F.F. ex rel. Y.F. v. State

• Decision Date: 18 March 2021
• Docket Number: 530783
• Parties: F.F., as Parent of Y.F. et al., Infants, et al., Appellants, v. STATE of New York et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

194 A.D.3d 80

143 N.Y.S.3d 734

F.F., as Parent of Y.F. et al., Infants, et al., Appellants,

v.STATE of New York et al., Respondents.

530783

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: February 5, 2021

Decided and Entered: March 18, 2021

Sussman and Associates, Goshen (Michael H. Sussman of counsel), for appellants.

Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Dustin J. Brockner of counsel), for respondents.

Whatley Kallas, LLP, New York City (Henry C. Quillen of counsel), for American Medical Association and others, amici curiae.

Before: Garry, P.J., Lynch, Aarons, Pritzker and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ.

OPINION AND ORDER

Pritzker, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Hartman, J.), entered December 11, 2019 in Albany County, which, among other things, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.

Public Health Law § 2164 requires children from the ages of two months to 18 years to be immunized from certain diseases, including measles, in order to attend any public or private school or child care facility (see Public Health Law § 2164[7][a] ). Initially, the school vaccination law contained two exemptions to this requirement: a medical exemption requiring a physician's certification that a certain vaccination may be detrimental to a child's health (hereinafter the medical exemption) and a non-medical exemption that required a statement by the parent or guardian indicating that he or she objected to vaccination on religious grounds (hereinafter the religious exemption) (see Public Health Law § 2164[8] ; former § 2164[9] ).

In 2000, public health officials declared that measles had been eliminated from the United States (see Sponsor's Mem, Senate Bill S2994A [2019]). However, after seven cases of measles were reported in Rockland County in the fall of 2018, a nationwide measles outbreak¹ occurred that was largely concentrated in communities in Brooklyn and Rockland County with "precipitously low immunization rates" (Sponsor's Mem, Senate Bill S2994A [2019]). That October, following state regulations, both the State and County Commissioners of Health advised certain schools with reported cases of measles to exclude children who had not been vaccinated pursuant to the religious exemption. In January 2019, companion bills were introduced in the Senate and Assembly that proposed to repeal the religious exemption (see 2019 N.Y. Senate–Assembly Bill S2994A, A2371A). On June 13, 2019, the Legislature voted to adopt the bills (hereinafter the repeal), which went into effect immediately (see Public Health Law § 2164, as amended by L 2019, ch 35, §§ 1, 2).

Plaintiffs are parents from throughout the state who, prior to the repeal, were granted religious exemptions from their children's schools due to a myriad of religious beliefs. They commenced this declaratory judgment action seeking to have the repeal declared unconstitutional and the legislation enjoined. Defendants thereupon submitted a pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, which plaintiffs opposed. Supreme Court granted defendants’ motion, finding, among other things, that the repeal was a neutral law of general applicability driven by public health concerns and not tainted by hostility towards religion. Ultimately, the court concluded that the complaint failed to plausibly allege free exercise, equal protection or compelled speech claims and thus dismissed the complaint in its entirety. Plaintiffs appeal.

Plaintiffs raise a number of constitutional challenges, but primarily contend that the complaint alleged a viable cause of action that the repeal was motivated by active hostility towards religion and thus violated the Free Exercise Clause. "[I]n a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, a ‘court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true and provide [the] plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference’ " ( Koziatek v. SJB Dev. Inc., 172 A.D.3d 1486, 1487, 99 N.Y.S.3d 480 [2019], quoting EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 N.Y.3d 11, 19, 799 N.Y.S.2d 170, 832 N.E.2d 26 [2005] ). "The question to be resolved on such a motion is not whether [the] plaintiff can ultimately establish [his or] her allegations and is likely to prevail, but whether, if believed, [his or] her complaint sets forth facts that constitute a viable cause of action" ( Mason v. First Cent. Natl. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 86 A.D.3d 854, 855–856, 927 N.Y.S.2d 694 [2011] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]). However, "the favorable treatment accorded to a plaintiff's complaint is not limitless and, as such, conclusory allegations – claims consisting of bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity – are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss" ( Rodriguez v. Jacoby & Meyers, LLP, 126 A.D.3d 1183, 1185, 3 N.Y.S.3d 793 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 25 N.Y.3d 912, 2015 WL 3952245 [2015] ).

To begin our analysis, we must first determine the proper constitutional standard of review by answering the key question: given that the repeal eliminated a religious exemption, is it nonetheless a neutral law of general applicability ? It is well settled that, "the right of free exercise [of religion] does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that [one's] religion prescribes (or proscribes)" ( Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 [1990] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). As such, to state a federal free exercise claim, a plaintiff generally must establish that "the object or purpose of a law is the suppression of religion or religious conduct" ( Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 [1993] ). Significantly, if the law is neutral and of general applicability, a rational basis is all that is required to meet constitutional muster under the First Amendment, even if the law "proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that [one's] religion prescribes (or proscribes)" Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595 ; Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 7 N.Y.3d 510, 526, 825 N.Y.S.2d 653, 859 N.E.2d 459 [2006], cert denied 552 U.S. 816, 128 S.Ct. 97, 169 L.Ed.2d 22 [2007] ).

"Neutrality" and "general applicability" are not synonymous, but are "interrelated, and ... failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied. A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest" ( Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531–532, 113 S.Ct. 2217 ). With regard to the "neutrality" factor, "[t]he Free Exercise Clause bars even subtle departures from neutrality on matters of religion" ( Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731, 201 L.Ed.2d 35 [2018] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). "Factors relevant to the assessment of governmental neutrality include the historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body" ( id. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

Here, plaintiffs allege three reasons in their complaint why the repeal was not a neutral law: first, that the Legislature failed to act during the height of the measles outbreak, asserting that the timing of the legislation undermines the public health concerns it relied upon in adopting the repeal; second, that, despite multiple requests from plaintiffs and others in the six months between the proposal of the bills and their adoption, no public hearings were held on the matter; and third, that the alleged religious animus is reflected in certain statements made by some of the legislators.

First, we do not find that the timing of the repeal reveals political or ideological motivation; rather, the record reflects that the repeal simply worked its way through the basic legislative process and was motivated by a prescient public health concern. As to the public health concerns, the American Medical Association, the Medical Society of the State of New York, the American Academy of Pediatrics and the New York State American Academy of Pediatrics, as amici curiae in support of defendants’ position, offered their conclusion that eliminating religious exemptions is in the best interest of public health. They describe the highly contagious nature of measles,² noting that effective prevention will occur when 93% to 95% of the population becomes immune, requiring that "the vaccine be given to virtually everyone who can safely receive it." The amici curiae note that they submitted statements to the Legislature in support of the repeal and were joined by 26 other organizations with expertise in medicine and public health. They further describe that the evidence before the Legislature at the time the repeal was adopted "was accurate and consistent with the scientific literature" and that the determination to eliminate the religious exemption was a "sound, evidence-based decision in the interest of public health." Given the foregoing, the timing of the repeal fails to demonstrate any neutrality infraction by the Legislature, and instead reveals a reasonably prompt deliberation and targeted response to a very serious public health issue.³ Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the timing of the repeal are unpersuasive, considering that most public schools in the state complete the...