Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 06-95-00026-CV
| Decision Date | 30 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-95-00026-CV,06-95-00026-CV |
| Parties | 30 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 1097, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,553 Susan Renae MILES, Individually and As next Friend of Willie Searcy and Jermaine Searcy, Minors, and Kenneth Miles, Appellants v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY and Douglas Stanley, Jr., d/b/a Doug Stanley Ford, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Before CORNELIUS, C.J., and BLEIL and GRANT, JJ.
The plaintiffs Susan Renae Miles, individually and as next friend of minors Willie Searcy and Jermaine Searcy, and Kenneth Miles sued Ford Motor Company and Douglas Stanley, Jr., doing business as Doug Stanley Ford, to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by Willie Searcy as a result of a two-car collision that occurred in Dallas County. The plaintiffs asserted liability on the basis of defective product, negligence, and breach of warranties, alleging that a faulty seat belt caused Willie Searcy's injuries. Before trial, the court granted Ford and Stanley's summary judgment motion on the loss of consortium claims of Kenneth Miles, Willie's stepfather, and Willie's brother Jermaine. The jurors found for the plaintiffs on all claims against Ford but not against Stanley, and awarded $30 million compensatory damages. The jurors also found that Ford had acted with gross negligence and malice, and awarded exemplary damages of $10 million.
Both sides appeal. Ford and Stanley contend that the trial court erred in refusing to transfer venue to Dallas County from Rusk County; in allowing the plaintiffs to present certain expert testimony and refusing to allow Ford to present contradicting expert testimony; in admitting the plaintiffs' test evidence and excluding the defense's test; in admitting voluminous exhibits en masse without individually considering authenticity, hearsay, and relevance, and without balancing their probative value against possible prejudice and juror confusion; by instructing the jurors that Ford had a duty to "prevent all unnecessary and avoidable injuries"; in rendering judgment and in failing to grant Ford's motion for new trial because the jurors' liability findings were fatally conflicting; and in denying Ford's motion for new trial because the evidence was factually insufficient to support the jury's liability and punitive damage findings.
The plaintiffs contend that they should have a new trial on their claims against Stanley because the jury's failure to find liability against Stanley was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and was manifestly unjust, and that the trial court erred in granting Ford and Stanley's motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs' loss of consortium claims.
Because we find factually insufficient evidence to support the findings of gross negligence and malice, we will reverse the judgment and remand the cause for a new trial on the issues of gross negligence and malice. In all other respects, we will affirm the judgment.
Susan Miles is Willie and Jermaine Searcy's mother, and her husband Kenneth Miles is their stepfather. Willie was fourteen and Jermaine was twelve in April of 1993, the time of the collision. The collision occurred when the 1988 Ford Ranger pickup Kenneth Miles was driving struck a Mercury Cougar that had crossed the median into the truck's path. Kenneth Miles and Willie were wearing seat belts and shoulder harnesses, and Jermaine was wearing a lap belt only.
Kenneth Miles and Jermaine were injured, but generally recovered. Willie suffered a spinal cord injury rendering him quadriplegic. He needs round-the-clock care and can breathe only with the help of a ventilator. Willie's injuries form the basis of the suit.
The plaintiffs' theory was that, some time before the collision, Willie, who was riding on the right passenger side, leaned forward to pick up trash on the floorboard, which caused the webbing on his shoulder harness to spool out, creating six to eight inches of slack. A device on the truck called a "tension eliminator" prevented the webbing from rewinding onto the spool, much as the pull-down device on a window shade can be set to prevent the shade from rewinding. Plaintiffs say that when Willie sat up straight, the webbing folded behind his back, creating the appearance of a snug shoulder harness when the harness really was quite loose. When the collision occurred, Willie was thrown forward and his torso moved forward until it hit the webbing when the slack ended. The belt then rode up under Willie's neck. This force caused the ligaments attaching Willie's skull to his spine to tear apart. One expert also theorized that the collision caused Willie's body to "submarine," or slide under his lap belt. When his shoulder harness caught his head, the force separated his skull from his spine. The plaintiffs argue that the tension eliminator created the slack in the shoulder harness and thus caused the injury.
The defense's theory was that Willie was properly wearing his shoulder harness and lap belt, with no undue slack, and that the force of the crash simply was too great for Willie's neck muscles and ligaments, which were immature for his age and size. The injury occurred simply by his head and neck snapping forward, they argue.
Ford and Stanley, in their position as appellants, contend that the trial court should have transferred the suit from Rusk County to Dallas County because the plaintiffs are Dallas County residents, Doug Stanley Ford is a Dallas County business, and the accident occurred in Dallas County.
We must uphold the trial court's venue determination if, after viewing the entire record, including the trial record, we find any probative evidence that venue was proper in Rusk County. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 1986); Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex.1993). At the time this suit was filed, a plaintiff could sue an out-of-state corporation doing business in this state in any county where the company had an agency or representative. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 15.037, Act of June 3, 1987, 70th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 4, § 1, 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 52-53. 1 When there were two or more defendants in the same action and venue was proper in the county of suit as to any one defendant, venue could be maintained there against the other defendants. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 15.061. 2 For the purposes of the venue statute, an agency means a more-or-less permanent business operation, and a representative means someone who has broad powers to act for the corporation. Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d at 759. An ordinary employee does not qualify as an agency or a representative because an ordinary employee does not have the broad power and discretion to act for the corporation. Id. To come within the term agency or representative, there must be some discretionary power conferred on the entity. Brazos River Transmission Elec. Coop. v. Vilbig, 244 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1951, no writ). The agency or representative must be an entity authorized to bring about a business relationship between the principal and a third party, an authority not characteristic of a mere servant or employee. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Coplin, 445 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1969, no writ).
The plaintiffs based their claim of venue in Rusk County on the fact that Premier Ford Mercury, Inc., a Ford dealership, is located in Rusk County. Ford and Stanley argue that Premier is not an agency or representative of Ford Motor Company as those terms were used in the venue statute. The Sales and Service Agreement detailing the relationship between Ford and Premier prohibits the dealership from "act[ing] or attempt[ing] to act, or represent himself, directly or by implication, as agent of the company or in any manner assum[ing] or creat[ing] any obligation" and disclaims any general liability by Ford for dealership operations. Thus, Ford says, the dealership has practically no discretion to act for it. It argues that the dealer's obligations, such as promotion and advertising, are obligations to do things for the dealership itself, not for Ford. Other Premier duties, Ford contends, such as handing out warranty booklets and owners' manuals, are not discretionary but ministerial. Premier cannot alter a Ford warranty and it has no discretion in deciding whether to deliver a warranty. Ford also points out that Premier's predelivery inspections, as well as all recall and correction work, are nondiscretionary and are done only under Ford's express direction.
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the dealership is authorized and is responsible to Ford for several discretionary duties specified by the Sales and Service Agreement, including (1) promoting the retail sale of Ford cars and trucks; (2) advertising Ford vehicles; (3) incorporating Ford's warranty into sales documents for Ford vehicles; (4) performing predelivery inspection, conditioning, and repair of Ford vehicles; (5) performing all warranty service on Ford products; and (6) performing recall and correction work on Ford products. The Premier Ford manager has final approval of all warranty work done at Premier Ford and final approval on all vehicles received new from Ford. There was also evidence that Ford has told the dealership it represents Ford in dealing with the public. The dealership agreement also requires Premier to "develop, maintain and direct a trained, quality" vehicle sales organization and service organization.
Premier was incorporated by Ford under a dealer development program designed to increase minority ownership...
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