Flanders v. Georgia Southern & F. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 December 1914
• Citation: 68 Fla. 479,67 So. 68
• Parties: FLANDERS v. GEORGIA S. & F. RY. CO.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

67 So. 68

68 Fla. 479

FLANDERS v. GEORGIA S. & F. RY. CO.

Florida Supreme Court

December 9, 1914

Error to Circuit Court, Duval County; Geo. Couper Gibbs, Judge.

Action by William E. Flanders against the Georgia Southern & Florida Railway Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

At common law no right of action existed in any one to recover damages for the death of a person. Any statutory right of action given to recover damages for the wrongful death of a person must be instituted and maintained by the persons and for the damages as stated in the statute conferring the right of action, and the action must be brought within the time fixed by the statute.

Whenever a valid federal regulation covers a subject within the sphere of the federal law, it is paramount; and any and all conflicting state regulations of such subject are ipso facto wholly excluded therefrom. Otherwise the federal enactments would not be the supreme law of the land, and the federal authority would not be paramount within its sphere of operation.

If the facts on which a cause of action must rest bring the cause within the operation of the the paramount federal statute, it is quite immaterial how or when the real facts developed in the progress of the cause.

When the facts of a case, whether developed by the pleadings or by the evidence, bring the federal law regulating interstate commerce into operation, such law is paramount and excludes all conflicting state regulations, even though the facts are commingled with other facts showing an intrastate operation at the same time by the same parties and by the means used by them.

Where a decedent was fatally injured while he was employed in interstate commerce as an employé of a 'common carrier by railroad,' as a proximate result of the negligence of the carrier, the dominant federal law controls and is exclusive even though the decedent and the carrier were also engaged in intrastate commerce.

Procedure is not of substance or at all material, where the facts on which the cause of action rests do not authorize the action as brought to be maintained.

COUNSEL W. M. Toomer, of Jacksonville, for plaintiff in error.

John C Cooper & Son, of Jacksonville, for defendant in error.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

In his individual capacity Flanders brought an action against the railroad company under the General Statutes of 1906 to recover damages for mental pain and suffering and for loss of services caused by the alleged wrongful death of his minor child, Charles Emory Flanders; the declaration alleging that the decedent was an employé of the defendant 'as a switchman on the railroad yards, Y's, and terminals of said company, at and near Palatka, Putnam county, Fla., his said death having resulted from the passing over his body of a locomotive engine of said defendant,' at Palatka, and that such death was caused by stated negligence of the defendant railroad company. The defendant pleaded not guilty and that the alleged injury was caused solely by the negligent acts of the decedent. Issue was joined on these pleas. Later a special plea of assumed risk was filed. A demurrer to this special plea was overruled. By leave of court and over the objection of the plaintiff a further plea was filed, as follows:

'That the said Charles Emory Flanders, mentioned in plaintiff's declaration, at the time of the injury causing his death and immediately prior thereto, was employed as a switchman by this defendant, a common carrier by railroad, operating a line of railroad between and through the states of Georgia and Florida, and, among other points, between the city of Valdosta in the state of Georgia, and the city of Palatka in the state of Florida, and engaged in commerce between said states, and that the said Charles Emory Flanders, at the said time of the injuries causing his death, and immediately prior thereto, was acting as such switchman in the operating and handling of a certain train of the defendant running between the city of Valdosta in the state of Georgia, and the city of Palatka in the state of Florida, and which train had just arrived in the city of Palatka in the state of Florida, from the city of Valdosta in the state of Georgia, and was then and there being handled and operated in the city of Palatka, Fla., by employés of said defendant, including said Charles Emory Flanders, preparatory to its leaving the city of Palatka in the state of Florida for a continuous movement of said train from said city of Palatka in the state of Florida, through portions of the state of Florida and through portions of the state of Georgia to the city of Valdosta in the state of Georgia, and that the said injuries of the said Charles Emory Flanders, resulting in his death, occurred while he was thus engaged in such commerce between the states of Georgia and Florida, and while the defendant was thus engaged in operating its said train between and through the said states of Georgia and Florida, and that under and by the terms of the act of Congress of the United States of America in such cases made and provided, the defendant is made liable to and the right of action, if any, is given to and vested in the personal representative of said Charles Emory Flanders, deceased, for the benefit of certain persons therein named, including the parents of the said Charles Emory Flanders, deceased, and that the plaintiff in this cause is the father of said Charles Emory Flanders, deceased, and that the plaintiff in this cause is not such personal representative of said Charles Emory Flanders, deceased, and this action is not brought or maintained by plaintiff as such representative of Charles E. Flanders, deceased, and that plaintiff has no right or authority to bring and maintain the said above-entitled action.

'And this the defendant is ready to verify. Wherefore it prays the judgment of the writ and declaration in this cause, and that the same may be quashed.'

A demurrer to this last plea was overruled. The following stipulation was then filed:

'It is stipulated in the foregoing cause in open court at the trial of said cause that the plea filed by leave of court on this date and attached to notice of motion for leave to file same, which notice was filed February 13, 1914, correctly states the facts in regard to the matters and things set forth in said plea; and that upon motion of defendant's attorneys on the said stipulation and plea that the court shall instruct a verdict in favor of the defendant upon the above mentioned and described plea, filed February 16, 1914, by leave of court, and that the court shall act upon the said motion without the intervention of a jury.'

Final judgment for the defendant was entered, and the plaintiff on writ of error contends that there was error in allowing the last or second additional plea to be filed, and in overruling the demurrers to the first and second additional pleas.

At common law no right of action existed in any one to recover damages for the death of a person. Any statutory right of action given to recover damages for the wrongful death of a person must be instituted and maintained by the persons and for the damages as stated in the statute conferring the right of action; and the action must be brought within the time fixed by the statute.

Article 6 of the Constitution of the United States provides that:

'This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.'

Whenever a valid federal regulation covers a subject within the sphere of the federal law, it is paramount; and any and all conflicting state regulations of such subject are ipso facto wholly excluded therefrom. Otherwise the federal enactments would not be the supreme law of the land, and the federal authority would not be paramount within its sphere of operation. See Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352, 33 S.Ct. 729, 57 L.Ed. 1511, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1151.

It is contended that the federal regulation giving a right of action in case of a wrongful death for the recovery of damages 'for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employé; and, if none, then of such employé's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employé'--does not cover the same subject covered by the state law giving a right of action to the parent to recover damages for his mental pain and suffering and for loss of services caused by the wrongful death of his minor child. But within the sphere it operates the federal law covers every case of wrongful death whether of an adult or a minor; and within the sphere of its operation the federal law is both paramount and exclusive. Therefore any regulation by the state that in any material way conflicts with the paramount federal law is excluded. Taylor v. Taylor, 232 U.S. 363, 34 S.Ct. 350, 58 L.Ed. 638; St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co. v. Seale, 229 U.S. 156, 33 S.Ct. 651, 57 L.Ed. 1129, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 156; Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 33 S.Ct. 192, 57 L.Ed. 417, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 176; North...