Felder, Matter of
| Decision Date | 08 February 1978 |
| Citation | 402 N.Y.S.2d 528,93 Misc.2d 369 |
| Court | New York Family Court |
| Parties | In the Matter of Henry FELDER, a person alleged to be a juvenile delinquent, Respondent. |
This juvenile delinquency proceeding involves a designated felony pursuant to the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976, N.Y. Family Court Act §§ 711-767, 29 A McKinney's Consolidated Laws 1977. It presents a case of first impression for this court. Respondent, a boy of fifteen, allegedly committed a robbery in the first degree, Penal Law § 160.15, a designated felony. F C A § 712(h). When the case came before the Court, the Respondent moved for a jury trial, asserting that under Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970), an individual charged with a crime where the penalty could exceed six months imprisonment is entitled to a jury trial. The respondent alleged that since he can be confined in a secure facility for a period of time up to twelve months, pursuant to section 753-a(4)(a)(ii) of the Family Court Act, the Baldwin doctrine applied, and he is entitled to a trial by jury.
On the other hand, the petitioner alleged that the United States Supreme Court decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971), is controlling. McKeiver holds that a juvenile charged with a delinquency, which precludes, by definition, criminal consequences and tried in a civil court, does not have a due process right to a jury trial. Petitioner further alleged that while New York is not constitutionally precluded from granting a jury trial under McKeiver, it has determined not to do so, citing In re Daniel G., 27 N.Y.2d 90, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704, 261 N.E.2d 627 (1970) and Matter of George S., 44 A.D.2d 352, 355 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1st Dept., 1974).
The issue before the court, then, is whether the instant proceeding is controlled by McKeiver or by Baldwin. Specifically, the question turns on whether this is a juvenile proceeding within the meaning of McKeiver, or, whether so many of the attributes of a juvenile proceeding have been discarded that the proceeding is in effect "criminal" in nature and thus within the ambit of Baldwin. 1
The concept of designated felony was created as a part of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976. (Chapt. 878, Laws of 1976).
The Legislature has chosen to label this new "designated felony concept" as a "juvenile" proceeding. It is axiomatic that this court is not bound by that designation if, in fact, the new proceeding is indeed a criminal proceeding. 2 The Supreme Court recognized this principle in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, at 94, 78 S.Ct. 590, at 594, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958), when the Court taught us:
But the Government contends that this statute does not impose a penalty . . . . We are told that this so because a committee . . . said it "technically is not a penal law." How simple would be the task of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if specific problems could be solved by inspection of labels pasted on them . . .
Further, "(N)either the label which a state places on its own conduct, nor even the legitimacy of its own motivation, can avoid applicability of the Federal Constitution." Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235, at 1240 (7th Cir. 1972) ().
The fundamental substantive distinction between a juvenile proceeding and a criminal proceeding is that a juvenile disposition is limited to treatment, while a criminal proceeding may impose punishment regardless of whether the punishment results in retribution and, or, deterrence. The view that the difference between criminal and juvenile proceedings is the difference between retribution and deterrence, on the one hand, and treatment, on the other, is confirmed by an examination of the history of the juvenile court system. This examination will also show that a denial of a juvenile's full exercise of his constitutional rights can only be predicated upon the presence of the treatment principle of the juvenile justice system.
At common law there were no juvenile courts or juvenile proceedings. If a child, over the age of seven, committed a criminal act, he was tried in a criminal court, and afforded all of the privileges of an adult charged with the same conduct. Thus, he was arrested, indicted by a grand jury, tried by a petit jury, and, if convicted, sent to prison. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv.L.R. 104, at 106 (1909).
The reformers of the nineteenth century were appalled by the fact that juveniles could be given long prison sentences to be served with hardened criminals. They recognized that criminal jurisprudence was founded not on "Reformation of the Criminal, but punishment; punishment as expiation for wrong, punishment as a warning to other possible wrongdoers." Mack, supra, at 106. To alleviate this situation, special juvenile centers were established which were authorized to admit children convicted of petty criminal offenses. The premise of these juvenile centers was that children were not criminal offenders, and, if properly treated, could be saved from a life of crime. The juvenile reform movement later became concerned not only with the disposition received by the juveniles but with the adjudication of juveniles as well. Thus, separate court proceedings were established.
The juvenile statutes were early challenged on the basis that the statutes were criminal in nature and the procedures employed were, therefore, violative of the constitutional protection applicable to criminal proceedings. In most cases the challenges were rejected on the ground that the disposition was rehabilitative and not grounded on motivations of punishment and deterrence. E. g. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905). Where the challenge succeeded was in those situations where the proceeding was, in effect, criminal in nature. E. g. Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 151 Mich. 315, 115 N.W. 682 (1908).
This historical examination of the origins of the juvenile justice system shows that the informality, flexibility, and, concomitantly, the absence of constitutional safeguards at juvenile proceedings was justified on the ground that the juvenile was to be treated and rehabilitated. Conversely, when the juvenile proceeding was primarily for retributive and deterrent purposes, it was considered criminal in nature, and hence subject to all of the limitations of a regular criminal proceeding. Sometimes referred to as the "exchange principle of juvenile law", 3 the trading of the constitutional protections of a criminal proceeding for rehabilitation still remains today the sine qua non of juvenile proceedings. Typical is the comment of the court in Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F.Supp. 1354, at 1364 (D.R.I.1972). The court said:
(T)he constitutional validity of present procedural safeguards in juvenile adjudications, which do not embrace all of the rigorous safeguards of criminal court adjudications, appears to rest on the adherence of the juvenile justice system to rehabilitative rather than penal goals
Rehabilitation, then, is the interest which the state has defined as being the purpose of confinement of juveniles. Due process in the adjudicative stages of the juvenile justice system has been defined differently from due process in the criminal justice system because the goal of the juvenile system, rehabilitation, differs from the goals of the criminal system, which include punishment, deterrence and retribution.
It is against this background that McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, must be viewed. It is true that McKeiver stated that in a juvenile proceeding trial by jury is not a constitutional requirement. The Court specifically refused to abandon the salutary goals of the juvenile system and rejected the jury trial because it could "tend to place the juvenile squarely in the routine of the criminal process." 403 U.S., at 547, 91 S.Ct. at 1987. Indeed, the Court acknowledged that when a child is adjudicated as a juvenile, but treated as a criminal, an inconsistency results, for the Court stated: Id., at 547-48, 91 S.Ct. at 1987. In effect, the Court deferred until a more appropriate occasion the determination of when a juvenile disposition fails to meet the rehabilitative premise of the juvenile system. The determination in McKeiver that in a juvenile proceeding a jury trial is not required, is, therefore, necessarily limited to those proceedings that are juvenile in nature. Thus, there is no requirement of a jury trial in family court where the dispositi is rehabilitative and non-penal. When, however, the protections provided to the juvenile criminal offender have been so eroded away that what is actually a punishment is characterized as a treatment, an abuse of constitutional dimension has occurred, and, a jury trial is required before punishment, although appropriate, may be inflicted.
In response to the reported increase in the frequency and severity of crimes committed by juveniles, the Legislature in the 1976 session enacted the Juvenile Justice Reform Act. This bill significantly amended Article 7 of the Family Court Act. The express purpose of Article 7 was redefined to include, for the first time, consideration of the needs of the community: "In any juvenile procedure under this article, the court shall consider the needs and best interests of the respondent as well as the need for protection of the community." F C A § 711. To this end, the...
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