Faulkner-King v. Wicks
| Decision Date | 31 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | P,No. 4-91-0660,FAULKNER-KIN,4-91-0660 |
| Citation | 590 N.E.2d 511,226 Ill.App.3d 962 |
| Parties | , 168 Ill.Dec. 874 Vivianlaintiff-Appellant, v. Eugene C. WICKS, Donald Pilcher, James Kaufman, Jack McKenzie, Edwin L. Goldwasser, Theodore Zernich, Alvin D. Moore, Jerrold Ziff, and the Board of Trustees for the University of Illinois, Defendants-Appellees. Fourth District |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Robert G. Kirchner, Lerner & Kirchner, Champaign, for plaintiff-appellant.
Michael R. Cornyn, Thomas, Mamer & Haughey, Champaign, for defendants-appellees.
This case is before us pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308. (134 Ill.2d R. 308.) The Champaign County circuit court certified five questions for our review related to its jurisdiction to hear plaintiff Vivian Faulkner's claims. We find under each circumstance presented in the questions, the circuit court correctly found it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's claims.
Plaintiff was employed at the University of Illinois (University) in the School of Art and Design. As of August 20, 1987, her employment at the University was not extended. On September 16, 1988, she filed suit in Champaign County circuit court against the board of trustees at the University and against individual defendants Eugene C. Wicks, Donald Pilcher, James Kaufman, Jack McKenzie, Edwin L. Goldwasser, Theodore Zernich, Alvin D. Moore, and Jerrold Ziff. The individual defendants were professors and administrators at the University.
Plaintiff previously filed a complaint with the Illinois Department of Human Rights. The complaint was dismissed because it was filed beyond the statute of limitations. We recently upheld that ruling. (Faulkner-King v. Department of Human Rights (1992), 225 Ill.App.3d 784, 167 Ill.Dec. 330, 587 N.E.2d 599.) According to defendants, plaintiff also filed an action under Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988)), which was dismissed by the Federal district court because it was filed beyond the statute of limitations. (Faulkner-King v. Board of Trustees (C.D.Ill.1991), 757 F.Supp. 951.) This ruling is currently on appeal before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (case No. 91-1578). Finally, she has filed a claim in the Illinois Court of Claims (docketed case No. 91-CC-1417), which has been stayed until the other cases are resolved.
In this case, plaintiff alleges she was denied a promotion and tenure as a result of the individual defendants' evaluations and recommendations. She seeks damages for the individual defendants' past actions. Defendants acted in their capacities as either committee members, deans, directors or assistant vice-chancellors. She also seeks injunctive relief against the University's board of trustees in the form of reinstatement to her position at the University.
Plaintiff filed a second-amended complaint March 12, 1990. Her theories of recovery were based on the claim that she had been discriminated against because of her gender, and/or that the evaluation and recommendation process for retention, promotion, and tenure was conducted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The second-amended complaint alleged claims under the Constitution of Illinois (, the Constitution of the United States (U.S. Const., amend. XIV), Federal law (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1988)), and common law claims including tortious interference with contract, prospective economic advantage, common law due process, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's second-amended complaint, arguing among other reasons, that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear her case because of the basis of her claims.
In its opinion filed July 2, 1991, the circuit court dismissed plaintiff's second-amended complaint. The court concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the causes of action set forth by plaintiff's complaint because the court's jurisdiction over gender-based discrimination claims is restricted to reviewing decisions of the Human Rights Commission pursuant to section 8-111(C) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 68, par. 8-111(C)). The court found gender-based discrimination was central to each of plaintiff's 14 counts. It concluded that to the extent plaintiff's claims were not premised on gender discrimination, the Court of Claims was the appropriate forum. It also noted the allegations of the second-amended complaint did not properly allege a claim against any of the individual defendants and stated plaintiff could replead allegations if she wished.
On plaintiff's motion, the court entered an order pursuant to Rule 308. It certified the following questions of law for our review:
"a. Whether the Circuit Court has jurisdiction over a claim for retaliatory discharge founded upon the public policy of the State of Illinois as expressed in Article I, Sections 2, 17 and 18 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois, 1970 where the Plaintiff claims to have been retaliatorily discharged as a result of sexual discrimination and arbitrary or capricious conduct in the tenure evaluation process, the decision denying her promotion and tenure, and in the decision as to whether to discharge her from her employment at the University of Illinois.
b. Whether the Circuit Court has subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action brought directly under Article I, Sections, 2, 17 and 18 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois, 1970 where the Plaintiff claims to have been retaliatorily discharged as a result of sexual discrimination and arbitrary or capricious conduct in the tenure evaluation process, the decision denying her promotion and tenure, and in the decision as to whether to discharge her from her employment at the University of Illinois.
c. Whether the Circuit Court has subject matter jurisdiction over claims founded upon a theory of Due Process (common law), tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and fraudulent misrepresentation where the Plaintiff claims that the conduct of the Defendants was motivated as a result of the Plaintiff being a female and/or for arbitrary and capricious reasons.
d. Whether the Circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought under Title 42 U.S.C.S. Sections 1983, 1985 and 1986 where the Plaintiff alleges that the actions taken against her were as a result of her being a female and/or for arbitrary and capricious reasons.
e. Whether the Circuit Court has subject matter jurisdiction over claims alleging a civil conspiracy to violate Plaintiff's common law and constitutional rights based upon her status as a female and/or for arbitrary and capricious reasons."
These questions raise two issues. The first question is whether section 8-111(C) of the Act precludes circuit courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims brought under the Constitution of the State of Illinois (, the Constitution of the United States (U.S. Const., amend. XIV), Federal law (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1988)), and common law where the underlying theory for the complained-of actions is gender-based discrimination and/or arbitrary and capricious conduct.
The second issue raised is whether plaintiff's claims founded on other than gender discrimination in the evaluation of her as a professor, for retention, promotion, and tenure must be brought in the Court of Claims.
Plaintiff first argues the circuit court erred by concluding it lacked jurisdiction to hear discrimination claims based on the Illinois Constitution, common law, Federal constitutional and statutory law. She raises the following arguments: (1) article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution permits her to seek original review by the circuit court of her claims; (2) article I, section 17, of the Illinois Constitution was enacted to protect against private, not public, discrimination; (3) article I, section 18, of the Illinois Constitution authorizes her to seek remedies in the circuit court; (4) the language of the Act does not preempt the circuit court's jurisdiction because her claims are not protected under the Act; and (5) circuit courts have original jurisdiction of Federal statutory and constitutional claims and cannot refuse to consider cases which raise these issues. We reject plaintiff's arguments.
The language of the Act and article I, sections 2, 17, and 18, of the Illinois Constitution is pertinent to resolving whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims.
The Act states it is intended to "secure and guarantee the rights established by Sections 17, 18 and 19 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution of 1970." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 68, par. 1-102(C).) Section 8-111(C) of the Act further provides, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, no court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation other than as set forth in this Act." Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 68, par. 8-111(C).
Article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution states "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws." Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2.
Article I, section 17, of the Illinois Constitution provides:
"All persons shall have the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, national ancestry and sex in the hiring and promotion practices of any employer * * *.
* * * [T]he General Assembly by law may establish reasonable exemptions relating to these rights and provide additional remedies for their violation." Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 17.
Article I, section 18, of the Illinois Constitution states: "The...
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