Fort Worth Steel & Machinery Co. v. Norsworthy
Decision Date | 27 July 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 1157,1157 |
Citation | 570 S.W.2d 132 |
Parties | FORT WORTH STEEL AND MACHINERY COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. Michael Darby NORSWORTHY, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Michael L. Dunn, Kenley, Boyland, Hawthorn, Starr & Coghlan, Larry W. Starr, Mathew Dove, Roberts, Harbour, Smith, Harris, French & Ritter, Otto A. Ritter, Longview, for appellants.
Rick McPherson, Crawford Parker, Jr., Carthage, for appellee.
This is a venue action in which the appellants have appealed from an order overruling their pleas of privilege.
Appellee, plaintiff in the court below, instituted this action in the 123rd District Court of Panola County, Texas against Fort Worth Steel & Machinery Company, hereafter referred to as "Fort Worth Steel," and Refrigeration Engineering Corporation, hereafter referred to as "Refrigeration."
This suit arises out of personal injuries allegedly sustained by Michael Darby Norsworthy, appellee, at the Rite-Care Poultry Processing Plant in Panola County, Texas on December 21, 1971. On that date, appellee was working alone in the "ice house" of the Rite-Care plant. A screw-type conveyor system in the "ice house" was utilized to carry ice to other portions of the plant. A grill, consisting of four 1/2 steel bars, covered the trench in which the conveyor was located. As the appellee stood on the grill, it suddenly "gave way" and his right leg became entangled in the conveyor below, severing it four inches below the hip.
The conveyor system and grill were designed and manufactured by Fort Worth Steel prior to being sold to Refrigeration, who then installed the system and grill in the Rite-Care plant. Appellee first seeks recovery for his personal injuries against both appellants on the grounds of strict liability in tort, alleging that the conveyor system and grill were defectively designed so as to be unreasonably dangerous. Additionally, appellee alleges that Refrigeration is liable for negligent installation of the system.
Both appellants filed pleas of privilege; Fort Worth Steel to be sued in Tarrant County, Texas and Refrigeration to be sued in Bexar County, Texas. Appellee, by his amended controverting plea, asserted that venue was properly placed in Panola County, Texas on the basis of sections 9a, 23, and 29a of Article 1995, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. However, in his brief appellee waived his allegation that venue is proper in Panola County, Texas under section 29a. The venue hearing was before the court without a jury and the trial court overruled both pleas of privilege. Appeal therefrom has been timely perfected to this court by both Refrigeration and Fort Worth Steel. No findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested by any party and none were filed.
Appellants, Fort Worth Steel and Refrigeration, contend in their briefs that venue is not properly placed in Panola County, Texas under section 23 of Article 1995, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. Refrigeration also asserts that venue may not be maintained in Panola County, Texas against them under section 9a. It is uncontroverted that the residence of Fort Worth Steel is Tarrant County, Texas and that the principal place of business and residence of Refrigeration is Bexar County, Texas.
The general rule of venue is that a defendant must be sued in the county of his domicile. In order to defeat the defendant's plea of privilege to be sued in the domiciliary county, the burden is on the plaintiff to plead and Prove by a preponderance of the competent evidence that the case comes within one of the statutory exceptions. Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232, 88 S.W.2d 91 (Tex.Comm.App.1935, approved); Berry v. Pierce Petroleum Corporation, 120 Tex. 452, 39 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.Comm.App.1931, approved); General Motors Corporation v. Courtesy Pontiac, Inc., 538 S.W.2d 3 ( ); Beall Brothers, Inc. v. Benton, 478 S.W.2d 157 ( ); Ideal Baking Company v. Boyd,417 S.W.2d 613 ( ); Admiral Motor Hotel of Texas, Inc. v. Community Inns of America, Inc., 389 S.W.2d 694 ( ).
The burden imposed upon the plaintiff is one which is predicated on the belief that the defendant's right to be sued in the county of his domicile is an invaluable right and this right will be vitiated only when the evidence clearly supports the maintenance of venue in some other county. The right to be sued in one's own county is a right jealously guarded by the court and exceptions to the general rule must clearly appear. Unless the plaintiff clearly discharges his burden of proof, the defendant is entitled to have the case transferred to the county of his domicile. Goodrich v. Superior Oil Company, 150 Tex. 159, 237 S.W.2d 969 (1951); Burtis v. Butler Bro's.,148 Tex. 543, 226 S.W.2d 825 (1950); Seldon v. Green, 498 S.W.2d 285 ( ); Admiral Motor Hotel of Texas, Inc. v. Community Inns of America, Inc., supra.
