Flowers v. State
| Decision Date | 04 April 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 40434,40434 |
| Parties | FLOWERS v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Thomas H. Baxley, Blakely, Harold H. Hobbs, Arlington (court-appointed), for Donald Flowers.
Charles M. Ferguson, Dist. Atty., Cuthbert, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., for the State.
The appellant, Donald Flowers, was indicted in Early County for first degree arson and five counts of murder following a fire at a residence in Blakely, Georgia, in which five persons were killed. 1 Following a trial by jury, appellant was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently. He appeals the denial of his motion for a new trial. 2 We affirm.
1. (A) In his first enumeration of error appellant contends that his in-custody statement admitting the crimes should have been suppressed as it was made after an unlawful arrest. Appellant argues his arrest was illegal because it was made without a warrant having been issued and was without probable cause. We disagree.
In Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479 (1981), this court stated, in discussing probable cause at the time of arrest, that "whether that arrest was constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it --- whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense." Citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). In the case before us, the arresting officer had the following information prior to taking appellant into custody. On November 3, 1980, at 12:45 a.m., the Blakely Fire Department received a call to respond to a fire at the residence of Ray Williams. About five minutes later they arrived to find the house totally engulfed in flames. Fire department investigators and a state arson investigator on the scene determined the fire was caused by arson, and that a petroleum accellerant had been used on the back exterior wall of the residence. A search of the premises revealed a one gallon plastic milk jug with a nylon cord tied around the top found in a ditch eight to ten feet away from the residence. The jug had no lid and smelled of gasoline. One of the firemen answering the call, Kenzie Wiley, was present when the jug was found. He told investigators that he had seen the jug before. The appellant had mowed his grass one month earlier and had used a plastic milk jug with a nylon cord tied around the top for gas. Jerry West, a witness on the scene, told investigators that he had seen the appellant earlier that evening at the scene with the milk jug and that it had gasoline in it at the time. West had come to the residence in response to an argument between appellant and Ray Williams. While he was there, West witnessed another argument between the appellant and Porter Marsh, another victim of the fire. The appellant lived with his aunt approximately 70 yards from the Williams residence. When investigators went to appellant's residence they found in a crack between the porch and front door, a plastic cap which fit the jug described previously. We conclude this information was sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that appellant had committed the offense. Vaughn, supra.
(B) Appellant also contends his in-custody statement should have been suppressed because it was involuntarily given. The appellant gave three different statements to police throughout the day on November 3, 1980. The first statement was given at approximately 8:30 a.m. after appellant was advised of his Miranda rights. This statement was entirely exculpatory. The second statement was given at 3:41 p.m. that afternoon following some investigation by the officer who conducted the morning interrogation. Appellant was advised of his rights again prior to the questioning. When asked whether he wished to talk to officers at that time, appellant responded that he had said all he had to say. The interrogation continued and resulted in the second statement. Nothing in this statement was introduced into evidence at trial nor does the record reflect its content. Following this interrogation, appellant was taken voluntarily to Dothan, Alabama, and given a polygraph test. The record does not show what questions were asked or what answers were given. On the return trip to Georgia, the officer and appellant engaged in conversation unrelated to the fire. The third statement was made by appellant after the return to Georgia, during the booking procedure some four hours after the second interrogation had ceased. During the course of booking, appellant blurted out, It is this third statement which appellant sought to suppress on the ground it was made after he had invoked his right to remain silent during the second interrogation.
We agree with appellant that interrogation should have ceased when in response to his Miranda rights he stated that he had said all he had to say. The U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), established guidelines under which an in-custody statement can be obtained from a defendant. There the court held that the in-custody interrogation of the defendant must cease if the defendant states or indicates to the officers that he will...
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...We discern no abuse of the trial court's discretion in its denial of Arrington's motion for a mistrial. See Flowers v. State, 252 Ga. 476, 479(2), 314 S.E.2d 206 (1984). In addition to the foregoing, Arrington complains about portions of the prosecutor's opening statement and closing argume......
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...to refuse to grant a mistrial if the alleged harmful testimony can be corrected by a proper instruction to the jury." Flowers v. State, 252 Ga. 476(2), 314 S.E.2d 206; accord Crawford v. State, 256 Ga. 585(2), 351 S.E.2d 199. Abuse of discretion does not exist in this case because the curat......
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