result of fear and persuasion. Support for the latter is said to lie in appellant's testimony that his counsel told him and he delivered that a life sentence was better than 25 years; that he did not understand that he might have to spend the rest of his life behind bars. Appellant counts on Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, for the proposition that the acceptance of a guilty plea without an affirmative showing that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily made violates the Constitution and refers to State v. Edmondson, Mo.Sup., 438 S.W.2d 237, and State v. Roach, Mo.Sup., 447 S.W.2d 553, contending that virtually none of the guidelines laid down in the latter case were followed.

We have concluded that the trial court's findings that appellant was mentally competent to enter a plea of guilty on the date the plea was entered and that the plea was voluntarily and understandably made are not clearly erroneous but are supported by the following evidence:

Pursuant to an order for a mental examination under § 552.020, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S. appellant was examined at State Hospital at Fulton by Drs. Jack C. Cotton and Elmer C. Jackson, who made a written report to the court in which they concluded that appellant did not have a mental disease or defect within the meaning of § 552.020; that he had the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense, and that he knew and appreciated the nature, qualify and wrongfulness of the offenses with which he was charged (two first degree murders). The report indicated that tests failed to show any indication of an organic process or of a psychosis; that appellant is fully aware of the proceedings against him and knows what he did was wrong; that although tests indicate borderline intelligence 'his intellect is not so severely impaired as to prevent him from knowing that what he did was wrong or from conforming his actions to the requirements of law'; that there is no reason to believe that he was not responsible for his actions at the time of the shooting incident. Commenting on the fact that appellant had been a patient at Farmington State Hospital, with a diagnosis on admission of mental deficiency, idiopathic, moderate with psychosis, and that he had been finally discharged from the rolls of that hospital in March, 1967, the Fulton doctors recited that 'there was nothing in his behavior while he was a patient in this hospital that would lead one to believe that he was psychotic at the time of the examination here or at the time of the offense charged * * *.' This report was in the hands of the sentencing judge prior to and at the time of sentence. Appellant's attorney, after examining appellant's medical records at the two hospitals, discussed the doctors' conclusions with appellant, and advised him to plead guilty to one of the two murder charges in the hope...