Fleet Leasing, Inc. v. District Court In and For City and County of Denver

• Decision Date: 16 August 1982
• Docket Number: No. 82SA197,82SA197
• Citation: 649 P.2d 1074
• Parties: FLEET LEASING, INC., an Oregon corporation d/b/a Jubitz Truck Stop, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT In and For the CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, State of Colorado, and the Honorable Roger Cisneros, one of the Judges thereof, Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1074

649 P.2d 1074

FLEET LEASING, INC., an Oregon corporation d/b/a Jubitz Truck Stop, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT In and For the CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER State of Colorado, and the Honorable Roger Cisneros, one of the Judges thereof, Respondents.

No. 82SA197.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Aug. 16, 1982.

Wood, Ris & Hames, P. C., Jeffrey J. Cowman, Denver, for petitioner.

Stuart L. Boulter, P. C., Roger W. Westlund, Denver, for respondents.

QUINN, Justice.

In this original proceeding under C.A.R. 21 the petitioner, Fleet Leasing, Inc., an Oregon corporation doing business as Jubitz Truck Stop (Jubitz), seeks relief in the nature of prohibition on the ground that the respondent, the District Court of the City and County of Denver, exceeded its jurisdiction in violation of due process of law by exercising in personam jurisdiction pursuant to the Colorado Long Arm Statute for the alleged commission of a tortious act within the state of Colorado by Jubitz. Section 13-1-124(1)(b), C.R.S.1973. Because we conclude that the exercise of jurisdiction over Jubitz does not comport with due process of law, we now make the rule absolute.

I.

On February 12, 1981, a semi-trailer truck driven by Jerry Strom went out of control and turned over on Interstate Highway 70 in Jefferson County, Colorado. Strom, his wife, and his son, all of whom were Colorado residents, were injured in the accident and treated at St. Anthony's Hospital in Denver, Colorado. On September 12, 1981, Strom filed a suit in a California court against various defendants, including Jubitz. ¹ The complaint alleged, inter alia, that a 1972 three-axle truck-tractor, bearing Oregon license number T411743, and a 1975 tractor were left at Jubitz's service station in Portland, Oregon on various dates in the latter part of 1980 for the purpose of inspection and repair of the brake system, that Jubitz negligently inspected and repaired the brake system, and that Jubitz's negligence caused the truck to go out of control and overturn on Interstate Highway 70 in Jefferson County, Colorado on February 12, 1981, thereby resulting in injuries to Strom, his wife and his child. Strom sought general and special damages including hospital and medical expenses incurred for care at St. Anthony's Hospital. Jubitz voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the California court. St. Anthony's Hospital thereafter filed a statutory lien for $18,703.72 on any judgment that might be awarded Strom in the California action for services it had rendered to him and the other members of his family. ²

In October 1981 St. Anthony Hospital Systems, Inc. (St. Anthony's Hospital), filed a separate suit in Denver District Court against Jerry and Phyllis Strom and all the named defendants in the California action, including Jubitz. ³ St. Anthony's Hospital sought money damages for payment of the medical services rendered to the Stroms as a result of the accident on February 12, 1981. The complaint alleged, in pertinent part, as follows: that Jubitz was located in Portland, Oregon, and was engaged in the business of refueling and servicing semi-trailer trucks; that Jubitz negligently repaired the brakes on the semi-trailer truck during 1980; that on February 12, 1981 Jerry Strom was driving the semi-trailer truck in Jefferson County, Colorado, and was involved in a collision which resulted in necessary medical services being rendered by St. Anthony's Hospital to Jerry Strom, his wife, Phyllis Strom, and his son, Robert Strom; and that the negligent repair of the brakes by Jubitz was the direct and proximate cause of the unpaid medical services which St. Anthony's Hospital claimed as damages. ⁴ St. Anthony's Hospital served a copy of the summons and complaint upon Jubitz's registered agent in Portland, Oregon.

