Frances Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Burlington Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 17,17
• Citation: 285 N.C. 344,14 UCC Rep. 1110,204 S.E.2d 834
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: , 72 A.L.R.3d 466, 14 UCC Rep.Serv. 1110 FRANCES HOSIERY MILLS, INCORPORATED v. BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED.

Page 834

204 S.E.2d 834

285 N.C. 344, 72 A.L.R.3d 466, 14 UCC

Rep.Serv. 1110

FRANCES HOSIERY MILLS, INCORPORATED v. BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED.

No. 17.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 15, 1974.

Sanders, Holt & Spencer by W. Clary Holt, James C. Spencer, Jr. and Frank A. Longest, Jr., Burlington, for defendant appellant.

Latham, Pickard, Cooper & Ennis by Thomas D. Cooper, Jr., Burlington, for plaintiff appellee.

LAKE, Justice.

Article IV, § 1, of the Constitution of the United States provides:

'Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Act, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.'

By an Act of Congress, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738, the manner in which judicial proceedings in the court of any state are to be proved in other courts within the United States is established and it is provided that judicial proceedings, so authenticated, 'shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States * * * as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State * * * from which they are taken.'

As was said by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577:

'The implications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution, first received the sharp analysis of this Court in Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. (U.S.) 457, 21 L.Ed. 897. * * * Thompson v. Whitman made it clear that the doctrine of Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481, 3 L.Ed. 411 (i.e., the judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity and effect in every other court of the United States which it had in the state where it was pronounced) comes into operation only when, in the language of Kent, 'the jurisdiction of the court in another state is not impeached, either as to the subject matter or the person.' Only then is 'the record of the judgment * * * entitled to full faith and credit.' 1 Kent, Commentaries (2d ed., 1832), 261 n.b. * * *

'A judgment in one State is conclusive upon the merits in every other State, but only if the court of the first State had power to pass on the merits--had jurisdiction, that is, to render the judgment.'

The judgment rendered by the New York Court in the present matter is a judgment In personam. Such a judgment is void if the court which rendered it did not have jurisdiction both as to the person and as to the subject matter of the action before it. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not give validity to such void judgment when it is offered as a basis for action, or as a defense, in the court of another state. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221; New York et rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133; Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 32 S.Ct. 641, 56 L.Ed. 1009; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565; Thompson v. Whitman, supra; Marketing Systems v. Realty Co., 277 N.C. 230, 176 S.E.2d 775; Thomas v. Frosty Morn Meats, 266 N.C. 523, 146 S.E.2d 397.

'It is elementary that unless one named as a defendant has been brought into court in some way sanctioned by law, or makes a voluntary appearance in person or by attorney, the court has no jurisdiction of the person and judgment (in personam) rendered against him is void.' Thomas v. Frosty Morn Meats, supra; Pennoyer v. Neff, supra. When suit is brought upon a judgment In personam rendered by a court of another state, or when such judgment is pleaded as a defense, the burden is upon such person resisting such judgment to establish that the court rendering it had no jurisdiction, Thomas v. Frosty Morn Meats, supra, and the jurisdiction of such court is to be determined by the law of the state wherein the judgment was rendered. Marketing Systems v. Realty Co., supra; Dansby v. Insurance Co., 209 N.C. 127, 183 S.E. 521.

However, a mere recital in the judgment that the court rendering it had jurisdiction is not conclusive and, notwithstanding such recital, the court of another state, in which the judgment is asserted as a cause of action, or as a defense, may, within limits noted below, make its own independent inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court which rendered the judgment. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., supra; Brown v. Fletcher's Estate, 210 U.S. 82, 28 S.Ct. 702, 52 L.Ed. 966; Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 23 S.Ct. 237, 47 L.Ed. 366; Thormann v. Frame, 176 U.S. 350, 20 S.Ct. 446, 44 L.Ed. 500; Pennoyer v. Neff, supra; Thompson v. Whitman, supra. As Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, said in Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 37 S.Ct. 492, 61 L.Ed. 966: 'A court that renders judgment against a defendant thereby tacitly asserts, if it does not do so expressly, that it has jurisdiction over that defendant. But it must be taken to be established that a court cannot conclude all persons interested by its mere assertion of its own power, Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L.Ed. 897, even where its power depends upon a fact and it finds the fact. * * * There is no doubt of the general proposition that, in a suit upon a judgment, the jurisdiction of the court rendering it over the person of the defendant may be inquired into.'

Of course, jurisdiction is, itself, an issue which may have been fully litigated in, and determined by, the court which rendered the judgment thereafter pleaded as a cause of action, or as a defense, in a court of another state, as where the defendant therein was actually present in the first court and raised and litigated therein a question concerning the fact and validity of the service of its process upon the defendant.

In Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S.Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d 186, the petitioners sued in a Nebraska court to quiet title to certain bottom land on the Missouri River. The Nebraska court had jurisdiction of the subject matter if, but only if, the land was in Nebraska. That depended upon whether a shift in the river's course was due to accretion or avulsion. The respondent appeared in the Nebraska court and fully litigated the issues, including a contest of the jurisdiction of the Nebraska court over the subject matter of the controversy. The Nebraska court found the issues in favor of the petitioners and ordered title quieted in them. The respondent thereafter filed suit in Missouri to quiet title of the same land in her. That suit was removed to the Federal Court because of diversity of citizenship. The question arose as to whether the Federal Court in Missouri (in the same position as a State court in this respect) could inquire into the jurisdiction of the Nebraska court over the subject matter. The District Court held that the Nebraska judgment on this question was Res judicata. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a Missouri court could inquire into the jurisdiction of the Nebraska court over the subject matter of the Nebraska action. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, saying, through Mr. Justice Stewart:

'(W)hile it is established that a court in one State, when asked to give effect to the judgment of a court in another State, may constitutionally inquire into the foreign court's jurisdiction to render that judgment, the modern decisions of this Court have carefully delineated the permissible scope of such an inquiry. From these decisions there emerges the general rule that a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit--even as to questions of jurisdiction--when the second court's inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment.

'With respect to questions of jurisdiction over the person, this principle was unambiguously established in Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 71 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244. There it was held that a federal court in Iowa must give binding effect to the judgment of a federal court in Missouri despite the claim that the original court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant's person, once it was shown to the court in Iowa that that question had been fully litigated in the Missouri forum. 'Public policy,' said the Court, 'dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the results of the contest; and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties. We see no reason why this doctrine should not apply in every case where one voluntarily appears, presents his case and is fully heard, and why he should not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter concluded by the judgment of the tribunal to which he had submitted his cause.' * * *

'Following the Baldwin case, this Court soon made clear in a series of decisions that the general rule is no different when the claim is made that the original forum did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.'

In the Durfee case, a footnote by the Court states: 'It is not disputed in the present case that the Nebraska courts had jurisdiction over the respondent's person. She entered a general...