Ford v. State, No. 05-04-01819-CR (TX 3/22/2006)
| Decision Date | 22 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-04-01819-CR.,05-04-01819-CR. |
| Parties | ROBERT CHARLES FORD, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F04-51494-WJ.
Affirmed.
Before Justices BRIDGES, FRANCIS, and LANG-MIERS.
Robert Charles Ford appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine. In four issues, he argues (1) the trial court should have sua sponte conducted an informal inquiry into his competency to stand trial, (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a competency hearing, (3) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient, and (4) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence and by overruling his objections to the admission of certain evidence. We affirm.
On April 28, 2004, the Dallas Police Department received a complaint about prostitution and drug activity at 517 East 12th Street. Drug task force officers Chris Wagner and Andrew Ortiz drove by the address, a two-story house converted into an apartment complex, but did not stop. A few hours later, the six members of the task force, in three marked squad cars, drove by the area. Wagner and Ortiz were in the lead car and saw activity consistent with a hand-to-hand drug transaction between two males at the gate in front of the complex. The officers drove past the complex, stopped quickly, and jumped out to question the suspects. Both suspects ran. Charles Henry ran into the apartment complex and locked the door; the other suspect escaped. Wagner and Ortiz pursued Henry into the apartment where they saw Henry and Ford, the owner of the apartment complex, exit a room on the downstairs level. Henry was placed in custody for evading arrest. Ortiz conducted a protective sweep of the area for the officers' safety and discovered in plain view 2.8 grams of cocaine packaged in 18 small ziplock bags. Ford said he owned the complex, was in the process of renovating it, and no one lived there but him.
After finding the cocaine in plain view, the officers called for a canine unit and a search warrant for the rest of the complex. With warrant in hand, the officers began their search of the complex. They found 2.8 "net ounces" of marijuana packaged in 22 "dime bags" in a nearby downstairs room. Upstairs, in what was described as Ford's bedroom, the canine alerted to the odor of narcotics on a bag. Inside the bag officers found $3,797 in cash, mostly in one-dollar denominations. A nine millimeter handgun, a rifle, and a loaded .357 magnum revolver were also seized from Ford's upstairs apartment.
Ford moved to suppress the cocaine seized in plain view and the marijuana, guns, and cash seized pursuant to the warrant. The trial court denied the motion to suppress the cocaine. The court initially granted the motion to suppress the marijuana, guns, and cash, but this evidence was later admitted in trial. Ford was convicted of unlawful possession of one gram or more but less than four grams of cocaine, a third-degree felony, and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.102 & 481.115(c) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2005).
In his first and second issues, Ford argues the trial court should have conducted an informal inquiry into his competency to stand trial and that his counsel was ineffective for not requesting an inquiry. We review a trial court's decision not to conduct a competency inquiry for an abuse of discretion. See Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1216 (2000). A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a)(1) & (2) (Vernon Supp. 2005). If evidence suggesting a person may be incompetent to stand trial comes to the attention of the court, the court on its own motion shall conduct an informal inquiry into whether "there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial." Id. art. 46B.004(b) & (c).1
Ford argues that evidence suggesting he may have been incompetent to stand trial came to the court's attention on three occasions: prior to trial, during the guilt/innocence phase, and during the punishment phase.
Before the trial began, Ford complained to the court about his appointed attorney and asked the court to declare the attorney ineffective. Ford said his attorney was "radical" and "hostile" and did not have his best interest at heart because his attorney tried to coerce him to take a plea offer for deferred adjudication. Ford interpreted the plea offer as an attempt to cover up the facts, and he wanted a jury trial to make sure the truth was told. On appeal, Ford contends this demonstrated an inability to communicate and cooperate with his attorney and should have caused the court to conduct an informal inquiry into his competency to stand trial.
Although Ford did not articulate his complaint well, from our review of the record, Ford understood what was happening. He said he was the one who had to do the time (if convicted), and he should have the right to a fair trial. When the court advised Ford that no one could make him plead guilty, Ford responded, "That's what I am saying . . . The use of force is what I'm stressing." And the record demonstrates that Ford was able to communicate with his attorney, although he disagreed with and disregarded his attorney's advice at times. See Reed v. State, 112 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) (); Burks v. State, 792 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd) ().
Ford did not follow his attorney's advice not to testify in the guilt/innocence phase of trial. His attorney advised him that evidence of several prior convictions would be admissible to impeach him if he took the witness stand. Ford said he understood but insisted on testifying to "clarify some of what they are telling you that is totally wrong." During his testimony, Ford appeared to understand the questions and answered them responsively. He even corrected the attorneys at times when he thought they were confused about the way things happened. However, now Ford contends he "exhibited bazaar [sic] and delusional behavior" during his testimony when he testified that the police planted the drugs in his apartment, that he had seen the prosecutor at his apartment spying on him, and that he kept the bag of cash because he was a "registered gambler."
Ford's decision not to follow his attorney's advice could as easily support a conclusion that he was competent as that he was incompetent. Arnold v. State, 873 S.W.2d 27, 36-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 830 (1994). And although his testimony may not have been credible, it did not indicate Ford was incompetent as that term is defined under article 46B.003. See Eddie v. State, 100 S.W.3d 437, 444 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. ref'd) ().
In the punishment phase of trial, Ford's daughter and sister testified that Ford was diagnosed with schizophrenia about seven or eight years earlier. His daughter testified she takes him to the "MHMR" regularly and that Ford takes two medications, a sleeping pill and Celexon, which she testified is also a sleeping pill. She said Ford had not taken his medications during the trial. And she asked the jury to be lenient so that Ford could get psychological help. But there was no evidence that any of the medications Ford was taking were "powerful mood and mind altering medications, given only to those who are most seriously ill and given by only a doctor or psychiatrist," as Ford now claims.2 And evidence of mental impairment alone is insufficient to constitute incompetency. Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 395-96 (); Grider v. State, 69 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (no evidence of incompetency even though defendant diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia five years earlier, still on medications, and testified to hearing voices and seeing visions).
After a thorough review of the record, we found no evidence of recent severe mental illness, moderate retardation, or bizarre acts such that would require the trial court, sua sponte, to conduct an informal inquiry into Ford's competency. See McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (). We overrule Ford's first issue.
As a result, we cannot conclude that Ford's attorney was ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing. Wilkerson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 542, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). We overrule Ford's second issue.
In his third issue, Ford complains the evidence is legally and factually...
To continue reading
Request your trial