Ex Parte State (in Re Carlton Reashard Lane v. State ).
Decision Date | 24 September 2010 |
Docket Number | 1091117. |
Citation | 66 So.3d 824 |
Parties | Ex parte State of Alabama.(In re Carlton Reashard LANEv.STATE of Alabama). |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Troy King, atty. gen., and William D. Little, asst. atty. gen., for petitioner.Joshua J. Lane, Anniston, for respondent.LYONS, Justice.
Carlton Reashard Lane was convicted in March 2008 of murder in the death of Christopher Toson, see § 13A–6–2, Ala.Code 1975. The trial court sentenced him to 120 years' imprisonment pursuant to the Habitual Felony Offender Act, § 13A–5–9, Ala.Code 1975 (“the HFOA”).1 The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction but reversed his sentence and remanded the case for the trial court to resentence Lane. Lane v. State, 66 So.3d 812 (Ala.Crim.App.2009). Judge Windom and Judge Main dissented from the decision to reverse Lane's sentence. On remand, the trial court resentenced Lane to 99 years' imprisonment. On return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Lane's sentence, without an opinion, with Judge Windom and Judge Main again dissenting. Lane v. State, 66 So.3d 812, 823, 824 (Ala.Crim.App.2009). The State then petitioned this Court for certiorari review. We granted the State's petition to review a question of first impression concerning the interpretation of § 13A–5–9(b)(3) of the HFOA, in particular the language authorizing imprisonment “for any term of not less than 99 years” as an alternative to imprisonment for life. We reverse and remand.
The Court of Criminal Appeals summarized the evidence presented at trial as follows:
66 So.3d at 814 (footnote omitted).
In challenging his sentence on appeal, Lane argued that his sentence of 120 years constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that before it could address Lane's argument, it must first determine whether his sentence exceeded statutory limits because, it said, if his sentence exceeded the maximum allowed by law, it would be an illegal sentence, which would affect the trial court's jurisdiction.2 Wallace v. State, 959 So.2d 1161, 1165 (Ala.Crim.App.2006). The Court of Criminal Appeals then sua sponte reversed the trial court's judgment sentencing Lane to 120 years' imprisonment and remanded the case for the trial court to resentence him to a term of 99 years or life imprisonment, finding that Lane's sentence exceeded what the Court of Criminal Appeals determined to be the statutory 99–year maximum permitted by § 13A–5–9(b)(3) of the HFOA. Section 13A–5–9(b) provides:
“(b) In all cases when it is shown that a criminal defendant has been previously convicted of any two felonies and after such convictions has committed another felony, he must be punished as follows:
“....
“(3) On conviction of a Class A felony, he must be punished by imprisonment for life or for any term of not less than 99 years.”
(Emphasis added.) The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the phrase “for any term of not less than 99 years” means that 99 years is the maximum sentence under the statute.
The Court of Criminal Appeals applied the rationale of Smith v. State, 447 So.2d 1327 (Ala.Crim.App.1983), aff'd, 447 So.2d 1334 (Ala.1984). In Smith, the Court of Criminal Appeals considered whether the trial court's 45–year sentence for Smith's conviction for manslaughter, a Class C felony involving the use of a firearm, was a legal sentence. Smith was sentenced pursuant to § 13A–5–6(a)(5), Ala.Code 1975, a firearms-enhancement provision, under which the sentence for a Class C felony committed using a firearm or deadly weapon is “not less than 10 years.” However, § 13A–5–6(a)(3) provided that a sentence for a Class C felony must not exceed 10 years. In finding that Smith's sentence exceeded the 10–year maximum provided by the statute, the court construed the language “not less than 10 years” to mean that 10 years was both the minimum and the maximum sentence under § 13A–5–6.
“Alabama has no general statute fixing the maximum penalty which may be imposed for a felony....
Turning to the statutes under which Lane was sentenced, the Court of Criminal Appeals read § 13A–5–9(b)(3) in pari materia with § 13A–5–6(a), which provides the following sentencing range for a Class A felony such as murder:
“(a) Sentences for felonies shall be for a definite term of imprisonment ... within the following limitations:
“(1) For a Class A felony, for life or not more than 99 years or less than 10 years.”
Applying the rationale of Smith, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that “the only sentences available for Lane were either 99 years' imprisonment or life; the 120–year sentence imposed by the circuit court exceeded the statutory maximum.” 66 So.3d at 818.
The State contends that the plurality opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals 3 did not address critical language in the HFOA that is missing from the statute that was at issue in Smith, specifically, the language in § 13A–5–9(b)(3) requiring that a defendant with two prior felonies who is convicted of a Class A felony be sentenced to “ any term of not less than 99 years.” (Emphasis added.) The State maintains that in reversing Lane's 120–year sentence the plurality disregarded the plain meaning of the statute.
This Court's inquiry is governed by well settled principles of statutory construction.
“
City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So.2d 1061, 1074–75 (Ala.2006). “When a court construes a statute, ‘[w]ords used in [the] statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says.’ ” Ex parte Berryhill, 801 So.2d 7, 10 (Ala.2001) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992)).
Judge Windom, in her special writing, faulted the plurality for rejecting the plain meaning of § 13A–5–9(b)(3). She explained:
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