The venue facts which the plaintiff must allege and prove to defeat a plea of privilege are those stated in the particular exception of Article 1995 applicable to the cause of action as alleged. The burden is on the plaintiff to establish those venue facts by a preponderance of the competent evidence. Wire Rope Corporation of America, Inc. v. Barner, 446 S.W.2d 361 ( ). A prima facie case, alone, is not sufficient. Compton v. Elliott, supra; Lynch v. Millican, 304 S.W.2d 410 ( ). Venue may not be established by the plaintiff on the basis of mere implication. Burtis v. Butler Bro's, supra; Socony Mobil Company, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 518 S.W.2d 257 ( ); Reynolds & Huff v. White, 378 S.W.2d 923 ( ); Key v. Davis, 554 S.W.2d 60 ( ); T. L. James & Company v. Waldrep, 385 S.W.2d 866 ( ); Ideal Baking Company v. Boyd, supra. This requirement is supported by considerations of public policy grounded upon the premise that otherwise it would be too easy by mere allegation and statements of conclusion to defeat the defendant's right to be sued at his domicile. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, Vol. 1 sec. 4.55(b), pp. 612, 613.
Appellee in the instant case relies, in part, upon section 23 of the venue statute. No attempt was made to plead or prove that either appellant had its principal office in Panola County, Texas; or that either had an agent or representative in such county. Venue, therefore, may be maintained in Panola County under section 23 only by establishing that the "cause of action or part thereof" arose in that county. Prior to reaching the question of where the "cause of action or part thereof" arose, it must first be determined whether or not the appellee, by a preponderance of the competent evidence, established that he did in fact have a cause of action against appellants. Wire Rope Corporation of America, Inc. v. Barner, supra. Unless there is, in fact, a cause of action, there could be no "part thereof" arising anywhere. Admiral Motor Hotel of Texas, Inc. v. Community Inns of America, Inc., supra.
Appellee first seeks to impose liability on both appellants based on strict liability in tort. In order to sustain his burden of proof, the appellee was required to establish that: (1) appellant sold the product in a defective condition, (2) the product reached the appellee without substantial change, and (3) the defective condition of the product caused the injury to appellee. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.1967); John Deere Company v. Ramirez, 503 S.W.2d 382 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1973, writ dism'd); Wright v. Climatic Air Sales, Inc., 527 S.W.2d 518 ( ). The Supreme Court stated in Technical Chemical Company v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.1972): "(i)n strict liability cases, proof of negligence is excused; but neither Section 402A (Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)), nor our former decisions have excused proof that the defect in the product was the cause of the injuries." Proof of causation is a necessary element of a strict liability case. Technical Chemical Company v. Jacobs, supra; Pittsburgh Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Pittsburgh v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.1969); Darryl v. Ford Motor Company, 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.1969); Menking v. Bishman Manufacturing Company, 496 S.W.2d 762 ( ).
Appellants contend that the court below erred in overruling their pleas of privilege because there is no evidence to support the maintenance of venue in Panola County, Texas under section 23 of Article 1995, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. In determining this "no evidence" point, it is the duty of this court to look only to the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which are favorable to the judgment of the court below. General Motors Corporation v Courtesy Pontiac, Inc., supra; Ralston Purina Company v. Wiseman, 467 S.W.2d 669 ( ); Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence Points of Error," 38 Texas L.Rev. 361, 364 (1960).
In the instant case, appellee called Dr. Bart Childs, a professor of mechanical engineering at Texas A & M University, as an expert witness. Dr. Childs testified that the grill and conveyor system had a number of design defects which rendered them defective and unreasonably dangerous. There was also evidence presented from which it could be concluded that the grill and conveyor system reached the appellee in a substantially unchanged condition. The appellee failed, however, to prove any causal link between the design defects established by the testimony of Dr. Childs and the resulting injuries.
The appellee testified in his deposition that the bar, upon...
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Ayres v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
...actionably defective. See, e.g., Simien v. S.S. Kresge Co., 566 F.2d 551 (5th Cir.1978); Fort Worth Steel & Mach. Co. v. Norsworthy, 570 S.W.2d 132 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1978, writ dism'd w.o.j.). But the plaintiff need not establish the specific feature which made the product defective. V. ......
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...the use of two boomers was not a producing cause of the accident. The recent case of Fort Worth Steel and Machinery Co. v. Norsworthy, 570 S.W.2d 132 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1978, writ dism'd w. o. j.), expressed the law in strict liability cases: Appellees first seek to impose liability on bot......
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...the plaintiff must show that the product reached plaintiff without substantial change. Fort Worth Steel and Machinery Co. v. Norsworthy, 570 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1978, writ dism'd); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (1965). Thus, in the present case, we con......