Folsom Engraving Co. v. McNeil

• Decision Date: 20 March 1920
• Citation: 235 Mass. 269,126 N.E. 479
• Parties: FOLSOM ENGRAVING CO. v. McNEIL et al. WRIGHT CO. v. SAME.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

235 Mass. 269

126 N.E. 479

FOLSOM ENGRAVING CO.

v.McNEIL et al.

WRIGHT CO.

v.SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

March 20, 1920.

Case Reserved from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.

Suits by the Folsom Engraving Company and the Wright Company against William McNeil and another. On reservation by a single justice, on the report and supplemental report of the master, for the determination of the Supreme Judicial Court. Injunctive relief to plaintiffs ordered.

William M. Noble, of Boston, for plaintiffs.

Daniel V. McIsaac, of Boston, and Dennis F. Dwyer, of Medford, for defendants.

BRALEY, J.

The master reports that at a meeting of the local union, a voluntary association, of which the defendants are respectively the president and secretary, the other members being too numerous to be joined as parties though properly represented by the officers and members named, it was voted to submit to the ‘photoengraving establishments of the city of Boston’ a form of proposed contract conferring on the union the absolute right of ‘collective bargaining,’ and of preferential employment with a minimum wage scale, and the permanent employés should not be temporarily ‘laid off’ even if there was not sufficient work to keep them employed. It was further provided that the ratio of apprentices to journeymen should be immutably fixed and that all disputes not covered by the agreement should be submitted to an arbitration committee of two from each party, but if they failed to agree a fifth member was to be chosen by the committee. And ‘no contracts individual or otherwise conflicting with this agreement be entered into, and all contracts of employment must be submitted and executed in accordance with the’ by-laws and constitution of the international photoengravers' union with which the local union was affiliated. The agreement having been presented to the plaintiffs who are engaged in the business of ‘photoengraving’ and whose workmen included a large number of union men, was not accepted. The union because of nonacceptance voted to strike, and the employés who were members of the union ceased to work, forcing the plaintiffs to secure in so far as possible men and women to succeed them, some of whom entered into written contracts of service. The question for decision is not whether an individual employé who has contracted to perform labor can abandon his contract leaving his employer to whatever remedy in damages he may have. It is whether by concerted action using the strike as a mass weapon the defendants could lawfully compel the plaintiffs to yield to their demands. The proposed agreement was presented as an entire contract to be unconditionally accepted.

If the plaintiffs declined to enter into the agreement the underlying purpose manifestly was to enforce acquiescence through the coercive power of a strike, which even where there is both a legal and illegal purpose is of itself illegal. Baush Machine Tool Co. v. Hill, 231 Mass. 30, 36, 120 N. E. 188.

[2] The provision that the employer must retain and pay more employés than were actually or reasonably required for carrying on his business, and that disputes not covered by the agreement must be submitted to arbitration even if proper subjects for negotiation where the parties are willing to negotiate, were, until accepted, mere proposals, the refusal of which was wholly insufficient to justify the measures adopted by the defendants. The plaintiffs could not be compelled to make an involuntary contract, or to substitute compulsory arbitration for due process of law. Haverhill Strand Theater v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 443, 118 N. E. 671, L. R. A. 1918C, 813, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 650;Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294, 84 N. E. 457,17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162. But these provisions, while material and important, comprise a part only of a general plan to compel the plaintiffs, who were employing nonunion as well as union labor, ‘to unionize’ their shops. The record states that prior to the vote to strike which followed the declination of the agreement no disagreement or controversy had arisen between the plaintiffs and their workmen. It is true the agreement reads, that the plaintiffs in the employment of journeymen and apprentices will give preference to union men by notifying the union officials when additional journeymen and apprentices are needed, and if the union cannot furnish and supply competent help, the employer may secure such help from other sources, and no express...