Jubitz filed a motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction and supported the motion with an affidavit of its president, H. Abbott Lawrence III. The affidavit alleged that Jubitz carries on no activities, performs no services, serves no patrons, neither directly nor indirectly attempts to serve markets in Colorado, and that it has not purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within Colorado.

During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, St. Anthony's Hospital conceded that Jubitz's sole contact with Colorado was its allegedly negligent repair of the brakes on the truck driven by Jerry Strom and that it could not be proven that Jubitz had conducted any other activity in the state. ⁵ The district court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that it had jurisdiction because Jubitz reasonably could have foreseen that trucks which had been repaired in Oregon might cause injuries in other states including Colorado and that Jubitz was only one defendant among many named in this action. Jubitz thereafter petitioned this court for relief in the nature of prohibition, claiming that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction under the facts of this case violated due process of law under the United States and Colorado Constitutions. U.S.Const. Amend. XIV; Colo.Const. Art. II, Sec. 25. We agree with Jubitz's claim.

II.

Section 13-1-124(1)(b), C.R.S.1973, commonly known as the Long Arm Statute, provides as follows:

"Engaging in any act enumerated in this section by any person, whether or not a resident of the state of Colorado, either in person or by an agent, submits such person, and, if a natural person his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state concerning any cause of action arising from ... (t)he commission of a tortious act within this state ...." ⁶

In enacting this statute the Colorado legislature intended to extend the jurisdiction of our courts to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions. E.g., Le Manufacture Francaise v. District Court, 620 P.2d 1040 (Colo.1980); Waterval v. District Court, 620 P.2d 5 (Colo.1980); Jenner and Block v. District Court, 197 Colo. 184, 590 P.2d 964 (1979). A party asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant under the Long Arm Statute must make a prima facie showing of threshold jurisdiction. Id. In determining whether a prima facie showing has been established, it is appropriate to consider the allegations of the complaint as well as any other evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Le Manufacture Francaise v. District Court, supra; Waterval v. District Court, supra. Threshold jurisdiction exists when it is demonstrated that tortious conduct initiated in another state ultimately caused injury in Colorado and that requiring a defense to the tort action in this state would be consistent with due process of law. E.g., Le Manufacture Francaise v. District Court, supra; Jenner and Block v. District Court, supra; Granite States v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972).

In this case the complaint specifically alleges that the injury to the Stroms occurred in Colorado as a result of Jubitz's negligent repair of the brakes in Oregon. This allegation constitutes a prima facie showing of a "tortious act" within this state for purposes of long arm jurisdiction. The critical inquiry, therefore, is whether the exercise of in personam jurisdiction on the basis of Jubitz's Oregon conduct comports with due process of law. For reasons hereafter stated we conclude that it does not.

A.

Due process prohibits the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless the defendant has "certain minimum contacts with (the forum state) such that maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 343, 85 L.Ed. 278, 283, 132 A.L.R. 1357 (1940). Thus, the relationship between the defendant and the forum state must be such that it is reasonable to require the defendant to defend the particular suit which is brought there. Id. at 317, 66 S.Ct. at 158, 90 L.Ed. at 102. The "minimum contacts" standard protects the defendant against litigating in an inconvenient forum and, at the same time, ensures that the states do not overreach the limits imposed upon them by their status as coequal sovereigns in our federal system. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92, 100 S.Ct. 559, 564, 62 L.Ed.2d 490, 498 (1980). Requiring as it does a determination of "reasonableness," the "minimum contacts" standard is not susceptible of mechanical application and, instead, involves an ad hoc analysis of the facts. In this area of the law the ultimate determination will rarely, if ever, be written in black and white. "The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable." Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1696, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, 141 (1978), quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545, 68 S.Ct. 1213, 1216, 92 L.Ed. 1561, 1566 (1948).

Sufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant may be found where the defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State." Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283, 1298 (1958). By availing itself of this privilege the defendant "has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567, 62 L.Ed.2d at 501. In this case it is undisputed that Jubitz has not purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the state of Colorado. As St. Anthony's Hospital concedes, Jubitz's sole contact with...