Fields v. State
| Decision Date | 11 August 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. NN-228,NN-228 |
| Citation | 402 So.2d 46 |
| Parties | John Henry FIELDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Michael J. Minerva, Public Defender, Gene S. Taylor, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
On this appeal 1 from a judgment of conviction and sentence on a charge of robbery, we are now required to dispose of allegations of error independent of those treated in our initial opinion in this cause.
Appellant, a juvenile, challenges the denial of his motion to suppress uncounseled confessions and admissions obtained during a custodial detention and interrogation of approximately four hours. Although appellant expressly waived his Miranda rights, we conclude that his action cannot be regarded as a voluntary, intelligent, or knowing waiver, and the various confessions and admissions should have been suppressed.
Appellant was, in formal terms, repeatedly advised of and said that he understood his Miranda rights, but upon being asked if he wanted a lawyer his response was that "I can't afford to get one." Appellant's interrogators did not then or at anytime thereafter make any further statement or clarification regarding his right to counsel. The trial judge suppressed the confession which was given contemporaneously with the quoted statement, but did not suppress the various other confessions and admissions given prior and subsequent to the statement.
A court-appointed psychologist testified that appellant had a reduced mental ability involving a "visual perceptual disorder" with brain damage and attention span problems, and that he had the reading ability of a first-grade student. The doctor also testified that appellant "would have trouble" understanding his Miranda rights as they were read to him.
A Miranda waiver during custodial interrogation is valid only if it is a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Tennell v. State, 348 So.2d 937 (Fla.2d DCA 1977). In determining whether a waiver is voluntary, intelligent, and knowing, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances, and while a juvenile may waive his Miranda rights, the state bears a "heavy burden" in establishing that the waiver is valid. Arnold v. State, 265 So.2d 64 (Fla.3d DCA 1972), cert. denied, 272 So.2d 817 (Fla.1973). In the present case the testimony of the court-appointed psychologist and appellant's statement regarding his inability to afford an attorney show plainly that appellant did not intelligently comprehend the meaning of his Miranda rights to have counsel even if he could not afford the cost. The record also reflects false police assertions 2 apparently calculated to delude appellant and destroy his resistance. We conclude that appellant has established that his waiver of Miranda rights was not a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver, and the trial judge should accordingly have granted his motion to suppress the confessions and admissions in question.
The judgment and sentence appealed are reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Evidence presented by the State at the suppression hearing revealed, as noted in the majority opinion, that appellant when asked if he wanted a lawyer stated "I can't afford to get one." During the period of approximately two hours 1 preceding this statement appellant had received Miranda warnings three times: First, at a playground in a residential neighborhood where the officers initially made contact with him; second, when he arrived at the Sheriff's Office in the Courthouse after agreeing to voluntarily accompany the officers there for further discussion of the crime for which he was later charged; and third, at the beginning of the taped interview at which appellant made the statement about not being able to afford counsel. Appellant initially denied being involved in the offense when first contacted by the officers. After the second Miranda warning at the Sheriff's Office, the officers conducted further questioning and investigation of information given by appellant tending to establish an alibi. This went on for an hour or so, at which time one of the officers made the factually incorrect representation to appellant that his fingerprints had been identified at the crime scene. This incorrect statement triggered appellant's first incriminating statement, to the effect that "I might have touched the door when I was leaving." The officers then commenced the taped interview at which time the third Miranda warning was given.
Edwards v. Arizona, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (...
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