Forest v. State
| Decision Date | 22 May 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 40350,40350 |
| Citation | 76 Wn.2d 84,455 P.2d 368 |
| Parties | In re the Welfare of Bruce David Forest. Bruce David FOREST, Lee Jennings and Maxine Jennings, his wife, Petitioners, v. STATE of Washington, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Bovy, Graham, Cohen, Munro & Wampold, Norman W. Cohen, Seattle, for appellants.
Charles O. Carroll, Pros. Atty., Robert S. Bryan, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.
*
David Bruce Forest, born July 9, 1950, was brought before the juvenile department of the Superior Court of King County on April 26, 1968, and the hearing resulted in a conclusion of delinquency based upon 10 burglaries, 1 larceny and 2 acts of malicious destruction of property. As a result of the juvenile court's findings and conclusions, David Forest was committed to the Department of Institutions.
Petitioner was arrested at his home with a companion. At the time of the arrests the boys were told by one of the officers:
(T)hey had a right to remain silent, that anything that they did say could be used against them in a court of law, that both boys had the right to an attorney of their own choosing; and if they or their parents could not pay for an attorney, one would be provided to them by the State.
The warning was repeated, and the officer then asked the boys if they understood what they were being told and they replied that they did. Thereafter petitioner admitted participation in the crimes which were the basis of the finding of delinquency. At the juvenile hearing the arresting officer testified as to petitioner's admissions. The sole issue raised by petitioner's writ of certiorari is whether admissions made by him at the time of his arrest were erroneously admitted into evidence at his juvenile hearing.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) the United States Supreme Court designated the procedural safeguards necessary to protect an individual's privilege against self-incrimination. The court observed that once an individual was in custody and subject to questioning, his privilege against self-incrimination was jeopardized. In order to protect this privilege the court stated at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Our first inquiry is whether the interrogation procedure required by Miranda is applicable to juvenile questioning as well. The leading case with regard to juvenile rights is In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). While Gault deals with the adjudicatory stage of juvenile proceedings, the court's broad language concerning a juvenile's privilege against self-incrimination can be applied to the pre-adjudicatory, investigation stage. In discussing this privilege the court stated at 47, 49 and 55, 87 S.Ct. at 1454, 1455, 1458:
It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children. The language of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is unequivocal and without exception. And the scope of the privilege is comprehensive. As Mr. Justice White, concurring, stated in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 94, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1611, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964):
'The privilege can be claimed in Any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory. * * * it protects Any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend Could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used.' (Emphasis added.)
It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all statements by juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead to 'criminal' involvement. In the first place, juvenile proceedings to determine 'delinquency,' which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as 'criminal' for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. * * *
We conclude that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults.
We believe that Gault requires a juvenile be afforded the same protection that is given an adult during custodial interrogation; namely that the Miranda warnings be given. Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817 (Tex.1968); In re Creek, 243 A.2d 49 (D.C.App.1968). See Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash.Dec.2d 272, 438 P.2d 205 (1968); In re Fletcher, 251 Md. 520, 248 A.2d 364 (1968); But See State v. Kramer, 72 Wash.2d 904, 435 P.2d 970 (1967). In the instant case petitioner had been placed under arrest prior to questioning, was definitely in custody, and was entitled to a Miranda warning. The warning he was given failed to comply with Miranda v. Arizona, Supra, in one respect; he was not told that he had the right to the presence of an attorney prior to any questioning. We therefore hold that the juvenile judge erred in admitting petitioner's admissions into evidence.
The question we now face is whether the fact that the admission was invalid requires a reversal of the judgment of the juvenile court. We are not here concerned with the prejudice to a defendant of the introduction into evidence of an invalid confession before a jury in a criminal trial. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The informal instant proceedings were conducted before a juvenile judge only. We recognize that there is a difference between the effect of error committed before a jury and that committed before a judge. See State v. Jefferson, 74 Wash.Dec.2d 793, 446 P.2d 971 (1968). It is also recognized in this state that a hearing to determine delinquency is not a criminal proceeding, Estes v. Hopp, Supra, and an order adjudicating a child delinquent is not deemed a criminal conviction. RCW 13.04.240. Because juvenile proceedings are civil, rather than criminal, we have held that a finding of delinquency must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence only; the normal evidentiary standard used in civil cases. State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court, 139 Wash. 1, 245 P. 409, 45 A.L.R. 1530 (1926). It must be pointed out that, while this was the rule at the time of the instant proceedings and so governs them, it is no longer the rule. Pursuant to Juvenile Court Rule 4.4(b), RCW vol. 0, effective January 10, 1969, the degree of proof required in a fact finding hearing on a petition alleging...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. S.J.C.
... ... The Supreme Court held in 1970 that the standard of proof for a juvenile offender proceeding must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Washington had already adopted that standard by court rule. In re Welfare of Forest, 76 Wash.2d 84, 87, 455 P.2d 368 (1969). When the Supreme Court determined that a jury trial was not constitutionally required, the Washington Legislature was with the majority of states that had already reached the same conclusion. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 54849 & nn. 78, 91 S.Ct. 1976. 36 ... ...
-
State v. Lanning
... ... (Citations omitted.) ... Appellant argues that State v. Davis, 73 Wash.2d 271, 438 P.2d 185 (1968); State v. Tetzlaff, 75 Wash.2d 649, 453 P.2d ... Page 432 ... 638 (1969); In re Forest v. State, 76 Wash.2d 84, 455 P.2d 368 (1969); State v. Creach,77 Wash.2d 194, 461 P.2d 329 (1969); and State v. Erho, 77 Wash.2d 553, 463 P.2d 779 (1970), are controlling and compel a reversal. Appellant's confidence in the five cases referred to is misplaced. In Davis, the court noted that even ... ...
-
Noble's Welfare, In re, 3775--I
... ... See generally, L. Schwerin, The Juvenile Court, Revolution in Washington, 44 Wash.L.Rev. 421 (1969). As our State Supreme Court has noted with respect to Gault, 'the altruistic concept ... embodied in the spirit of the 19th century juvenile court acts have run ... Further, a juvenile must be afforded the same protections that are given to an adult during interrogation. In re Forest, 76 Wash.2d 84, 86, 455 P.2d 368 (1969) ... Of equal note are some changes which Gault has Not wrought. It continues to be the ... ...
-
Statewright v. State
... ... Tetzlaff, 75 Wash.2d 649, 453 P.2d 638 (1969); cf. United States v. Cusumano, 429 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 400 U.S. 830, 91 S.Ct. 61, 27 L.Ed.2d 61 (1970); United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d ... 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 400 U.S. 907, 91 S.Ct. 150, 27 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970); In re Forest v. State, 76 Wash.2d 84, 455 P.2d 368 (1969) ... In the case sub judice, the defendant after being taken to the police station was advised that he did not have to say anything; that anything he said could be used against him in a court of law; that he would not be mistreated in any ... ...