Everhart v. State

• Decision Date: 10 January 1978
• Citation: 563 S.W.2d 795
• Parties: Charles R. EVERHART, alias, Appellant, v. STATE of Tennessee, Appellee. 563 S.W.2d 795
• Court: Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 795

563 S.W.2d 795

Charles R. EVERHART, alias, Appellant, v. STATE of Tennessee, Appellee.

563 S.W.2d 795

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Jan. 10, 1978.

Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court April 10, 1978.

Robert L. Tucker, Robert L. DeLaney, Martha Meares, Richard McGee, University of Tennessee Legal Clinic, Knoxville, for appellant.

Brooks McLemore, Jr., Atty. Gen., Patricia J. Cottrell, Asst. Atty. Gen., William Raikes, Research Asst., Nashville, Ronald A. Webster, Dist. Atty. Gen., William H. Crabtree, Asst. Dist. Atty., Knoxville, for appellee.

OPINION

TATUM, Judge.

The defendant appeals from a judgment rendered by the Criminal Court of Knox County declaring him to be an habitual offender under the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act. (T.C.A. §§ 59-1201 59-2117). Defendant was precluded from operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this state and ordered to surrender his motor vehicle operator's license. (T.C.A. § 59-2113)

At the hearing afforded the defendant, he conceded that he was convicted on three occasions for driving while intoxicated during a three-year period and that the offenses for which he was convicted were committed after April 5, 1974. His defense was that one or more of these convictions were void because he was not afforded counsel to represent him in the trial of the cases resulting in these convictions. The records evidencing the convictions reflected that the defendant had waived counsel for the trial of the driving while intoxicated cases. In the case sub judice, the Trial Judge refused to permit the defendant's testimony contradicting the judgments by stating that his waiver of counsel was not made understandingly and voluntarily.

In his assignments of error, the defendant urges that the Trial Judge erred in characterizing the proceeding as being civil in nature and in not admitting evidence attacking the validity of the prior convictions. These assignments are without merit.

In support of his contention that proceedings under the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act are criminal in nature rather than civil, the defendant argues that since the Act expressly bestows trial jurisdiction upon the criminal courts and appellate jurisdiction upon this court, this evinces a legislative intent that proceedings under the act are criminal in nature. We do not agree. The criminal courts and this court already had jurisdiction of criminal cases. The effect of these provisions in the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act was to bestow upon the criminal courts and this court additional civil jurisdiction that these courts would not have otherwise enjoyed.

The general scheme of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act creates a proceeding to revoke the driving privileges of persons who have repeatedly violated designated State statutes or City ordinances. The purpose of the Act is to promote public safety. (T.C.A. § 59-2102). The Act does not declare either a fine or imprisonment for being an habitual offender. The only penal provision in the Act is T.C.A. § 59-2116 for driving in violation of a court order after a hearing and judgment. The defendant is not charged with the violation of the criminal statute.

The controlling principles are enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sullins v. Butler et al., 175 Tenn. 468, 135 S.W.2d 930 (1940). In determining the constitutionality of Chapter 90, Public Acts of 1937, as amended by Chapter 205, Public Acts of 1939, familiarly known as the Financial Responsibility Law, the Tennessee Supreme Court held:

" Counsel for petitioner has misinterpreted the act. It contains no provision authorizing imprisonment for failure to pay a judgment founded upon the negligent operation of an automobile. Should petitioner never pay the $162 judgment entered against him, he could at no time be imprisoned for such failure. The punishment prescribed in the act is for operating an automobile after the operator's driver's license has been revoked.

The driving of an automobile is a privilege, not a property right, and is subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare."

" The general rule covering the subject is stated in 5 Am.Jur. 593, as follows:

§ 157. 'The statutes regulating the granting of operators' licenses or drivers' permits usually provide for their revocation. It is competent for the legislature to prescribe the conditions under which the privilege of operating an automobile on the public highways may be exercised. The fact that the license or permit was granted under a statute or ordinance which stated that it should be perpetual unless revoked as provided in such statute or ordinance, and which contained no provision for revocation, does not preclude revocation under a provision introduced by subsequent amendment.

'A license to operate an automobile is not property, but a mere privilege, the suspension of which does not deprive the licensee of his property without due process of law. The licenses or permits may not be revoked arbitrarily.

'The authority to revoke cannot be delegated to an official without prescribing what shall constitute grounds for revocation.' "

Also see Goats v. State, 211 Tenn. 249, 364 S.W.2d 889 (1963).

The Trial Judge properly characterized the proceeding in which the driving privilege of the defendant was revoked as civil in nature and not criminal. The purpose of the Act is to promote public safety on the highways. By revoking the driving privilege of the defendant, he is not subjected to punishment for either a felony or misdemeanor. He is not even deprived of a property right; he is only deprived of a privilege. Other states, having similar acts, have uniformly held proceedings to revoke or suspend driving privileges to be civil in nature and not criminal. See, State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 311 A.2d 300 (1973); State v. Carlisle, 285 N.C. 229, 204 S.E.2d 15 (1974); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788 (1970). We hold the proceedings to revoke or suspend driving privileges are civil in nature and not criminal.

In his second assignment of error, the defendant complains of the refusal of the Trial Judge to permit him to attack the validity of the judgments by showing that his waiver of counsel was made involuntarily and unintelligently. The judgments were facially sufficient, showing a waiver of counsel. The defendant does not characterize his purported attack upon the validity of these judgments as collateral attacks but terms them as "direct attacks." The setting aside of the convictions of the General Sessions Court is a necessary, but only incidental, objective of the suit. As such, this is a collateral rather than a direct attack upon the convictions. Turner v. Bell, 198 Tenn. 232, 279 S.W.2d 71 (1955).

The general rule is that a conviction on which a suspension or revocation of a driver's license is based cannot ordinarily be attacked collaterally in a proceeding relating to a suspension or revocation. See, 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 164.10. The Court of Appeals of Arizona, In Application of Hathcock, 9 Ariz.App. 178, 450 P.2d 419 (1969), said:

"The purpose of this judicial proceeding is...