Fitzpatrick v. Rosenthal
| Decision Date | 03 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | CA 05-01698. |
| Citation | 29 A.D.3d 24,809 N.Y.S.2d 729,2006 NY Slip Op 00832 |
| Parties | WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, as District Attorney of Onondaga County, Respondent, v. KATE ROSENTHAL, as Syracuse City Court Judge, Appellant, et al., Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
APPEAL from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Donald A. Greenwood, J.), entered May 13, 2005. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, declared that five felony complaints dismissed pursuant to CPL 140.45 by defendant Syracuse City Court Judge were facially sufficient, reinstated those felony complaints and remitted the matter to Syracuse City Court for further proceedings.
J. Scott Porter, Seneca Falls, for appellant. William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Victoria M. White of counsel), respondent pro se.
HURLBUTT, J.P.
Plaintiff, the District Attorney of Onondaga County (District Attorney), commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action seeking a writ of prohibition and declaratory relief. For the reasons set forth infra, we agree with Supreme Court that this is properly a declaratory judgment action inasmuch as a writ of prohibition does not lie under the circumstances presented herein. We further conclude that the court erred in declaring that five felony complaints dismissed pursuant to CPL 140.45 by defendant Kate Rosenthal, Syracuse City Court Judge, are facially sufficient, in reinstating those felony complaints, and in remitting the matter to Syracuse City Court for further proceedings consistent with its decision. We thus conclude that the judgment insofar as appealed from should be reversed and that judgment should be granted in favor of Judge Rosenthal.
Background
On February 17, 2005, defendant Ortez W. Madison, having been arrested without a warrant, was arraigned in Syracuse City Court on five felony complaints before Judge Rosenthal. Each such felony complaint is affirmed under penalty of perjury by a detective from the Syracuse Police Department, and each contains, as required by CPL 100.15 (3), a factual recitation of the conduct constituting the crimes charged in the various complaints, including reckless endangerment, criminal possession of a weapon, robbery, and assault. The complaints further recite that the sources of the affirming detective's information are "eyewitness accounts." No witness statement or police report was attached to any of the felony complaints.
At arraignment, Madison's attorney asserted that the felony complaints were "facially insufficient." The Assistant District Attorney contended that the felony complaints were "legally sufficient," and that, in determining the validity of the felony complaints, Judge Rosenthal was required by law to consider evidentiary material submitted ex parte by the People for in camera review. Judge Rosenthal refused to consider any such ex parte submission and dismissed the felony complaints based on her determination that they were not facially sufficient.
The District Attorney then commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action seeking, inter alia, to prohibit Judge Rosenthal from: (a) questioning the truth of the facts contained in sworn felony complaints in the context of CPL 140.45 review; (b) dismissing any felony complaint under CPL 140.45 without determining that it would be impossible to "draft" a sufficient felony complaint by "examining any and all facts and evidence being made available, including in camera review of confidential police reports where such reports are made available"; (c) requiring "actual or de-facto amendment" of felony complaints to avoid their dismissal; and (d) making public or providing to Madison any confidential witness statements or any confidential document submitted to Judge Rosenthal for in camera review. The District Attorney also sought declaratory relief pursuant to CPLR 3001, viz., a declaration imposing on Judge Rosenthal and "other Judges of preliminary jurisdiction" a duty to adhere to the strictures encompassed in the requested prohibition relief.
Notwithstanding that the relief sought relates only to the asserted requirement that Judge Rosenthal consider extraneous material in her CPL 140.45 review of a felony complaint, the District Attorney also alleged, as did the Assistant District Attorney appearing before Judge Rosenthal, that the subject felony complaints are facially sufficient. Supreme Court so found, reasoning that, under the "more relaxed requirement" for felony complaints, the reference in the subject felony complaints to "eyewitness accounts" as the basis for the factual allegations renders them facially sufficient under CPL 100.40 (4) (b) and 70.10 (2).
Judge Rosenthal contends on appeal, inter alia, that (1) the subject felony complaints are not facially sufficient; (2) a local criminal court's determination of the facial sufficiency of a felony complaint does not encompass in camera review of confidential witness statements or police reports submitted ex parte by the People; and (3) the court improperly granted declaratory relief.
Facial Sufficiency
Where, as here, a police officer makes an arrest without a warrant, the officer "must . . . bring the arrested person or cause him to be brought before a local criminal court and file therewith an appropriate accusatory instrument charging him with the offense or offenses in question" (CPL 140.20 [1]). Where the offense charged is a felony, the "appropriate accusatory instrument" is a felony complaint, which "serves to commence a criminal action but not as a basis for prosecution thereof" (CPL 1.20 [8]). When a defendant is arraigned on an accusatory instrument such as a felony complaint, the court acquires jurisdiction to "exercise control over [the defendant's] person with respect to such accusatory instrument and [to set] the course of further proceedings in the action" (CPL 1.20 [9]; see CPL 180.10). Upon the arraignment, if the felony complaint
"is not sufficient on its face, as prescribed in section 100.40, and if the court is satisfied that on the basis of the available facts or evidence it would be impossible to draw and file an accusatory instrument which is sufficient on its face, it must dismiss such accusatory instrument and discharge the defendant" (CPL 140.45).
Here, it is undisputed that the subject felony complaints generally are in conformance with the organizational requirements of CPL 100.15. Instead, the disputed issue is whether the felony complaints demonstrate the requisite reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense, within the meaning of CPL 70.10 (2). Such reasonable cause
(id.).
The "reasonable cause" standard defined in CPL 70.10 (2) and referenced in CPL 100.40 (4) (b) is, not coincidentally, also the statutory standard for determining whether a person was lawfully arrested (see CPL 140.10 [1]). We note, moreover, that reasonable cause is the equivalent of probable cause (see People v Maldonado, 86 NY2d 631, 635 [1995]; People v Wharton, 60 AD2d 291, 293 [1977], affd 46 NY2d 924 [1979], cert denied 444 US 880 [1979]), the constitutional prerequisite for a lawful arrest. "The [constitutional] standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and circumstances `sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense'" (Gerstein v Pugh, 420 US 103, 111 [1975], quoting Beck v Ohio, 379 US 89, 91 [1964]). Where a demonstration of probable or reasonable cause is based on hearsay information, New York courts apply the Aguilar-Spinelli test, requiring that the hearsay affiant establish "that the informant had some basis for the knowledge . . . transmitted . . . and that [the informant] was reliable" (People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 [1985]; see People v DiFalco, 80 NY2d 693, 696 [1993]; People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398, 402 [1985]; see generally People v Davis, 170 Misc 2d 987, 994 [1996]; People v Born, 166 Misc 2d 757, 759-761 [1995]).
The hearsay-based felony complaints before us fail to meet either prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. In People v Parris (83 NY2d 342 [1994]), the Court of Appeals concluded that an arrest made by a police officer based on hearsay information imparted by a fellow officer and attributed to an eyewitness was unlawful under the "basis-of-knowledge prong of Aguilar-Spinelli" and thus was not based on the requisite probable cause (id. at 350). In so concluding, the Court reasoned that
(id.).
As Judge Rosenthal correctly contends, the subject felony complaints also fail to establish the...
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